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ABSTRACT

Therapist Mentalization and Patient Outcomes in the First Year of Psychotherapy
by
Michael V. Palumbo

Advisor: Diana Diamond, Ph.D.

This study examined associations between therapist mentalization and patient outcomes
in the first year of psychotherapy. Mentalization is the implicit and explicit consideration of
mental states—one’s own as well as others’—and how such states mediate a person’s
experiences in the world. It is conceptualized as existing on a scale of increasing complexity.
This study sought to extend developmental research that has illustrated the positive influence of a
parent’s mentalization on a child’s emotional well-being. Specifically, it was proposed that
psychotherapy cases with high levels of therapist mentalization would have better patient
outcomes than those with low levels of therapist mentalization.
To test this hypothesis, 17 therapy cases at a community clinic were followed for one
year. In each case, the therapist completed the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—
Revised (PT-AAI-R) four months into treatment. From these interviews, each therapist’s level of
mentalization was obtained via the Reflective Functioning (RF) Scale, which is a method for
assessing the quality of mentalization in a narrative. This yielded a Therapist RF score for each
case. Patient outcomes were assessed at baseline and 12 months. The patient outcomes assessed
were symptoms that have been related to low mentalization—externalizing symptoms, emotion
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dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity. Changes in these symptoms
were expected to relate to Therapist RF scores.
Results indicated that Therapist RF was not related to symptom changes in the full
sample. However, for patients with high levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline, high
Therapist RF was associated with better outcomes in this symptom area. This was not the case
for patients with low levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline. This finding suggests that
Therapist RF might be particularly important in therapy with patients who have high levels of
emotion dysregulation. Additionally, Therapist RF was elevated in the context of elevated
personality pathology in patients, which suggests that high levels of personality pathology might
be a catalyst for high Therapist RF, though Therapist RF was not associated with better outcomes
for this symptom. A qualitative analysis of the PT-AAI-Rs of two therapists who each completed
two interviews was performed. This analysis illustrated that Therapist RF scores were influenced
by both the patient and the therapist in the dyads.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
While psychotherapy research supports the efficacy of a variety of treatment approaches
(American Psychological Association, 2013), the evidence for how therapy works is less robust.
Many clinical trials do not provide direct evidence for the mechanisms assumed to be responsible
for patient improvements (Kazdin, 2007; Mander et al., 2015). This is notable, as knowledge of
the mechanisms responsible for therapeutic change has implications for therapist training and
clinical practice.
A construct that has the potential to expand the existing knowledge of therapeutic change
mechanisms is mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). Mentalization refers to the implicit and
explicit consideration of mental states—one’s own as well as others’—and how such states
mediate a person’s experiences in the world (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 1991). It
is conceptualized as existing on a scale of increasing complexity, and higher levels of
mentalization include qualities such as the following: an awareness that mental states can be
opaque and that our understanding of others and even ourselves is incomplete; an understanding
that there is value in developing plausible mental-state-oriented explanations for behavior, even
though such explanations might be incorrect; and an understanding that thoughts and feelings
about a certain person or situation can change over time, even if that person or situation has not
noticeably changed (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). Preliminary findings suggest that
one’s level of mentalization is influenced by context and by the subject of one’s mentalizing
(Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998).
Moderate to high levels of mentalization have been associated with a number of interrelated
benefits, such as effective emotion regulation, integration of one’s self-representation, effective
social communication, and mental flexibility and resilience (Allison & Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy,
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Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a; Fonagy, Luyten,
Allison, & Campbell, 2017b). Conversely, low levels of mentalization have been linked with
many forms of psychopathology—e.g., externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation,
personality pathology, and attachment insecurity (Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy et al., 1998;
Fonagy et al., 1996; Lecours, Briand-Malenfant, & Descheneaux, 2013; Levy et al., 2006b;
Stover & Kiselica, 2014).
Increasing patients’ capacity for mentalization is currently hypothesized to be a
mechanism of change in a variety of psychotherapeutic interventions, including several that have
had success in reducing the forms of psychopathology mentioned above (e.g., Bales et al., 2014;
Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Diamond et al., 2013; Goodman, 2013; Lecours et al., 2013; Levy et
al., 2006b; Petersen et al., 2010). Notably, a recent study by De Meulemeester, Vansteelandt,
Luyten, and Lowyck (2018) found that increases in patients’ levels of mentalization during a
treatment for borderline personality disorder accounted for a large proportion of the reductions in
symptoms observed, a finding that provides support for this being a mechanism of change.
Overall, the mentalization construct has already advanced the field’s understanding of
psychotherapy processes and outcomes, and it is a construct with considerable promise for future
research.
However, while patient mentalization has been studied as a marker and mechanism of
therapeutic change across different types of psychotherapies, relatively few studies of
mentalization in clinical settings have investigated the role of therapist mentalization. This
omission is notable given the central role that therapist mentalization likely occupies in a variety
of approaches to psychotherapy (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2018; Jurist, 2018). It is possible
that therapist mentalization is related to the beneficial outcomes experienced by patients in many
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types of therapies—even those that do not view improvements in patient mentalization as a
putative mechanism of change.
Indirect evidence for the relevance of therapist mentalization for patient outcomes can be
found in the developmental literature, which gives mentalization an important role in the
relationship between a caregiver and a child. In studies of mother-child dyads, levels of maternal
mentalization have been positively related to children’s attachment security (Fonagy et al., 1991;
Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005). Conversely, levels of maternal
mentalization have been inversely related to the incidence of hostile and intrusive parenting
behaviors (e.g., Ensink, Rousseau, Biberdzic, Bégin, & Normandin, 2017; Grienenberger, Kelly,
& Slade, 2005; Stacks et al., 2014). Synthesizing a range of theory and empirical research,
Gergely and Unoka (2008) have drawn a direct line from caregiver mentalization to early forms
of mentalization in infants. Specifically, they assert a caregiver’s marked mirroring of their
infant’s affect states—an activity that requires the caregiver’s mentalization—leads to the
creation of secondary representations of affect states for the infant. They argue that this is the
foundation of the infant’s future mentalizing as well as their sense of agency and efficacy in the
world. Along these lines, studies have found associations between levels of mentalization in
caregivers and children at later stages of childhood—e.g., preadolescence and adolescence
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015;
Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Additionally, multiple writers have argued that interactions
in which “being mentalized about (by others) spurs the evolution of mentalizing (by the self)”
(Jurist, 2018, p. 45) are not limited to childhood attachment relationships but also occur later in
life—and in an individual’s broader social world (Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a;
Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017b; Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). However,
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it is also believed that early attachment relationships are critical in the development of the
capacity for mentalization; specifically, dysfunctional parental behaviors in early attachments
(i.e., those that are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative, abusive, or neglectful) adversely affect
a young child’s ability to mentalize later in life (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). The
adverse effect of these behaviors would be, at least in part, through damaging the young child’s
epistemic trust—i.e., their openness to receiving new information from others, undergirded by a
sense that such information might be generalizable to the self (Jurist, 2018).
Extending the empirical findings and theory presented above to the patient-therapist
relationship, and viewing the therapist as operating within a caregiving role, a therapist’s
mentalization might have bearing on a patient’s capacity for mentalization. However, some
caution should be exercised when extrapolating from the relationship between a parent and a
young child to the relationship between a therapist and an adult patient. The latter relationship
differs from the former in several important ways, including its scope and its reliance on verbal
versus nonverbal communication (Holmes & Slade, 2018). At the same time, Parish and Eagle
(2003) have found evidence suggesting that therapists assume many of the qualities that
attachment figures do (e.g., “stronger and wiser,” “available and responsive”), and that a
therapist can be an attachment figure for a patient. Holmes and Slade (2018) assert that the
therapist’s role as an attachment figure is responsible for the therapy relationship’s ability to
open a “sensitive period” in a patient’s life—i.e., a period in which substantial personal changes
become possible. Stated another way, the therapy relationship is evocative of a relationship
template that also underlies childhood attachments, and it utilizes that template’s ability to prime
the patient for new learning. This priming might happen via the rekindling of the patient’s
epistemic trust, which would allow the therapist’s mentalizing to stimulate the patient’s
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mentalizing (Jurist, 2018). Overall, the literature suggests that therapist mentalization should
have a role in developing patient mentalization, which, as stated above, is inversely associated
with many types of psychopathology.
To build on the theory and research above, the present study sought empirical evidence
on the relation between a therapist’s capacity to mentalize about a patient and patient symptom
improvement. As mentioned above, mentalization is believed to be influenced by the context in
which it occurs (Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al, 1998); as such, therapist mentalization
should be viewed as a feature of the particular dyad in which it occurs—and one indicator of the
therapeutic process in that dyad. The present study also sought evidence on the types of patient
symptoms that might be related to therapist mentalization as well as evidence on whether
symptom severity plays a role in the relations between therapist mentalization and patient
outcomes. Based on the research cited above, it was expected that therapist mentalization would
be related to reductions in symptoms that have been linked with low mentalization in patients.
Specifically, it was expected that, for these symptoms, higher levels of therapist mentalization
would be associated with better outcomes by facilitating improvements in patient mentalization.
It also was expected that higher levels of therapist mentalization would be more beneficial for
patients with higher symptom levels. This expectation was based on clinical research in which
impairments in mentalization have been more pronounced in the context of greater symptom
severity (e.g., Fischer-Kern et al., 2013; Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011).
It also was based on developmental theory and research suggesting that caregiver mentalization
is more important in the context of a child’s heightened distress or in the context of current or
historic adversity in the family (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgitt, & Target, 1994; Fonagy et al.,
1995).
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The present study sought to address the questions above via a study of 17 psychotherapy
cases over one year of treatment. The cases included in this study were treated at The
Psychological Center, an outpatient clinic in an urban setting in the northeastern United States.
The Psychological Center provides low-cost treatment to a population composed primarily of
persons living in the surrounding community. The treatment offered at The Psychological Center
is predominantly psychodynamic in orientation and typically includes a combination of
expressive and supportive elements tailored to the patient (see Dewald, 1994 for a review of
supportive and expressive elements of therapy). Some cases at The Psychological Center are
conducted as manualized treatments, but most are not manualized. In light of the nonstandardized nature of the treatments in this study, it should be noted that Fonagy and colleagues
have argued that mentalizing is “the most fundamental common factor among psychotherapeutic
treatments” whether or not it is an explicit focus of the therapist (Allen, Fonagy, & Batemen,
2008, p. 1). In this view, therapist mentalization need not be a mechanism of change consciously
employed by the therapist for it to have bearing on the treatment.
To assess therapist mentalization, the therapist of each case in the study completed the
Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al., 2016;
George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996) four months into the treatment. The PT-AAI-R is a semistructured interview that elicits descriptions of the other member of the therapeutic dyad and of
the therapeutic relationship. PT-AAI-Rs were rated for mentalization according to the ReflectiveFunctioning Scale (RF Scale; Fonagy et al., 1998). RF is a narrative-based measure of an
individual’s level of mentalization, and higher RF scores are derived from statements that
communicate either explicitly or implicitly the qualities of mentalization. RF scores range from
-1 (negative reflective function) to 9 (superior reflective function). RF scores derived from the
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PT-AAI-Rs with therapists in this study were referred to as Therapist RF scores as they were
specific to a therapeutic relationship. Patient outcome measures were administered at baseline
and at 12 months of treatment as part of a larger programmatic evaluation study at The
Psychological Center. The outcomes used in this study were the following: externalizing
symptoms from the hostility and paranoid ideation subscales of the Brief Symptom Inventory
(BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991); emotion dysregulation from the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004); personality pathology from the primitive defenses and
identity diffusion subscales of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et
al., 2001); and attachment insecurity from the Experiences in Close Relationships—Relationship
Structures questionnaire (ECR-RS; Fraley et al., 2011).
The present study tested two specific hypotheses. First, that high levels of Therapist RF
would be associated with greater reductions in patients’ externalizing symptoms, emotion
dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity scores over one year of
treatment. Second, that the relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes for each of the
symptoms mentioned above would be moderated by the symptom’s level at baseline;
specifically, Therapist RF would be associated with better outcomes for patients with high levels
of the symptom at baseline, but it would not be associated with better outcomes for patients with
low levels of the symptom at baseline. Additionally, this study included a qualitative analysis of
PT-AAI-R responses to illustrate the ways in which the Therapist RF scores obtained in this
study were influenced by both the patient and the therapist in each dyad.
This study’s results contribute to its overarching goal: to obtain empirical evidence for a
potential mechanism of therapeutic change that may be associated with improvement in specific
patient symptoms. While this study was based on a small sample (N = 17), its findings have the
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potential to generate hypotheses for further research. Also of note, a recent study found that a 30hour mentalization training program for therapists increased levels of therapist mentalization
with regard to hypothetical patients (Ensink et al., 2013). As such, the present study’s results
have implications for therapist training programs.
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review
This study investigated the relation between therapist mentalization and patient outcomes
in psychotherapy. While, to date, this specific research topic has received little attention, it is
supported by a large body of theoretical and empirical work. This literature review seeks to
summarize the findings with relevance for the current study. It is presented in eight sections and
concludes with a statement of this study’s hypotheses. It begins with a section that defines
mentalization and its wide-ranging implications. This section also outlines a variety of personal
and interpersonal problems associated with difficulties in mentalization, which highlights the
importance of therapeutic interventions that would seek to redress such difficulties. The second
section presents the RF Scale (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998), the way mentalization is
most often assessed in research paradigms, which lays the groundwork for the references to
empirical research throughout this literature review. The third section concerns the development
of the capacity for mentalization, which begins in a child’s earliest interactions with a caregiver.
It describes the way a caregiver’s effort to regulate a young child affect states typically entails
the caregiver communicating their mentalizing about the child’s affect states, which, for the
child, creates higher-order representations of those states and stimulates the mechanisms that
underly independent mentalization. The fourth section outlines the ways in which the attachment
system is linked to mentalization—as well as the ways in which the capacity for mentalization is
influenced by the broader social milieu and develops independently of attachment relationships.
The fifth section builds on the prior section but focuses on the caregiving system, which exists in
a reciprocal relationship with the attachment system and organizes a caregiver’s role in
attachment relationships. This section details some ways in which the functioning of the
caregiving system interacts with a caregiver’s ability to mentalize in such relationships, and it
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presents empirical findings associated with caregiver mentalization. The sixth section introduces
clinical research on mentalization, which shows that low RF is an important marker of
psychopathology, and that increasing RF is hypothesized to be a mechanism of change in several
treatments—particularly those for personality pathology. The seventh section concerns
mentalization specifically within the patient-therapist relationship, and the ways in which it
interacts with the attachment and caregiving systems of the patient and therapist. It describes the
ways in which a therapist’s caregiving differs from the caregiving provided in other types of
attachment relationships. It also describes some factors that contribute to a therapist’s state of
mind with respect to their role as therapist—factors that are unique to the therapist role. Finally,
it presents preliminary findings on Therapist RF (i.e., a therapist’s ability to mentalize about a
particular patient) for the mentalization and attachment security of patients. The eighth and final
section considers, in light of the theory and research in this chapter, psychotherapy outcomes that
should be related to Therapist RF.

Mentalization and its importance in everyday life
The construct of mentalization was elaborated by Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy, Steele,
Steele, Moran, & Higgit, 1991), who defined it as mental activity informed by the knowledge
that we—and others—have a variety of mental states, and that mental states mediate a person’s
experiences of the world and behaviors within it. Subsumed within the activity of mentalization
is a recognition of intentional mental states in self and other—i.e., that behaviors are extensions
of underlying thoughts and feelings, not simply reactions to precipitating events in the physical
world (Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). Mentalization also entails
the elaboration of mental experiences via higher-order representations of those experiences;
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these representations are separate from, and more amenable to revision, than the initial
impressions left by the experiences that they represent (see Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, &
Campbell, 2017a). Further, the activity of mentalization entails the creation of links between
various higher-order representations within the mind—and between one’s own mental activity
and the hypothesized mental states of others (Fonagy, Target, Steel, & Steel, 1998). An
implication of this is that the mentalizing mind incorporates, in its views of its own mental states,
relevant thoughts or feelings that others might be having with regard to the self (Fonagy et al.,
1991).
The definition of mentalization provided above draws from several bodies of knowledge
and traditions of thought (Fonagy et al., 1998). The term was first used in the 1950s within the
French school of psychosomatics (see Jurist, 2018 for a review). Members of this school, such as
Pierre Marty, provided descriptions of patients who were poor mentalizers; such patients
produced tangential speech that contained few higher-order representations—and few indicators
of individuality or fantasy life (Marty & M’Uzan, 1963). Mentalization also has roots in
psychoanalytic concepts such as Freud’s “Bindung” (i.e., linking; Freud, 1911) and Bion’s
“alpha function” (Bion, 1962) as well as the more recent literature on theory of mind (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke,
1989; Morton & Frith, 1995) and metacognition in the context of attachment (see Main, 1991).
While the present-day construct of mentalization has clear relationships with other bodies
of knowledge, including its original definition within the French school of psychosomatics,
recent authors on mentalization have greatly extended prior thinking in this area. Specifically,
present-day theory and research on mentalization suggest that it carries interrelated benefits in a
wide range of important areas such as affect regulation, integration of self-representation, social
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communication, and mental flexibility and resilience (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy et
al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017b; Jurist, 2018). The
remainder of this section discusses these benefits in greater detail. However, it should be noted
that this is not a complete list of the benefits of mentalization. It also should be noted that these
benefits share many of the same underlying mechanisms, and they exist in reciprocal
relationships with each other. However, they are discussed separately for the sake of clarity.

Affect regulation
Fonagy and colleagues (see Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al.,
1995; Fonagy & Target, 2006) have suggested that some affect regulation is needed for an
individual to employ more than rudimentary mentalization—an individual in a state of intense
dysregulation experiences imperatives that supersede the work of thinking about thoughts and
feelings. However, they argue that mentalization, in its more realized forms, transforms affect
regulation. Specifically, they link mentalization to a variety of mindsets and skills that facilitate
affect regulation, including the following: an awareness that emotions are mental states and
therefore transient; an ability to generate higher-order representations for emotions, which
expands one’s repertoire for their management and increases the degree to which they are
amenable to control; and, related to the prior, an expectation that one’s mental states will be
understandable and controllable, which promotes a sense of agency both with regard to one’s
mental life and to external circumstances.
Jurist (2018) has asserted that a large part of the regulation of affect states through
mentalization concerns an individual’s autobiographical memory. Citing research that general
memories elicit greater arousal than more specific ones do (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez,
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2006), Jurist argues that “the ability to recall a specific past memory in order to place a current
emotion in an autobiographic context may help to reduce arousal level, making it more tolerable,
reducing the pressure to act on it, and modulating it through the use of strategies such as those
detailed in the process model” (p. 107)—for example, cognitive reappraisal. As an example of
this, one could view a distress-causing event as similar to a prior hardship, which might reduce
the gravity of the more-recent event and increase one’s sense that it—and the corresponding
emotion—can be coped with. It should be noted that relatively sophisticated affect-regulation
strategies such as this allow the individual to eschew more drastic mental maneuvers (e.g.,
primitive defenses such as splitting and projection) that provide relief from distress at the cost of
fragmentation of the self and compromised functioning.

Integrated self-representation
As mentioned above, mentalization allows one to regulate oneself without the use of
mental maneuvers that entail the defensive exclusion of information or the fragmentation of the
self. It also entails an awareness that emotions are transient events and do not fully define the
self. As such, it allows one to “stand in the spaces” between different self-states (see Bromberg,
1996) and contributes to a sense of self that has depth beyond one’s current mental state.
It also regards behavior as stemming from underlying intentions, even if those intentions
might be irrational or unconscious (Fonagy et al., 1998). This perspective, referred to as the
intentional stance, links a person’s various behaviors by viewing them as emanating from the
same actor. Thus, it has a special role in the development of a coherent representation of the
self—as well as coherent representations of others. The intentional stance also imbues
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individuals with qualities related to self-cohesion, such as autonomy and responsibility (Fonagy
et al., 1998).
An individual’s sense of his or her separateness from others is closely related to the
cohesion of his or her self-representation; as such, self-other differentiation is also expected to be
impaired in the context of low mentalization. Fonagy et al. (2017a) argued that, among
individuals who do not have reliable access to ordinary mentalization abilities, ways of
understanding the world and others tend to focus on external states and on affect over cognition.
As such, these individuals often experience emotional contagion in social situations. This, in
conjunction with a fragmented sense of self, influences their relationships with others in that they
“can feel forced to be rigid and highly controlling in order to maintain a subjective sense of
coherence and integrity” (Fonagy et al., 2017a, p. 7).

Social communication
Recent writing on mentalization (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016; Fonagy, Luyten, Allison,
& Campbell, 2017a, 2017b) has emphasized its role in social communication, and in the
processes by which individuals gain insight into the social world. Indeed, the centrality of
mentalization in social communication is one reason Gergely and Unoka (2008) argued that
humans have a hard-wired “mind-reading” mechanism that, in most individuals, is largely
functional except in situations of heightened dysregulation. By seeing intentional mental states
underneath others’—and one’s own—behaviors, these behaviors become more predictable and
have additional layers of meaning; the world “makes sense” in ways it otherwise would not
(Fonagy et al., 1998). This reduces the total amount of anxiety a person experiences, and, as
such, it is related to affect regulation. Additionally, the individual who mentalizes well, and can
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locate behavior within understandable mental states, has less distress and less need for the drastic
defensive maneuvers mentioned above (e.g., splitting, projection) to manage distress.
Mentalization directed toward identifying the intentions underlying others’ behavior is
also important in developing a sense of who to listen to and trust for information. This is crucial
for flourishing within the social world. However, a certain amount of trust is a prerequisite for
mentalization within the social world. Writers on mentalization (e.g., Allison & Fonagy, 2016;
Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a, 2017b) have used the term epistemic trust to refer
to an openness to receiving new information from others, undergirded by a sense that such
information might be personally relevant (i.e., generalizable from the speaker to the self). Note
that this term does not imply an indiscriminate trust in others but rather an openness to
evaluating information from the social world on its merits. Fonagy et al. (2017b) argued that
some mentalization is required for epistemic trust—one must have come to know enough
(relatively benign) information about one’s social environment, and the individuals in it, to feel
safe enough to open oneself to new information. However, Fonagy et al. also argue that some
epistemic trust is needed for one to proceed to mentalize about one’s social world. This
conundrum is typical resolved early in life, within a child’s relationship with his or her caregiver,
who initially performs mentalizing functions for the child (Fonagy et al., 1995). (Note: this
process is described in a later section in this chapter.) The child subsequently comes to view the
caregiver as a trusted source of information that often has personal relevance for the child.
Epistemic trust and mentalization are then applied to new contexts as a child’s social world
expands. However, in situations in which a child’s “early environment is heavily populated by
unreliable communicators,” Fonagy et al. (2017b) argue that “the opening of epistemic trust
becomes problematic and it may be more adaptive [for the child] to remain persistently vigilant
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about, or even closed off to, the communication of social knowledge. In the face of an abusive
and hostile caregiver, whose intentions towards the infant or child are not benign, epistemic
mistrust becomes entrenched as an appropriate adaptation that has been prepared by natural
selection” (p. 2).
It should be noted that the influence of mentalization on one’s movements through the
social world is not limited to more instrumental goals such as gaining important information.
Mentalization also influences the quality of one’s relationships. Slade (2005) summarized this
influence in the following way:
The more that human beings are able to envision mental states in the self and the other
(and thus what is internal to the self and particular to the other) the more likely they are to
engage in productive, intimate, and sustaining relationships, to feel connected to others at
a subjective level, but also to feel autonomous and of separate minds (p. 271).
Similarly, Wallin (2007) emphasized that mentalization “is intimately related to our capacities
for insight and empathy” (p.44) and adds a depth to relationships beyond behavior.

Mental flexibility and resilience
Subsumed within mentalization is metacognition—i.e., thinking about thinking (Fonagy
et al., 2017a). As such, it includes the processes by which one monitors the relative efficacy of
different mental activities, selects the ones most efficient in achieving expected or desired
outcomes, and adjusts the actions used in the context of changing situational demands. As such,
mentalization has a clear connection with mental flexibility and resilience. Fonagy et al. (2017a)
further elaborated this connection by identifying three specific mentalization-dependent
mechanisms that underly resilience: “positive situation classification, retrospective reappraisal of
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threat, and inhibition of retraumatizing triggers” (p. 1). They also elucidated the ways in which
each one is impaired by difficulties in mentalization. The first mechanism they identified,
positive situation classification, pertains to the ability to view nonthreatening situations
correctly—i.e., as nonthreatening. As low or impaired mentalization makes it harder to
understand the meanings of others’ actions, it often results in mistaken appraisals of threat. The
second mechanism, the retrospective reappraisal of a threat or adverse experience, pertains to the
ability to shift from negative appraisals to more positive appraisals—e.g., of how one has been
able to adapt or cope—and then maintain focus on more positive appraisals. Low or impaired
mentalization disrupts this process in a couple of ways. First, in order to retrospectively change
one’s appraisal of a given situation or event, one must generate higher-order representations of
the mental states surrounding it; these are the mental states that are modified. This process is
dependent on mentalization. Second, retrospective reappraisal often entails mentalizing about
others’ internal states, whether to create a more positive appraisal of the intentions or
motivations of someone who has caused harm, or to decide whether a person offering a new
perspective about the situation or event is trustworthy—i.e., whether their perspective should be
factored into future appraisals. However, in situations of low or impaired mentalization, one is
unable to achieve insight into the mind of an aggressor, and more broadly one is relatively closed
to new information from others. The third mechanism, the inhibition of retraumatizing triggers,
pertains to the ability to minimize threat-associated sensations surrounding memories of the
adverse experience, which “serve to reinforce, perpetuate and generalize the sense of threat”
(Fonagy et al., 2017a, p. 6). This mechanism, too, requires the generation of higher-order,
cognitive representations, which make possible the top-down disarmament or suppression of
retraumatizing memories. Failures of this kind of inhibition, in the face of retraumatizing
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triggers, lead to affect dysregulation and the impairment of the mentalization required for the
mechanisms above. Like most of the benefits of mentalization, these mechanisms are understood
to be in cyclical relationships with each other.
In normal development, the mechanisms above allow one to function in the context of a
normal array of setbacks, and to move forward from such situations without undue alterations in
functioning or the development of psychopathology. According to Fonagy et al. (2017a),
borderline personality disorder can be thought of as a marked deficit in these resiliencepromoting capacities, which are dependent on mentalization to be effective.

Section summary
The benefits above exist in reciprocal relationships with one another, with each one
supporting each of the others. Similarly, impairments in one would have repercussions for the
others. Fonagy et al. (2017b) offered the following depiction of the way mentalization
difficulties might expand across multiple domains of functioning:
Mentalizing difficulties lead to affect dysregulation, which in turn further disrupts
mentalizing. Wherever this cycle starts, mentalizing problems lead to interpersonal
conflict and social difficulties, which generate intense (social) affect such as shame,
which is inadequately contextualized because of the failure of social cognition. This
affect further undermines the capacity to mentalize, which can then create further social
challenges, generating interpersonal conflict that will inevitably lead to higher emotional
arousal. The emotional arousal is poorly modulated and causes further disruptions of
social cognition as part of a recursive process, the final outcome of which is an individual
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lacking the higher-order cognitive capacity necessary to withstand even everyday social
adversity (p. 5).
This model implicates mentalization difficulties in a range of personal and interpersonal
problems. As such, it suggests a need for effective strategies to ameliorate these difficulties.
Fortunately, evidence supporting the validity of mentalization has already indicated some
potential avenues for redressing difficulties in this area. Subsequent sections in this chapter
report research findings on mentalization as well as current thinking on the way mentalization
typically develops in early childhood—and on the relationship between mentalization and
attachment-related constructs. However, before this research and theory is presented, the
following section details the way mentalization is typically assessed in research paradigms.

Assessing mentalization: The RF Scale
Fonagy and colleagues did not see mentalization as something that would be either
present or absent; rather, they saw it as existing on a continuum of increasing sophistication
(Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). They developed a method for assessing the quality of
an individual’s mentalization called the Reflective-Functioning Scale (RF Scale; Fonagy et al.,
1991; Fonagy et al., 1998), with “reflective functions” being an umbrella term for the various
mental capacities that make mentalization possible. The RF Scale assesses mentalization in a
narrative, usually a transcript of an interview or conversation, on an 11-point scale from -1
(negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF). According to Fonagy et al. (1998), a person might explicitly
mentalize at times (e.g., say, “I know one’s mood can color one’s opinion of things, so, even
though I didn’t like the movie, that might have been due to how I was feeling when I saw it”),
but mentalization is usually more implicit. As such, a higher RF score is derived from statements
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that communicate either explicitly or implicitly any of the following qualities of mentalization:
an awareness of the nature of mental states (e.g., that mental states are often opaque and our
understanding of others and even of ourselves is incomplete); efforts to identify mental states
underlying behavior (e.g., that, despite the above, we see the value in coming up with plausible
mental-state-oriented explanations for behavior, even though we understand that such
explanations might be incorrect); a recognition of the developmental aspects of mental states
(e.g., that thoughts and feelings about a certain subject can change over time, even if the subject
itself has not changed); and an awareness of mental states in relation to the person or persons
with whom we are interacting (e.g., that another person might not know everything we know
about a particular topic and, even if they did, they might not have the same thoughts about it).
While the RF scale might be used in different contexts, it was designed to be applied to the
transcript of a structured interview that assesses attachment- and caregiving-related concerns. It
was normed on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; Fonagy et al., 1998; George, Kaplan, &
Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), a semi-structured interview in which an adult interviewee describes the
caregiving they experienced in childhood, their current perceptions of those experiences, and
how those experiences relate to their present functioning—all of which is designed to elicit the
interviewee’s mental representations of relationships. Since then, the RF Scale has most
frequently been applied to the AAI, but it has been applied to other interviews as well. Notably,
it has been revised for use with the Parent Development Interview (PDI; Aber, Slade, Berger,
Bresgi, & Kaplan, 1985) and the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview (PT-AAI;
Diamond, Clarkin, Levy, Levine, & Kotov, 1999; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996).
The PDI can be used to assess a parent’s state of mind with respect to a child of theirs and their
relationship with them; the PT-AAI can be used to assess a patient or a therapist’s state of mind
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with respect to the other member of the therapeutic dyad and the treatment relationship. Each
interview is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Further details regarding the RF Scale
are provided in Chapter III.

The development of mentalization abilities
Multiple authors have asserted that the development of a strong capacity for
mentalization—or, alternately, the development of deficits in mentalization—starts early in life
(e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991; Gergely & Unoka, 2008).
Synthesizing a range of theory and empirical research, Gergely and Unoka (2008) argued that a
caregiver’s marked mirroring of their infant’s affect states leads to the creation of secondary
representations of those affect states for the infant. They asserted that this is the foundation of the
infant’s future mentalizing as well as their sense of agency in the world. Fonagy and colleagues
similarly located the earliest origins of mentalization abilities in a child’s interactions with their
primary caregiver in the first months of life (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991). They
focused on what they hypothesized was the affect-regulating function of many of those
interactions (Fonagy et al., 1995). According to Fonagy et al. (1995), infants and young children
lack robust mechanisms for regulating emotions on their own. As such, they tend to experience
their emotions as overwhelming events. At the earliest stages of development, a caregiver is
needed for affect regulation. Caregivers typically serve this function while the child becomes
able to do an increasing amount of it themselves. According to Fonagy et al. (1995), a parent
contains their child’s intense affects though verbally and nonverbally communicating to the child
notions such as the following:
•

That they understand the child’s feeling, the cause of it, and how difficult it is.
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•

That the feeling can be contained and coped with.

•

That they see intentionality in the child’s gestures and communications to them, and that
the child sees intentionality in the parent’s gestures and communications.

In such situations, the caregiver “sees” an inchoate mental state underlying their child’s distress
(a mental state that is perhaps very rudimentary or even nonexistent at the outset of the
interaction). In subsequent interactions with the child, the caregiver identifies and elaborates this
mental state in a way that communicates that the associated affect can be coped with. The child
then internalizes the caregiver’s communications, along with regulation they provided.
Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002), as well as Gergely and Unoka (2008),
have argued that the communications from a caregiver that are likely to ameliorate an infant’s
negative affect—and form the building blocks of independent mentalization—will feature
mentalizing that is both contingent and marked. In other words, it will both contain an accurate
reflection of the child’s feeling-state and be modified in some way. The accuracy of the
reflection is important, they argued, because within the first year of life infants can perceive
discrepancies between their own affective states and those re-presented back to them by another
face (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely & Unoka, 2008). As such, noncontingent responses are
experienced by the infant as “not me” intrusions; they are unconnected to the infant’s current
self-state, and they carry little potential for affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely &
Unoka, 2008). However, if a response is only contingent, and it is not visibly altered by the
caregiver’s perspective, the infant or young child is likely to perceive the caregiver as
experiencing the same dysregulating emotion as the child is; such a response would “return” to
the child their affect without lessening its dysregulating quality, and it would be likely to amplify
the child’s distress (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely & Unoka, 2008).
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Notably, both a caregiver’s ability to accurately infer the mental state underlying a child’s
visible behavior—as well as their ability to present a modified version of that mental state in
their response—require mentalization on their part (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 1991).
Similarly, a caregiver’s communications about intentionality, which Fonagy et al. (1995) argued
were particularly formative with regard to a child’s mentalizing abilities, also require
mentalization. This points to the importance of a caregiver’s ability to mentalize. In this vein,
Fonagy et al. (1991) wrote that caregivers differ in their “capacity to think about behavior in
terms of psychological rather than physical determinants. The caregiver who manifests this
capacity at its maximum will be the most likely to be able to respect the child’s vulnerable
emerging psychological world” (p. 208). They added that “the caregiver who has a wellestablished capacity to see her own and others’ actions in terms of mental states will be able to
perceive the causes of defensive behavior in her child,” whereas “the parent with more limited
reflective ability may fail accurately to identify that her own behavior is the primary cause of the
infant’s distress, thus, inadvertently, reinforcing the infant’s felt need for such behavioral
strategies” (Fonagy et al., 1991, p. 208).
A caregiver’s ability to mentalize depends on their state of mind with respect to their role
as caregiver for a particular child, which has many determinants. This is discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter. However, in light of Fonagy et al.’s (1991) assertions above, it should
be noted that research indeed suggests that parents differ in their level of mentalization, and that
their level of mentalization is associated with their child’s level of mentalization (Benbassat &
Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; Rosso, Viterbori, &
Scopesi, 2015). Parents’ mentalization also has been positively associated with the security of
their child’s attachment to them (Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy, & Locker, 2005).
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Conversely, it has been negatively associated with hostile and intrusive parenting behaviors (e.g.,
Ensink, Rousseau, Biberdzic, Bégin, & Normandin, 2017; Grienenberger, Kelly, & Slade, 2005;
Stacks et al., 2014). As an example of these latter findings, Ensink et al. (2017) assessed RF and
personality organization in a sample of new mothers. The former was assessed via the AAI, and
the latter was assessed via the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger,
Clarkin, Kernberg, & Foelsch, 2001). Maternal caregiving behavior was assessed via an
observational method when the child was 15–18 months old. Ensink et al. (2017) found that
reduced RF and impaired reality testing (and, to a lesser extent, primitive defenses and identity
diffusion) on the IPO were associated with the increased incidence of intrusive-aggressive
maternal behaviors—i.e., they seemed to interfere with a mother’s ability to modulate her
aggression with her child. Following the thinking by Fonagy et al. (2002) and Gergely and
Unoka (2008) outlined above, intrusive and aggressive behaviors from a caregiver would be
failures in contingency and markedness; as such they would be unlikely to attenuate a child’s
distress and would require the child to implement primitive psychological defenses for the
management of intense affect. Further, these exchanges would not build the child’s own capacity
for mentalization; rather, they might inhibit it. While mentalization is believed to stem from a
hard-wired mind-reading mechanism that, in most individuals, is largely functional except in
situations of heightened dysregulation, this mechanism can be inhibited, and early attachment
relationships are believed to be critical in this regard (e.g., Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018).
Specifically, if parental behaviors in early attachments are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative,
abusive, or neglectful, this would damage a child’s epistemic trust—i.e., their openness to
receiving new information from others, undergirded by a sense that such information might be
generalizable to the self (e.g., Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018). This, in turn, would
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adversely affect the child’s propensity to mentalize—and the level at which they do so—in future
interactions.
While the descriptions of caregiver-child interactions given thus far have focused on
early-childhood interactions, a child’s mentalization capacities might be developed in other ways
at subsequent stages of childhood. In an older child, for example, the way a caregiver sets limits
in response to the child’s transgressions can have considerable importance for mentalization
(Fonagy et al., 1998). Limit setting ideally suggests a way the child might cope independently
with the distress they are experiencing. In this process, as in the interactions described above, the
caregiver presents the contents of the child’s mind back to the child in a way that is contingent
(i.e., reflective of what the child is thinking and feeling) but at the same time different in that it
also features contents of the caregiver’s mind (Fonagy et al., 1998). A somewhat different way in
which a caregiver might promote the development of mentalization abilities in a child is through
pretend play with the child (Fonagy et al., 1998). Pretend play promotes the development of
mentalization in that it links fantasy—an aspect of mental life—with the tangible world. It
demonstrates that fantasy and the tangible world are related but different from each other, as
opposed to unrelated or equivalent. As such, it develops a mental stance that facilitates the work
of mentalization (Fonagy et al., 1998). It also should be noted that, as a child grows and
increases their range of social connections, it is not just the relationships with his or her primary
caregivers that are important in the development of his or her capacity for mentalization; his or
her relationships with individuals in the larger caregiving environment (composed of other
relatives, family friends, neighbors, teachers, etc.) are also highly important (see Fonagy et al.,
2017b).
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A final point with regard to the development of mentalization abilities is that the existing
evidence suggests mentalization is not an all-or-nothing achievement. Rather, it develops in
increments, with the ability to discern others’ intentions appearing around 9–12 months of age
and more sophisticated mentalizing appearing around 3–4 years of age with the maturation of
language (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Jurist, 2018).

Mentalization and the attachment system
The mentalization that occurs in the relationship between a parent and a young child has
been closely tied to the functioning of the attachment system (e.g., Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy
et al., 1991). The attachment system encompasses the collection of behaviors a child regularly
uses to gain access to a parent in times of distress—and to the sense of security that that access
provides (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Notably, Ainsworth and
colleagues found connections between the nature of a child’s security-seeking behaviors and the
nature of the caregiving he or she had received from his or her mother in the home (Ainsworth,
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978); these findings were replicated in subsequent studies (see
Bretherton, 1992 for a review). Ainsworth et al. (1978) also found that a child’s security-seeking
behaviors typically demonstrated a coherent strategy for obtaining the most functional
attachment possible to his or her mother, with her particular strengths and weaknesses as a
caregiver. To evaluate the quality of a child’s security-seeking behaviors with a primary
caregiver—and, more generally, the quality of the child’s attachment to that caregiver—they
developed a laboratory procedure called the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978). In the
Strange Situation, a child, aged one year, is separated from his or her primary caregiver in an
environment that is unfamiliar and potentially threatening to him or her as it contains an
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unfamiliar adult (Ainsworth et al., 1978).1 Both the separation and the unfamiliarity of the setting
are designed to engage the child’s attachment system. The results of studies with the Strange
Situation led Ainsworth and colleagues to observe—and elucidate—three different types of
attachments that a child might have with a primary caregiver in early childhood: secure,
avoidant, and ambivalent (Ainsworth et al., 1978). Later, Main and Solomon (1986) identified a
fourth type: disorganized. See the first two columns of Table 1 for descriptions of each of these
attachments as well as the parental caregiving behaviors associated with each one.
Notably, the initial development of the capacity for mentalization also takes place within
a child’s early-life relationships with primary caregivers (see Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al.,
1995); as such, it shares this domain with the attachment-related processes described above.
Additionally, specific features of the attachment system overlap with the capacity for
mentalization. For example, evidence suggests that the attachment system, in addition to
encompassing observable behaviors, has a representational dimension (see Main, Kaplan, &
Cassidy, 1985). This notion began with Bowlby (1973), who proposed that a child is able to
adjust to his or her primary caregiver, and act in accordance with those adjustments in a wide
variety of situations, because he or she has an “internal working model” of the relationship. He
proposed that this model contains mental representations of “self” and “other” formed in early
interactions with the primary caregiver. Subsequently, Main and colleagues (Main et al., 1985)
found that a child’s behavior on the Strange Situation was related the language he or she used
when talking about attachment-related situations (e.g., separations) five years later. In discussing
these findings, Main et al. argued that internal working models include expectations for
behavior; as such, they influence the nature of future interactions and provide consistency to an
The Strange Situation has subsequently been administered at different timepoints in a child’s first two
years of life.
1
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Table 1. Caregiving behaviors and related Strange Situation and AAI classifications
Parent’s caregiving Young child’s behavior on
Adult’s state of mind with respect to
in the home
Strange Situation
attachment on AAI
Secure
Secure/Autonomous
Attuned,
Easily soothed when reunited Coherently discusses information with
cooperative,
with the caregiver.
a range of affect and does not
accepting, and
contradict self in the process. Appears
emotionally
to value the importance of attachmentavailable.
related experiences. Is mindful of the
interviewer’s perspective throughout.
Avoidant
Dismissing
Rebuffs the child’s
Displays an apparent
Provides brief, constricted responses
bids for attention
indifference to the
regarding the nature of attachmentand displays an
caregiver’s coming and
related experiences—or devalues the
aversion to his or her going.
importance of such experiences.
negative emotions.
Provides few supporting details. Given
Many have limited
details are weak or contradict
physical contact
information provided elsewhere in the
with the child.
interview.
Ambivalent
Preoccupied
Only intermittently
Preoccupied with the
Appears preoccupied with past
available and often
caregiver’s whereabouts and attachment-related experiences—
handles the child in
unable to explore freely at
particularly negative ones. Speech
an inept way. Tends any point. Not soothed by the lacks coherence in terms of subject
to discourage the
caregiver upon his or her
matter (e.g., it contains clear
child’s autonomy.
return. Some oscillate
contradictions) as well as form (e.g., it
between displays of anger
contains confusing, rambling
and bids for connection with sentences). Does not consistently
the caregiver. Others make
maintain the interviewer’s perspective
only weak bids for comfort.
and provides an overly long narrative.
*
Disorganized
Unresolved/Disorganized**
Frightened or
Exhibits bizarre behavior.
Loses some connection with reality or
frightening. More
Upon the caregiver’s return, orientation to the interview situation
likely than parents in some freeze, fall to the floor, when discussing loss, abuse, or other
the other categories
or appear dazed. May cover
trauma.
to maltreat or abuse mouth in what appears to be
their child.
an effort to stifle a scream.
Unclassifiable
Cannot Classify/Unorganized
Behavior includes both
Interview includes both dismissing and
avoidant and ambivalent
preoccupied elements. Or it includes
elements.
neither but fails to be coherent enough
to be rated secure/autonomous.
*

Children classified as disorganized are given a second classification (i.e., secure, avoidant, ambivalent,
or unclassifiable) for their attachment-related behaviors outside of the ones that yield this classification.
**
An interview in this category is also assigned to one of the other categories, which would speak to the
interviewee’s state of mind and approach to the interview when not disorganized.
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individual’s attachments. In this vein, subsequent research has suggested that attachment security
is consistent across settings in early childhood (e.g., Vaughn & Waters, 1990) and over time in
the absence of changes in the family environment (e.g., Waters, Weinfield, & Hamilton, 2003). It
also should be noted that the representational dimension of attachment has a role in facilitating
the attachment system’s goal of a sense of security (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Specifically, if
access to a caregiver is reliably obtained when sought, there will be a mental representation of
the sense of security that that access provides, and physical proximity to the caregiver will not
have to be maintained in order for that security to be felt.
The representational dimension of attachment, which includes mental models of “self”
and “other”—and expectations for the caregiver’s behaviors—overlaps considerably with the
capacity for mentalization. One aspect of this overlap is that an individual’s representations of
“self” and “other” will accumulate more sophisticated markers of mentalization as the capacity
for mentalization matures. In this vein, it should be noted that the attachment system is not just a
childhood phenomenon. Bowlby (1973, 1980), Ainsworth (1989), and others (e.g., Holmes &
Slade, 2018; Parish & Eagle, 2003) have cited evidence that the attachment system, while an
imperative for physical survival in early life, is a behavioral system that is active throughout the
life span. Specifically, Ainsworth (1989) noted that the parent-child relationship continues to be
an attachment even after the child becomes an adult; the parent remains a safe haven for his or
her adult child. Additionally, adults have other relationships (e.g., with a therapist or a romantic
partner) that bear many of the features of early childhood attachment relationships, such as
specificity (i.e., the other person is not interchangeable with anyone else) and distress
surrounding prolonged separations (Parish & Eagle, 2003). In this vein, Holmes and Slade
(2018) defined an attachment relationship as “one that is person-specific, intimate, and affect-
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regulating” (p. 29)—a definition that covers a range of relationships beyond early childhood.
Research on states of mind with respect to attachment in adults has demonstrated a link between
the security of such states of mind and mentalization, the latter typically assessed via the RF
Scale (e.g., Bizzi, Ensink, Borelli, Mora, & Cavanna, 2009; Bouchard et al., 2008; Fonagy et al.,
1991). Such findings are in line with expectations that mentalization would increase the
sophistication of the mental representations underlying attachment relationships, and that that
would have bearing on the security of such relationships—for example, by making the other’s
behavior more meaningful and predictable.
Another way in which attachment security is related to mentalization is the way in which
the former affects not just the contents of one’s mental life but also one’s characteristic ways of
thinking. Main and colleagues (e.g., Main et al., 1985; Main, 1991) found evidence suggesting
that attachment security shapes the way an individual processes information and emotions—and
influences what types of mental events are excluded from awareness. In the case of an insecure
state of mind with respect to attachment, which entails less-positive semantic information and
less-positive affects for “self,” “other,” and “relationship,” information and affects concerning
important relationships are managed via mental processes that make a larger-than-usual amount
of mental content inaccessible to the individual at any given time (George & Solomon, 1996).
Additionally, deficits in metacognition maintain these defensive mental processes by reducing
awareness of them (George & Solomon, 1996; Main, 1991). Given that the ability to gain insight
into one’s own mind and others’ minds is synonymous with mentalization (Wallin, 2007), the
mental processes mentioned above—and the deficits in metacognition that maintain them—
represent constraints on the mentalizing that an individual is able to do.
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According to Main (1991), these mental processes are carried forward from an
individual’s earliest attachments to subsequent stages of childhood and to adulthood. To assess
attachment security and insecurity in adults, Main and colleagues developed the Adult
Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), which asks an adult
interviewee to recall early childhood experiences with caregivers—moments of comfort seeking,
separation, and rejection as well as possible trauma or loss. The questions are designed to evoke
the individual’s current state of mind with respect to early attachment relationships. However,
this state of mind is not about a particular relationship as the Strange Situation is; rather, it is
about an adult’s current mental models for attachment relationships. And while Main and
colleagues viewed the content of an adult’s representations of his or her early attachment
relationships as important—and designed the AAI to elicit such content—they argued that the
way a person thinks and speaks about past relationships would be more critical in determining
his or her state of mind with respect to attachments (Main, 1991; Main et al., 1985). They
developed a classification system for AAI transcripts that initially included four states of mind
with respect to attachment: secure/autonomous, dismissing, preoccupied, and
unresolved/disorganized (Main et al., 1985). Each one speaks to a particular quality of thought
regarding attachment relationships. And each has been linked with a particular type of
attachment in a child for whom the individual would be a primary caregiver. These states of
mind, along with the Strange Situation attachments with which they have been linked, appear in
Table 1. Notably, Hesse (1996) subsequently introduced a fifth state of mind with respect to
attachment that has been seen in AAI transcripts: cannot classify (alternately: unorganized). This
state of mind has been associated provisionally with Strange Situation procedures that are
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unclassifiable as well those that are classified as disorganized (Behrens, Hesse, & Main, 2007;
Hesse, 1996; Main, 2000; Shah, Fonagy, & Strathearn, 2010). See Table 1 for a description.
To elaborate further the link between attachment security and mentalization: an insecure
attachment in childhood—or an insecure state of mind with respect to attachment as an adult—
can be seen as a affect-regulation strategy; it minimizes scenarios in which one’s poor affectregulation skills, underscored by weak mentalization abilities, become too problematic. In the
case of avoidant/dismissing attachment, the individual minimizes his or her reliance on
attachment figures who fail to alleviate distress—and thus limits exposure to the unsatisfying and
dysregulating elements of these relationships. This strategy is supported via the individual
minimizing the importance of attachment relationships (George & Solomon, 1996). In the case
of ambivalent/preoccupied attachment, the individual maximizes his or her exposure to
attachment figures who are unreliable in their ability to alleviate distress yet are still counted
upon to do so; this reduces the probability that the needed-but-unreliable attachment figure will
be inaccessible. The individual maintains proximity to the attachment figure via disavowing his
or her anger for him or her (George & Solomon, 1996). However, while each of these forms of
organized attachment insecurity comes with a coherent strategy for attachment relationships, it
still is associated with relatively little felt security.2 This is the case to an even greater degree for
disorganized and unorganized attachment insecurity, which grow out of a sense of the
attachment figure as frightened or frightening (Main & Solomon, 1986). The low amount of felt
security in insecure attachment relationships is associated with dysregulation and, consequently,

2

It is important to note that, even among infants with avoidant attachment who exhibit few overt
attachment-related behaviors, there is evidence of increased heart rate and cortisol levels during Strange
Situation procedures when compared with secure infants (Spangler & Grossman, 1993; Sroufe & Waters,
1977). This suggests that the procedure was more stressful for them than it was for secure infants, and
their lack of overt attachment (i.e., proximity-seeking) behaviors can be seen as due to an effort to
suppress such behaviors rather than a lack of a need for them.
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constraints on mentalization. As Fonagy et al. (2017b) succinctly put it, “attachment stress
derails mentalizing” (p. 5). In secure attachments, an individual experiences the timely regulation
of affect via an available, mentalizing attachment figure (more on this below), and his or her
attachment system is deactivated—and mentalizing restored—in an expeditious way. Individuals
who are insecurely attached expend greater mental resources than do those who are securely
attached in trying to adapt to a dismissing, inconsistent, or frightening attachment figure; as such,
they regularly lack the mental space to explore their own mind or others’ minds (Fonagy &
Target, 2005). Overall, there is a reciprocal relationship between insecure attachment and
frequent or prolonged impairments in the capacity for mentalization (Fonagy & Target, 2006).
The way in which a caregiver facilitates his or her child’s attachment security also
highlights mentalization. As mentioned above, Ainsworth originally emphasized the role of the
caregiver’s actual behavior in determining a child’s attachment security (e.g., Ainsworth et al.,
1978). However, van IJzendoorn (1995), in a meta-analysis of attachment studies, found that the
influence of the caregiver’s overt behavior on the attachment status of her child, while
substantial, was not as large as the influence of other, undetermined factors. In this vein, Fonagy
et al. (1991) found that RF scores on AAIs conducted with expectant parents prior to their child’s
birth had strong predictive value for the security of their child during Strange Situation
procedures conducted at one year of age—among parents with strong RF, children were three to
four times more likely to have a secure attachment than an insecure attachment; among parents
with weak RF, children had roughly even odds of having a secure attachment or an insecure
attachment. This predictive power was beyond that of the parent’s state of mind with respect to
attachment (i.e., the overall classification of secure, dismissing, preoccupied, or
unresolved/disorganized), and it offered at least a partial explanation for the unexplained
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variance in attachment security that van IJzendoorn (1995) reported. Additionally, Fonagy,
Steele, Steele, Higgitt, and Target (1994) found that, in cases in which a mother had a history of
substantial adversity, her RF was an almost perfect indicator of whether or not her child would
be rated secure at one year of age. As such, they concluded that high RF enabled parents to break
intergenerational cycles of attachment insecurity and impart secure attachment to their children.
More recent evidence adds further support to the notion that a caregiver’s mentalization has an
important role in sensitive caregiving and in facilitating the deactivation of a child’s attachment
system (i.e., emotional arousal and attachment-seeking behaviors) in a timely way when threats
are not imminent or have passed (Grienenberger, Kelly, and Slade 2005; Slade et al., 2005;
Stacks et al., 2014). These studies are discussed in the section below, which focuses specifically
on caregiving.
The theory and research above suggest that mentalization plays an important role in early
childhood attachments and, more broadly, the functioning of the attachment system interacts
with the capacity for mentalization. Additionally, it should be reiterated that, in early childhood
attachments, parenting behaviors that are intrusive, unpredictable, dissociative, abusive, or
neglectful—i.e., those that are associated with disorganized attachment—instill epistemic
mistrust in a child; this adversely affects the child’s propensity to mentalize, and the level at
which they do so, in future interactions (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). However, while the
importance of early childhood attachments in the maturation of the capacity for mentalization
has not been contested, it should be noted that authors on mentalization have recently attributed
greater weight to the broader caregiving environment and to the society and culture into which a
child is born. Evidence suggests that humans have a hard-wired capacity for mind reading and
that, ultimately, a range of social interactions—not just those with early attachment figures—
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influence epistemic trust and mentalization (Gergely & Unoka, 2008). Additionally, it has been
argued that the extent to which early childhood attachments are influenced by the context in
which they occur has been underappreciated (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al., 2017b).
Fonagy et al. (2017b) stated that a child’s attachment relationship with a primary caregiver does
not occur in a vacuum; rather, it is impinged upon by features of the social environment, and
“attachment styles are themselves one piece of social communication that the familial context is
promoting about the most effective way to function in the prevailing culture” (p. 4). They also
argued that, in certain environments—e.g., those in which unpredictability and aggression
predominate—styles of relating to the world consistent with low mentalization and insecure
attachment might be viewed as adaptive (Fonagy et al., 2017b). They said the following:
Low levels of interpersonal understanding, or even frank attacks on the self-awareness of
individual family members, may be biologically successful, evolutionarily selected
strategies. A stance of dismissing attachment and non-mentalizing is not experienced as a
deficit by the person adopting this stance, but rather as the most appropriate strategy to
ensure their survival (Fonagy et al., 2017b, p. 4).
Overall, recent authors have argued that early childhood attachments contribute to the initial
starting point and direction of the development of mentalization and social competence, but, in
most cases, these skills have a trajectory that is somewhat independent from an individual’s
attachments (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a; Fonagy et al., 2017b).

Section summary
Early-childhood attachments are the first theater in which mentalization is either
facilitated or constrained. The quality of an attachment affects mental representations,
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information-processing rules, and metacognition; it affects thinking—and thinking about
thinking. As such, it overlaps with mentalization in important ways. The following section builds
on the theory and research reported here by outlining attachment-related factors might have
bearing on a caregiver’s state of mind with respect to their role as caregiver—and on their
mentalization in that role. Both influence the mentalization of the recipient of their caregiving.
However, it also should be noted that the link between attachment relationships and the
capacity for mentalization might be indirect in certain ways—e.g., through the development of
epistemic trust. And it is likely that the broader cultural milieu in which a person is located also
plays a role in the quality of mentalization that an individual learns. Early childhood attachments
do not exist in a vacuum, and they transmit information from the larger social environment.
Additionally, as a child’s social world expands, relationships beyond those with primary
caregivers might have an effect on their capacity for mentalization. This being the case, it is still
likely that close relationships—particularly those with attachment figures—have a proportionally
greater influence on this capacity. According to Holmes and Slade (2018), poor mentalization
can be redressed later in life in relationships (e.g., with a therapist) that could be considered adult
attachments. They argue that such relationships, if epistemic trust is established, open a
“sensitive period” in which one’s capacity for mentalization as well as one’s state of mind with
respect to attachments might be altered for the better. This, too, is discussed in greater detail later
in this chapter.

Mentalization and the caregiving system
The extent to which an individual is able to mentalize within and about an attachment
relationship in which they are a caregiver depends on what they think—and how they think—
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about that relationship. Bowlby (1969/1982, 1988) suggested that, similar to a child’s role in an
attachment relationship, a parent’s role in such a relationship is shaped by a system of mental
representations and behaviors, and he referred to this system as the caregiving system. Following
Bowlby’s work, Solomon and George (1996) wrote that internal working models within the
caregiving system would feature the self in the role of caregiver rather than that of attachment
(i.e., security) seeker. They proposed that, similar to the internal working models that underly the
attachment system, these mental representations have two parts: first, specific postulates about
“self” and “other” in the context of a relationship in which one is a caregiver, and related
postulates about the nature of that caregiving relationship, and, second, “information-processing
rules that guide perception and memory” with regard to that relationship (Solomon & George,
1996, p. 189). In interviews with parents, they observed that parents’ postulates (i.e., the contents
of their internal working model of themselves as a parent) typically addressed three “questions”:
“(1) willingness to respond, (2) effectiveness of caregiving strategies, and (3) ability to read and
understand signals” (George & Solomon, 1996, pp. 200–201). Their data suggested that, over the
course of an interview, distinct states of mind with respect to caregiving can be identified based
on parents’ “answers” to these questions, and a given parent’s state of mind with respect to a
particular child might be predicted on the basis of the security and organization of that child’s
attachment to them. Specifically, the parent of a child with a secure attachment is likely to have
positive answers to the questions above; George and Solomon (1996) classified this as a Secure
Base state of mind with respect to caregiving. The parent of an avoidant child, however, is likely
to provide a negative answer to the first question (i.e., “willingness to respond”); they classified
this as a Rejecting state of mind with respect to caregiving. The parent of an ambivalent child, on
the other hand, is likely to have uncertain answers—e.g., “vacillations in opinion or conviction”
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(p. 201)—to all three questions; they classified this as an Uncertain state of mind with respect to
caregiving (George & Solomon, 1996). Finally, the parent of a disorganized—or unorganized—
child is likely to feel helpless in the face of their child’s bids for care and protection; they
classified this as a Helpless state of mind with respect to caregiving.
The states of mind described above would have bearing on a parent’s capacity to
mentalize in their relationship with their child as each one yields characteristic ways of
processing information with respect to the relationship (Solomon & George, 1996). These
specific ways of processing information largely concern which and how much information the
caregiver defensively excludes from conscious awareness, and the ways in which that
information is excluded (George & Solomon, 1996). With regard to the states of mind with
respect to caregiving that George and Solomon (1996) identified, the Secure Base state of mind
is associated with the least amount of defensive exclusion. Parents with this state of mind are
generally able to incorporate a wide range of cognitive and emotional information into their
thinking about the relationship, and, as such, it is associated with a largely unimpaired ability to
mentalize. Generally speaking, these parents would be open to thinking about whatever thought
or feeling might be in the child’s mind, even if it is not pleasant. They also would be able to
adjust their behavior flexibly in the service of meeting the goal of the caregiving system (i.e., the
child’s continued safety or felt security). The Rejecting state of mind, however, is associated
with the defensive exclusion from awareness of information pertaining to the effects of their
“unwillingness” to respond to their child. George and Solomon (1996) argue that this defensive
strategy is essential to the maintenance of the “unwilling” postulate as it allows a parent to
remain blind to the effects of it. On the other hand, the Uncertain state of mind, according to
George and Solomon (1996), entails the disavowal of negative affect for the child that has the
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potential to overwhelm the parent’s ability to care for the child. This splitting off of negative
affect allows a parent to keep the caregiving system engaged and to continue to act toward its
goal; however, it also leads to a lack of coherence with regard to how they feel about their child,
their relationship with that child, and themselves within that relationship. Finally, in the Helpless
state of mind, there is an isomorphism between the sense of futility the parent feels in the face of
their caregiving responsibilities and their inability to regulate their negative thoughts and
emotions regarding the relationship; each reinforces the other (George & Solomon, 1996). The
Rejecting, Uncertain, and Helpless states of mind are all associated with clear constraints in the
capacity for mentalization within one’s role as caregiver.
Though a parent’s caregiving system is heavily informed by their experiences in
attachment relationships, it is important to note that caregiving relationships are not simply
regurgitations of the care that a parent has received. Rather, they reflect a parent’s present state
of mind with regard to those earlier experiences as well as the experience of childbirth, the
temperament of the child in question, and the degree of support the parent is receiving in their
role as caregiver (Solomon & George, 1996). In this vein, George and Solomon (1996) referred
to the caregiving system as “a mature transformation of the attachment system” (p. 213). In their
view, “the individual begins in adolescence to construct a representation of the self as caregiver
(i.e., as protector) that is parallel to but distinct from a representation of the self as attached”
(Solomon & George, 1996, p. 190). This representation continues to develop alongside their
child’s internal working model of attachment, and in a reciprocal relationship with it. At the time
of the birth of a parent’s first child, their internal working model of themselves as a caregiver
still might develop in a variety of different ways.
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As evidence suggests that the therapeutic relationship can be an attachment relationship
(Holmes & Slade, 2018; Parish & Eagle, 2003), similar considerations should apply to therapists’
relationships with their patients. For example, a therapist’s internal working model with respect
to their caregiving for a particular patient should be distinct from their internal working models
with respect to any children they might have. And, as is the case with parents who have multiple
children, a therapist should have somewhat different internal working models for the caregiving
relationships they have with different patients (Slade, 2008). This, along with reasons a therapist
might feel greater or lesser security with regard to their role as therapist within a particular
therapeutic relationship, is discussed later in this chapter.
As stated above, a parent’s felt security in a caregiving role would be expected to
influence the mentalizing they are able to do in that role—and by extension influence the degree
to which they are able to facilitate a secure attachment with and facilitate mentalization in the
child. In this vein, Slade et al. (2005) sought to obtain empirical evidence for the relation
between a mother’s mentalizing with specific respect to her relationship with a child of hers and
that child’s attachment status. As in many studies of attachment-related phenomena, Strange
Situations were administered to the mothers and children in the study. Notably, however, Slade
et al. administered the Parent Developmental Interview (PDI; Aber et al., 1985) to the 40
mothers in the study. The PDI is based on the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George,
Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996) and yields information about a parent’s caregiving
relationship with a particular child. They used this approach as Fonagy and colleagues (1998)
have suggested that one’s RF, similar to one’s state of mind with respect to attachment, might be
higher or lower in different relationships (Fonagy et al., 1998). Additionally, as mentioned
above, the caregiving system is a behavioral system that is related to but distinct from the
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attachment system, so when determining a mother’s RF with respect to her child, it would make
sense to ask her to speak about that relationship rather than her early childhood attachment
relationships, which is what occurs in AAIs. From these PDIs, Slade et al. obtained Maternal RF
scores. They found a significant relationship between Maternal RF and children’s attachment
status, with high Maternal RF associated with increased likelihood of secure attachment. They
also found that Maternal RF within the caregiving relationship mediated the relationship between
mothers’ state of mind with respect to attachment, which had been assessed via the AAI, and
children’s attachment security. Building on prior research by Fonagy and colleagues (e.g.,
Fonagy et al., 1994; Fonagy et al., 1991), Slade at al. (2005) stated that Maternal RF might be
responsible for much of the variance in children’s attachment status that was still unaccountedfor after van IJzendoorn (1995), in his meta-analysis, controlled for the effect of mothers’ and
fathers’ overt caregiving behaviors. Additionally, studies by Grienenberger, Kelly, and Slade
(2005) and Stacks et al. (2014) have found evidence suggesting that Maternal RF assessed via
the PDI is positively associated with the sensitivity of mothers’ caregiving behaviors for a child
of theirs and inversely associated with their hostility in their interactions with that child. These
findings dovetail those by Ensink et al. (2017), mentioned above, that suggested a negative
relationship between a mothers’ RF and their intrusive and aggressive behaviors with their
children, though Ensink et al. measured mothers’ RF more generally, through the AAI, rather
than with regard to their role as caregiver for a specific child. Finally, and most pertinently for
the current study, recent research has found associations between parents’ RF for a specific child
of theirs and the level of mentalization of that child (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin,
Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015; Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Notably,
this association has been replicated with samples of parent-child dyads from a variety of cultures
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(i.e., French Canadian, Israeli, and Italian) and with children at different ages (i.e.,
preadolescence and adolescence). It provides direct evidence for a relationship between the
mentalization of caregivers and the mentalization of the recipients of caregiving in attachment
relationships.

Section summary
Attachment theory suggests that a parent’s mentalization for a specific child will be
informed by what and how they think about that child within the specific demands of their role
as parent. Additionally, empirical research has shown that mothers’ level of mentalization for a
young child of theirs is related to the security of that child’s attachment to them—a well as the
sensitivity of their caregiving behaviors for that child, and the relative absence of negativity and
hostility in those caregiving behaviors. Further, research has linked both parents’ level of
mentalization for a child of theirs with the level of mentalization exhibited by that child.
As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the developmental theory and research
outlined above could have implications for the patient-therapist relationship. The following
section introduces the importance of mentalization for clinical work, and it presents clinical
findings for mentalization (operationalized as RF)—including outcomes of select prevalence
studies and psychotherapy trials. The subsequent section describes potential determinants of a
therapist’s mentalization (RF) in a treatment relationship, and how therapist and patient
mentalization might operate in such a relationship.

Mentalization (RF) in clinical research
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Impaired mentalization, operationalized via low scores on the RF Scale, has been linked
with a number of different types of psychopathology—for example, panic disorder (Rudden,
Milrod, Target, Ackerman, & Graf, 2006), depression (Ekeblad, Falkenström, & Holmqvist,
2016), and drug abuse (Stover & Kiselica, 2014). However, it most frequently has been
associated with personality pathology (e.g., De Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, Luyten, & Lowyck,
2018; Fonagy et al., 1996; Levy et al., 2006b). In psychotherapy outcome trials, increases in RF
over the course of a treatment have been associated with a variety of improvements in symptoms
related to personality pathology (e.g., attachment insecurity, irritability, and verbal assault); as
such, increased RF has been considered an indicator of good treatment outcome (Clarkin, Levy,
Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2007; De Meulemeester et al., 2018; Levy et al., 2006b).
In addition to being a marker of clinical improvement for patients with personality
pathology, increased RF is also purported to be a mechanism of change in specific treatments. In
this regard, Bateman and Fonagy (2006) developed a psychoanalytically oriented therapy—
Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT)—for the treatment of borderline personality disorder.
MBT takes the augmentation of patient mentalization as its primary goal. Research has shown
MBT, in both individual and group modalities, to be associated with large reductions in patient
symptoms (e.g., Bales et al., 2014; Bateman & Fonagy, 2009; Petersen et al., 2010). And there is
preliminary evidence that the symptom reductions experienced by patients who receive
mentalization-based treatment might be accounted for by increases in their level of mentalization
(De Meulemeester et al., 2018).
It also has been argued that mentalization is a large part of what therapists do in talktherapy treatment modalities, regardless of whether it is an explicit focus of treatment (Allen et
al., 2008). However, to date, there has been little research on therapist mentalization. A study by
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Diamond et al. (2003), discussed in further detail below, has provided preliminary evidence to
suggest that cases within a particular treatment modality might vary in terms of the sophistication
of the therapist’s mentalizing. They also found evidence to suggest that a therapist might
mentalize at different levels of sophistication for different patients. While certain types of
treatments appear to be, on average, associated with greater increases in patient mentalization
than others are (see Levy et al., 2006b), it is uncertain whether potential differences between
treatments in the average level therapist mentalization are a factor in such differences. Overall,
there is a paucity of direct evidence pertaining to therapist mentalization and its associations with
patient outcomes. However, if future evidence suggests that therapist mentalization is indeed
related to patient outcomes, it would have practical implications. Specifically, there is evidence
that RF—and a therapist’s RF, in particular—can be increased through the modeling and direct
instruction of mentalizing abilities (see Ensink et al., 2013; Suchman, DeCoste, Castiglioni,
Legow, & Mayes, 2008).
In summary, the extant research suggests that low RF is a marker of various types of
pathology and that RF, in general, is a construct of importance for treatment outcomes. However,
the current knowledge base on the role of mentalizing within the patient-therapist relationship is
still largely theoretical in nature. The following section outlines some current thinking on the
ways in which mentalization—and, in particular, therapist mentalization—might operate within
the patient-therapist relationship.

Mentalization (RF) in the therapeutic relationship
While the therapeutic relationship need not be an attachment relationship for therapist
mentalization to be a key factor in the development of the patient’s own mentalizing capacity,
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the therapeutic relationship often is an attachment relationship (Holmes & Slade, 2018; Parish &
Eagle, 2003). As Parish and Eagle (2003) have noted, “Certain aspects of the therapy situation
cater to attachment needs; for example, the therapist provides a secure base from which to
explore past and present experiences, and the therapist is a person to whom one can turn in times
of distress” (p. 272). To obtain empirical evidence with respect to the attachment-relationship
qualities of the therapeutic relationship, Parish and Eagle (2003) conducted a survey of
individuals in therapy. They found that the relationships these individuals had with their
therapists exhibited many of the attachment-relationship qualities the authors had identified in
the attachment literature—e.g., serving as a safe haven in times of distress and as a secure base.
And, when compared with patients’ primary attachment figures (i.e., the person in each patient’s
life to whom he or she felt closest), therapists on average were rated higher for the qualities of
stronger and wiser and available and responsive. The overall strength of the attachment to the
therapist—as measured by the overall level of endorsement of the nine qualities of attachment
relationships the authors identified—was related to the working alliance between the patient and
therapist. This notable as the working alliance, in turn, has been associated with successful
therapy outcomes (see Horvath & Symonds, 1991). Parish and Eagle (2003) also found that
different indices of insecure attachment—as assessed via self-report—were negatively related to
the overall strength of the attachment to the therapist, the working alliance, and the duration of
the treatment.
In cases in which the patient-therapist relationship is indeed an attachment, the therapist’s
mentalizing might have additional import for the patient. Holmes and Slade (2018) assert that,
while therapy relationships with adult patients do not take place at naturally occurring “sensitive
periods” in development—i.e., “windows in developmental processes when environmental
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influence and therefore neuroplasticity are most salient” (pp. 58–59)—establishing an attachment
to a therapist entails the re-opening of “a sensitive period in clients’ lives so that the suffering
patient is open to the anxiety-modulating presence of a caregiver” (p. 59). A view of the patienttherapist relationship as an attachment relationship also increases the relevance of Slade et al.
(2005)’s findings linking Maternal RF and attachment security, as well as the relevance of the
findings linking Maternal RF to quality of caregiving (Grienenberger, Kelly, & Slade, 2005;
Stacks et al., 2014) and Maternal RF and Paternal RF to assessments of child mentalization
(Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink, Bégin, Normandin & Fonagy, 2016; Ensink et al., 2015;
Rosso, Viterbori, & Scopesi, 2015). Collectively, these findings suggest that, if a therapeutic
relationship is indeed an attachment relationship, a therapist’s level of RF with respect to his or
her patient might be an indicator of successful psychotherapeutic processes for the amelioration
of attachment insecurity and symptoms related to low RF.
A view of the patient-therapist relationship as an attachment also suggests that
a therapist’s mentalization within a therapeutic relationship would be informed by their
caregiving system. However, the caregiving provided by a therapist to a patient of theirs would
be distinct, in several ways, from the caregiving they would provide to a child of theirs. Holmes
and Slade (2018), writing about the patient-therapist relationship from the perspective that it can
be an attachment relationship, mention several important differences in the caregiving provided
in patient-therapist and parent-child relationships, some of which will be elaborated here. First,
the recipient of a therapist’s caregiving is typically a person contending with some form of
psychopathology or maladaptation.3 As such, the caregiving provided by a therapist is generally

3

For example, while an insecure state of mind with respect to attachment has been found in only 35–45
percent of adults in the general population (Magai, 2008), it is likely that a majority of individuals seeking
psychotherapy are insecure with respect to attachment (Dozier, Stovall-McClough, & Albus, 2008).
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tasked with changing the patient’s ways of being in the world. This influences the therapist’s
caregiving in that the type of mirroring the therapist performs ideally progresses from
“reasonably exact, albeit marked” to “only partially contingent” (Holmes and Slade, p. 45).4 The
therapist has a challenging role, which is needed to promote change, and which becomes more
pronounced over the course of the treatment. Another way in which a therapist’s caregiving
differs from a parent’s is that the former features “professional” analogues of some of the
caregiving elements found in parent-child relationships—as well as additional elements not
typically found in parent-child relationships (e.g., therapists explicitly make use of conceptual
tools such as countertransference and projective identification that most parents do not have
access to). In terms of professional analogues of parental caregiving, Holmes and Slade (2018)
argue that the synchrony (affective, behavioral, and—ultimately—hormonal) that is important in
parent-child relationships is achieved in somewhat different ways in the patient-therapist
relationship. They write the following:
Synchrony—in a more general sense—is built into the parameters of the patient-therapist
relationship. A “common factor” of most therapies is a warm, calm, quiet, interruptionfree, consistent, predictable, regular, reassuring therapist ambience and therapist persona.
It is reasonable to speculate that these features reproduce and evoke some of the
biobehavioral aspects of secure mother–infant relationships, and that therapists provide,
metaphorically at least, the sensitive “touch” which is often so lacking in their clients’
developmental experience (p. 58).

A therapist’s reasonably exact mirroring in the early stages of a treatment would develop in the patient
the epistemic trust needed in order for them to take in novel information from the treatment relationship
(Fonagy et al., 2017b; Holmes & Slade, 2018).
4
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To underline this distinction, patient-therapist relationships are mediated by language to a much
greater degree than parent-child relationships are. Beyond this, a relationship between a therapist
and an adult patient—i.e., a relationship between two adults—is very different from a
relationship between a parent and a young child; this difference has profound implications for the
range of interactions within the scope of the relationship. A final difference mentioned by
Holmes and Slade (2018) is that the frame of the therapy relationship (e.g., an hour-long session
once a week) influences the caregiving provided within it. Specifically, a therapist is likely to
experience “caregiving pressures” at times specific to the therapeutic paradigm. Holmes and
Slade (2018) write that “especially in the early stages of therapy, and often at the beginning and
end of sessions, patients will be seeking comfort and security rather than exploration. Therapists
at these moments will sense a caregiving pressure towards reassurance and soothing” (pp. 30–
31).
The above highlights some of the ways in which a therapist’s caregiving with respect to a
patient might differ from a parent’s caregiving with respect to a child. It also should be noted that
a therapist’s state of mind with respect to the caregiving they provide as a therapist is informed
by different factors than those that inform a parent’s state of mind. According to Holmes and
Slade (2018), the security of a therapist’s state of mind has to do with their comfort in their role
as therapist, specifically. They further argue that it is the therapist’s comfort with a specific
therapeutic approach, regardless of what that approach might be, that is important. They cite
research by Miller, Hubble, Chow, and Seidel (2013) that suggests that therapists who are most
successful have “deep, domain-specific knowledge” (Miller et al., 2013, p. 90) in a particular
orientation or approach. In other words, it is not what one knows as much as it is knowing
something well. This has implications for a therapist’s answer to the “effectiveness of caregiving
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strategies” postulate identified by Solomon and George (1996), and it likely informs their answer
to the “willingness to respond” postulate as well.
A therapist’s state of mind with respect to their caregiving for a particular patient likely
affects their work with that patient in multiple ways. Most notably for this study, and as outlined
earlier in this chapter, state of mind with respect to a particular caregiving role is should be
related to mentalization in that role (see Slade et al., 2005). Of note in this regard, Holmes and
Slade (2018) cite Dozier, Cue, and Barnett (1994) who found that secure therapists were more
likely to respond in ways that differed from or counteracted a patient’s insecure attachment style,
while insecure therapists were more likely to respond “in style” with insecure patients and thus
reinforce their attachment insecurity. Slade (2008), writing about the therapeutic relationship,
summarizes Dozier at al. (1994)’s findings in the following way:
Secure therapists were more able than insecure therapists to hear and respond to the
dependency needs of their dismissing patients, and were thus less vulnerable to
countertransference reactions toward them. Secure therapists were also more able to
manage the overt demands and explicit dependency needs of patients who were
preoccupied in relation to attachment (p. 768).
Of course, a sensitive therapist would not respond entirely “out of style” with a patient—the
patient would experience such an approach as largely noncontingent. Along these lines, Holmes
and Slade (2018) stated that therapists ideally respond flexibly: “in style” at certain times and
“out of style” at others. In this vein, they cite work by Daly and Mallinckrodt (2008) that states
that one of the prevailing qualities of experienced clinicians is the ability to be flexible in their
approach with a patient. Notably in this regard, it requires mentalization to gain insight on the
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relational patterns that a patient anticipates and engenders—and to work within such patterns at
times and outside of them at others.
As a brief summary of the above, evidence suggests that the patient-therapist relationship
possesses many of the qualities of attachment relationships, and that therapists can be attachment
figures for adult patients. However, the caregiving provided by therapists differs in many
important ways from the caregiving provided by parents (particularly parents of young children).
Additionally, the determinants of an individual’s felt security within the therapist role should
differ from the determinants of their felt security within the parent role, and, by extension,
mentalizing within each role should be influenced by different factors. For these reasons, caution
should be exercised when extrapolating theory and findings regarding the parent-child
relationship to the patient-therapist relationship. This study tentatively extends the
developmental literature to generate its hypotheses because there is limited empirical data
regarding mentalization within the therapy relationship. (This study’s hypotheses and the specific
rationale for each one are discussed below.) However, a notable study that directly assessed the
mentalizing of patients and therapists—and the functioning of the attachment and caregiving
systems of each—was conducted by Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy (2003).
Diamond and colleagues developed the Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview (PT-AAI;
Diamond et al., 1999; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), an interview that follows the
same schedule of questions as the AAI does, with minor changes in wording to fit the context of
the patient-therapist relationship. Additional questions specifically designed to explore patients’
and therapists’ experiences and representations of the therapeutic relationship appear after the
questions adapted from the AAI. Separate forms—one with the questions worded from the
patient’s point of view, and one with the questions worded from the therapist’s point of view—
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are included. Each form can be used to assess the interviewee’s state of mind with respect to the
therapeutic relationship, which, for the patient, might activate the attachment system, and, for the
therapist, might activate the caregiving system. The PT-AAI also can be used to obtain Therapist
RF and Patient RF with regard to the therapeutic relationship. The specificity of this RF is
notable because RF is expected to vary across different relationships and contexts (Fonagy et al.,
1998). Stated another way, each member of a therapeutic dyad might have higher or lower RF in
other contexts (e.g., with other patients or with other therapists).
Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, and Levy (2003) applied the PT-AAI in a
preliminary study of patient and therapist mentalization in Transference Focused Psychotherapy
(TFP; Yeomans et al., 2015), a manualized psychodynamic treatment designed for patients with
personality disorders. They administered the PT-AAI to both patients and therapists after one
year of treatment, yielding Patient RF and Therapist RF scores. They also administered the AAI
to patients after four months and one year of treatment, yielding attachment classifications and a
general RF score with respect to attachment relationships. Their findings provided preliminary
evidence to suggest that, in therapeutic dyads with favorable outcomes in terms of change in AAI
attachment classification, Therapist RF after one year of treatment was moderately ahead of
Patient RF—i.e., not mirroring Patient RF nor too far ahead of it. As the authors note, this is
suggestive of Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978), in which the learner
has capabilities beyond their own scaffolded by the teacher.
Diamond and colleagues’ (2003) preliminary results suggest that the relationship between
Therapist RF and Patient RF might ideally be a dynamic one, with the former based on the
latter’s stage of development. This would parallel the importance of a therapist’s ability to
conceptualize a patient’s state of mind within a session and adjust their interventions with regard
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to it (Holmes & Slade, 2018). It also lends support to a view in which Therapist RF is influenced
by intersubjective factors (see Holmes & Slade, 2018; Kantrowitz, 2016; Slade, 2008). Diamond
et al. (2003) hypothesized that “the capacity of patients and therapists to represent each other’s
internal worlds in mental state terms may in some sense be dependent on the dynamics of the
therapeutic dyad” (p. 229). However, more data is needed on how Therapist RF operates and
relates to outcomes in a patient-therapist relationship. Therapist RF is likely dynamic within in a
session; however, assessed via an interview such as the PT-AAI—as opposed to an observational
assessment of in-session interventions—it might have a linear relationship with patient outcome.
In the Slade et al. (2005) study described in detail above, Maternal RF, as assessed via the PDI,
had a linear relationship with children’s attachment security. It is also possible that high
Therapist RF becomes more important in the context of low RF in patients—this possibility is
described in greater detail below. However, an accumulation of research suggests Therapist RF
should be related to patient outcomes—at least for certain symptoms and in certain therapy
cases. The patient outcomes that Therapist RF is expected to be related to, and the circumstances
in which it is expected to relate to those outcomes, are the topics of the final section of this
chapter.

Prospective outcomes for Therapist RF
The present study employed a longitudinal observation of psychotherapy cases—
described in detail in Chapter III—to obtain empirical evidence regarding two primary questions.
The first question was whether Therapist RF (i.e., a therapist’s ability to mentalize about a
particular patient) would be related to patient outcomes. Pursuant to the theory and clinical data
presented in this chapter, it was expected that Therapist RF would relate to outcomes for
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symptoms that have been associated with low mentalization (RF) in patients. The symptoms
examined in this study, along with specific evidence for each one’s expected relationship with
Therapist RF, are listed below.5 These symptoms were assessed at the start of treatment and
again after 12 months of treatment; 12 months was expected to be a reasonable timeframe to
observe change in these symptoms among individuals in treatment (see Clarkin et al., 2007;
Steele, Steele, & Murphy, 2009).
The second question for which the present study sought evidence was whether the
expected relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes would be equally relevant for all
of the patients in this study. More specifically, the present study asked whether the expected
relation between Therapist RF and patient outcomes would be present among patients with
higher symptom levels but not patients with lower symptom levels. Theory and empirical
evidence with relevance for this question is presented later in this section, after the discussion of
each of the patient symptom measures included in this study.

Emotion dysregulation
In recent research, low mentalization has been associated with emotion dysregulation
(Innamorati et al., 2017; Schultheis, Mayes, & Rutherford, 2019) as well as alexithymia—a
component of emotion dysregulation (Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2019). Beyond these findings,
several writers have posited links between low levels of mentalization and emotion
dysregulation, asserting that mentalizing enhances the sophistication of one’s emotion regulation

5

Across these symptoms, it was expected that an important pathway through which Therapist RF would
be related to patient improvement would be increased mentalization in patients. However, the focus of the
present study was Therapist RF, and a direct assessment of patient mentalization (RF) was not included.
Increased patient mentalization as a mediator of symptom improvements explained by Therapist RF
might be the focus of a future study.
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techniques (e.g., Jurist, 2018; Lecours et al., 2013) as well as suggesting that high levels of
emotion dysregulation impair one’s ability to mentalize (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017a). Overall,
theory and empirical research suggest a relationship between emotion dysregulation and lower
levels of mentalizing. In this context, Therapist RF would be related to improvements in patients’
emotion dysregulation if it were associated with improvements in patients’ mentalizing, which
was proposed earlier in this chapter.
Also of note, developmental theory and research suggest that a caregiver’s mentalization
has implications for the emotion regulation of their child. Esbjørn et al. (2013) found that
mothers’ RF, assessed via the AAI, was negatively associated with the self-reported anxiety of
their 7- to 12-year-old children. And a study by Heron-Delaney et al. (2016) found that Maternal
RF, assessed via the PDI, was positively associated with the number of self-soothing behaviors
(e.g., sucking thumb, playing with clothing) that mothers’ six-month-old infants displayed when
distressed. In a similar vein, authors cited earlier in this chapter have asserted that caregiver
mentalization can facilitate a child’s emotion regulation in a direct way, by increasing the
efficacy of caregiving behaviors meant to soothe and contain the child’s distress (e.g., Fonagy et
al., 1995; Slade et al., 2005), as well as by spurring the development of the child’s own
mentalization and self-regulation abilities (Benbassat & Priel, 2012; Ensink et al., 2015, 2016;
Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Rosso et al, 2015; Scopesi et al., 2015). Extending these findings to the
patient-therapist relationship, Therapist RF might directly enhance patients’ emotion regulation
as well as develop a patient’s own capacity to mentalize and self-regulate.
A separate but related consideration is that Therapist RF might be related to a therapist’s
adeptness at regulating him- or herself in the context a patient’s dysregulation. Grienenberger et
al. (2005) found that Maternal RF made it less likely that a mother would act in intrusive or
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negative ways with her young child. This finding was subsequently corroborated by Ensink et al.
(2017). As the intrusiveness and negativity that mothers displayed in these studies was often in
response to behaviors of their children that had caused them distress, RF was seen as a factor that
prevented mothers from giving that affect back to a child of theirs in an unmodulated form.
These findings from the developmental literature might have bearing on the therapeutic
relationship. Specifically, Therapist RF might serve a regulating function for the therapist—and
help them to act in ways that ameliorate a patient’s dysregulation rather than exacerbate it.
Following the thinking outlined above, Therapist RF was expected to be associated with
reductions in patients’ emotion dysregulation symptoms. In this study, patients’ emotion
dysregulation was assessed via the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz &
Roemer, 2004).

Personality pathology
The current literature includes both empirical (e.g., De Meulemeester et al., 2018; Fonagy
et al., 1996; Levy et al., 2006b) and theoretical (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017b; Lecours et al., 2013)
links between personality pathology and low levels of mentalization (RF). In accordance with
Kernberg’s (1975) conceptualization of personality pathology, it was expected that if patients
experience improved emotion regulation and improved mentalization via their therapist’s
mentalization about the therapy relationship, they would rely less on drastic mental maneuvers
(i.e., primitive defenses) for the regulation of their negative affect. Additionally, they would have
a more cohesive sense of self. Both of these changes would be reflected in major dimensions of
the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et al., 2001)—specifically, the
primitive defenses and identity diffusion subscales. As such, in this study, Therapist RF was
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expected to be associated with reductions in personality pathology as assessed via these
dimensions of the IPO.

Externalizing symptoms
Recent studies have investigated the prevalence of externalizing symptoms among
persons with low or impaired mentalization (RF). Such research has linked difficulties in
mentalization with aggression and rule breaking (Morosan et al., 2019), drug use (Stover &
Kiscelica, 2014), and non-suicidal self-injury (Badoud et al., 2015). Research also has linked
deficits in a related construct—theory of mind—with hostility, suspicion, and paranoia
(Scherzer, Leveillé, Achim, Boisseau, & Stip, 2012; Versmissen et al., 2008). Overall, the extant
research suggests a link between low levels of mentalization and externalizing symptoms. As
such, Therapist RF should be associated with decreases in externalizing symptoms to the extent
that it is associated with improvements in patients’ mentalizing.
Empirical research also has demonstrated an inverse relation between caregivers’
mentalizing and externalizing symptoms in their children, whether child behaviors are assessed
at 20 months (Smaling, Huijbregts, van der Heijden, van Goozena, & Swaab, 2016) or 7–12
years of age (Ensink et al., 2016). Additionally, a mentalization-based intervention for parents of
children with behavioral and emotional problems was associated with reductions in externalizing
symptoms in children 1–7 years of age (Huber, McMahon, & Sweller, 2015). These findings, if
extended to the patient-therapist relationship, suggest that Therapist RF might be related to
improvements in patients’ externalizing symptoms. As such, in this study, it was expected that
patients would see greater improvements in externalizing symptoms in the context of higher
levels of Therapist RF. Externalizing symptoms were assessed via Benbassat and Shulman’s
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(2016) procedure, in which the hostility and paranoid ideation subscales of the Brief Symptom
Inventory (BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991) are averaged.

Attachment insecurity
The recent proliferation of research on mentalization began with a study that
demonstrated an association between mentalization (RF) and the security of attachment-related
states of mind (Fonagy et al., 1991). This association has since been replicated (e.g., Bizzi et al.,
2009; Bouchard et al., 2008). Even more pertinent with respect to the current study is Slade et
al.’s (2005) finding that Maternal RF—i.e., a mother’s ability to mentalize about her child—was
associated with the security of that child’s attachment to her. Extending this finding to the
clinical realm, there is reason to think that Therapist RF might be related to the security of a
patient’s attachment to their therapist. What is more uncertain is the relationship between
Therapist RF and the security of the patient’s other attachment relationships. In this study, the
relation between Therapist RF and changes in patients’ attachment security was assessed through
the Relationship Structures questionnaire of the Experiences in Close Relationships—Revised
(ECR-RS; Fraley, Heffernan, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2011). The ECR-RS is a self-report
measure of an adult’s state of mind with respect to attachment and, as such, it is a method of
assessing attachment that is less labor intensive than administering, transcribing, and scoring the
AAI—a process that requires specialized training at each step (Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2003).
While the ECR-RS has been used far less extensively as a measure of attachment than the AAI
has, its scores are reliable and associated with expected outcomes (Fraley et al., 2011). Also of
note, a single administration of the ECR-RS can be used to assess attachment in different
relationships—e.g., mother, father, romantic partner, best friend, and therapist. In a treatment
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study, this allows one to assess whether observed changes in attachment security are
generalizable across relationships. Of note in this regard, Parish and Eagle (2003) found a
correlation between the intensity of patients’ attachment to their therapist and the intensity of
their attachment to their primary attachment figure, which suggests that features of attachments
generalize among therapeutic and non-therapeutic relationships.6 That being said, Parish and
Eagle (2003) did not establish causality in the relationship above—or even explicitly measure
attachment security. However, given that attachment-related states of mind include informationprocessing rules and metacognitive elements (Main, 1991), both of which would be affected by
increases in an individual’s overall capacity for mentalization, changes in attachment security
associated with Therapist RF should generalize across different relationships.
Another notable feature of the ECR-RS is that it is a dimensional assessment of
attachment security with two distinct scales: attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety. This
is pertinent as evidence suggests that attachment states of mind in adults are not strictly
categorical (for a review, see Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). The ECR-RS’s avoidance and
anxiety scales are logical extensions of the two major types of insecurity documented by Main et
al. (1985)—dismissing and preoccupied, respectively. The ECR-RS offers the possibility that the
individual might score high in both dimensions, score high in one but not the other, or score low
in both. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, both the dismissing and preoccupied states of mind
with respect to attachment imply impaired mentalizing and, as such, both should be influenced
by Therapist RF. Overall, it was expected that patients would see greater improvements in
attachment insecurity (i.e., both avoidance and anxiety on the ECR-RS) in the context of higher

Note that Parish and Eagle did not assess the security of patients’ attachments to their therapist or their
primary attachment figure but rather the degree to which patients endorsed the qualities of an attachment
relationship for each one; they described the outcome of each of these assessments as the intensity of the
attachment.
6
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levels of Therapist RF, and it was expected that these benefits would generalize across the
relationships assessed by the ECR-RS.

Moderating effect of symptom level
The second research question mentioned above concerns the patients for whom Therapist
RF might be most beneficial. In formulating a hypothesis with regard to this question, it should
be noted that low levels of mentalization (RF) have been most clearly associated with high
symptom severity (e.g., Fischer-Kern et al., 2013); relatedly, some higher functioning outpatient
samples have been comparable to healthy controls in terms of levels of mentalization (e.g.,
Taubner, Kessler, Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011). If a major pathway through which
Therapist RF is expected to be associated with beneficial patient outcomes is increased patient
mentalization, then Therapist RF might be less relevant for patients with lower symptom levels.
Also of note, developmental theory and research suggest that a caregiver’s mentalization
would be most crucial when a child experiences heightened distress—i.e., it would be at such
moments that a caregiver’s mentalization, and the emotion regulation it brings, would be most
consequential for the development of a child’s mentalization abilities (Fonagy et al., 1995) and
possibly the caregiver’s own self-regulation (e.g., Ensink et al., 2017; Grienenberger et al.,
2005). In a similar vein, Fonagy et al. (1994) found that a mother’s RF had increased predictive
value for her child’s attachment security when she had experienced—or was currently
experiencing—substantial adversity. While this finding concerns the adversity experienced by a
caregiver rather than a recipient of caregiving, it supports the idea that a caregiver’s RF might
assume increased importance in the context of increased adversity or distress. Extrapolating the
developmental literature above to the patient-therapist relationship, it is possible that Therapist
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RF is more consequential for patient improvements in cases in which the patient brings a high
amount of distress to the treatment.
The psychotherapy literature also offers an intriguing finding with relevance for this
research question. Specifically, Schauenburg et al. (2010) found that a therapist’s attachment
security was associated with better outcomes in the areas of symptom distress and interpersonal
difficulties among patients with high baseline levels of those problems; however, it was not
related to outcomes for patients with low levels of baseline pathology. Notably, these findings
concern therapists’ attachment security rather than their RF. However, as outlined earlier in this
chapter, attachment security and RF are related constructs. As such, this finding provides indirect
evidence suggesting that patients’ baseline symptom levels might be a moderator of the relation
between Therapist RF and patient improvements, and that it might be high-distress cases where
this relation is observed. Based on the various findings summarized in this subsection—as well
as the expected concordance of the symptoms discussed above—it was expected that Therapist
RF would be of greater benefit to patients with higher symptom levels at baseline.

Research questions and hypotheses
As a culmination of the above, the following is a formal statement of this study’s research
questions and hypotheses. The first research question was whether Therapist RF would be
associated with patient improvement in the areas of externalizing symptoms, emotion
dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity from baseline to 12 months. It
was hypothesized that patients whose therapists have high levels of Therapist RF would
experience decreases in these symptom measures that would be on average larger in magnitude
than the decreases experienced by patients whose therapists have low levels of Therapist RF.
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The second research question was whether the relation between Therapist RF and patient
outcomes in the areas of externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality pathology,
and attachment insecurity would be moderated by the symptom level at baseline. It was
hypothesized that, among patients with high levels of a symptom at baseline, those whose
therapists have high levels of Therapist RF would have lower 12-month scores for that symptom
on average than patients whose therapists have low levels of Therapist RF. However, average 12month scores of patients with low levels of the symptom at baseline would not differ between
those whose therapists have high levels of Therapist RF and those whose therapists have low
levels of Therapist RF.
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CHAPTER THREE: Method
Setting and overview
This study was conducted at The Psychological Center, an outpatient mental health clinic
in an urban setting in the northeastern United States. The Psychological Center serves a
population composed primarily of persons living in the surrounding community. Therapists are
students of the clinical psychology doctoral program at The City College of New York (CCNY)
who receive an hour of individual supervision weekly for each patient with whom they work.
Supervisors cover different modalities of psychodynamic and other types of therapy. The
treatment offered at The Psychological Center typically includes a combination of expressive and
supportive elements tailored to the patient (see Dewald, 1994 for a review of supportive and
expressive elements of therapy).
The protocol for the present study was embedded within The Psychological Center’s
larger programmatic evaluation study, which has been approved by CCNY’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). All adult patients at The Psychological Center complete self-report
measures at the start of treatment as part of the standard-of-care intake process. Also at intake, all
adult patients are administered informed consent to allow their deidentified data to be used for
future research purposes. Patients who decline to provide consent are not penalized in any way
(i.e., they receive the same mental health services as those who provide consent). All patients
who move from intake to treatment, and their respective therapist, complete additional self-report
measures with regard to the treatment every four months thereafter. Therapists also complete
self-report measures at the time they begin clinical work at The Psychological Center and every
year thereafter for the duration of their residency.
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The protocol for the present study was approved by the CCNY IRB via an amendment to
the larger programmatic evaluation study. It entailed an interview, the Patient-Therapist Adult
Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al., 2016; George at al., 1984, 1988,
1996), with the therapist of each patient-therapist dyad included in this study. The PT-AAI-Rs
were conducted four months into the treatments, in conjunction with the first round of follow-up
measures mentioned above. The patient outcome measures used in this study were administered
at baseline (i.e., during the intake process mentioned above) and 12 months into the treatments as
part of The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study.

Inclusion criteria and recruitment protocol
Therapists at the Psychological Center were initially introduced to the study and its
general purpose (i.e., “to examine the patient-therapist relationship, and how it relates to
therapeutic processes and outcomes”) via presentations made by the author at weekly group
supervision meetings. Following these presentations, the author sent an email to The
Psychological Center’s listserv with the information included in the presentations. The author
also presented the study and its general purpose at an annual event devoted to research by the
students of the clinical psychology doctoral program at CCNY.
Potential participants were therapists currently providing psychotherapy to an adult
patient who at intake had given consent to have their deidentified data used in future research.
The recruitment process was limited to new therapy cases for two reasons. The first was to have
the PT-AAI-R administered at the same timepoint in each treatment. This was deemed important
to control for any effect that the duration of the therapeutic relationship might have on Therapist
RF. The second reason was to administer the PT-AAI-R early in treatments in order to look at
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the relation between Therapist RF scores and subsequent patient outcomes, rather than Therapist
RF and concurrent patient outcomes. In conjunction with the lead author of the PT-AAI-R, it was
decided that PT-AAI-Rs would be administered four months into each treatment so that the
patient and therapist would be familiar with each other at the time it was administered. An
additional inclusion criterion was that each patient had to have the potential to be in treatment for
a year or more (e.g., was not planning to relocate within the year), which was necessary for all
measures to be collected. Finally, therapists who were in the same research group as the author
of the study were not considered candidates for inclusion due to their knowledge of the primary
variable of interest in the present study, Therapist RF.
Working in conjunction with the associate director of The Psychological Center, 43 cases
that met the above criteria were identified over the 18 months during which PT-AAI-Rs were
administered. Therapists of these cases were contacted directly by the author. In all in-person and
electronic communications, potential participants were reminded of the general purpose of the
study but were not informed of the variable of interest. They were informed that participation
would entail an interview, about 60–90 minutes long, about their work with a particular patient.
They were told that the interview would be an opportunity “to have an in-depth discussion about
[their] work with a particular patient” as well as an opportunity “to learn more about [their] work
as a therapist.” No other incentives for participation were offered.
In 19 of the 43 potential cases initially identified, the therapist ultimately did not
complete a PT-AAI-R. In seven of these cases, the patient ended the treatment prior to the 4month timepoint. In six, the therapist declined to complete the PT-AAI-R. In three, the author
and the therapist were ultimately unable to schedule the PT-AAI-R. And, in three more, the lead
author of the PT-AAI-R excluded the case from this study due to an unusual break in the
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treatment. In 24 cases, the therapist agreed to participate and was administered the PT-AAI-R.
Of these cases, 17 continued for a full year and were included in the study’s analyses. The final
sample consisted of 17 different patients and 15 different therapists; two therapists each
completed two different PT-AAI-Rs—one each for two different patients. For these two
therapists, the amount of time between PT-AAI-Rs was approximately seven months for the first
therapist and approximately three months for the second therapist. The re-administration of the
PT-AAI-R within a limited timeframe was considered appropriate as interviews based on the
AAI—such as the PT-AAI-R—are designed to access unconscious, procedural information about
the attachment and caregiving systems (Main, 1995). As described in Chapter II, scoring
procedures for these interviews concern how an interviewee responds, not just what they say; as
such, it is difficult for the interviewee to alter their performance in order to achieve a specific
result—even with foreknowledge of the questions or the purpose of the interview. Given this, the
PT-AAI-R should not be greatly influenced by carryover effects from previous administrations
of the interview (see Minke, 1997 for a review of carryover effects).

Measures
Patient-Therapist Adult Attachment Interview—Revised (PT-AAI-R; Diamond et al.,
2016; George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996). The PT-AAI-R is a semi-structured interview that elicits
descriptions of the other in the therapeutic dyad and of the therapeutic relationship. It follows the
same schedule of questions as does the AAI (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1996), with minor
changes in wording to fit the context of the patient-therapist relationship. Additional questions
designed to explore patients’ and therapists’ experiences and representations of the therapeutic
relationship appear after the questions adapted from the AAI. Separate forms—one with the
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questions worded from the patient’s point of view, and one with the questions worded from the
therapist’s point of view—are included. The full interview appears in the Appendix. In this
study, only the form for therapists was used.
The original PT-AAI (Diamond et al, 1999; George at al., 1984, 1988, 1996) was revised
for this study by the author and the lead author of the original PT-AAI; the outcome of that
revision was the PT-AAI-R. The revisions were intended to elicit additional data with regard to a
therapist’s caregiving system. The PT-AAI-R includes 37 questions. Examples of questions are
“Why do you think your patient behaves the way he or she does as a patient,” “How effective, do
you think, are the therapeutic techniques that you are using to help your patient,” and “How do
you think that your patient feels about you?” All interviews were conducted by the author, who
completed a training program in AAI administration and then received additional instruction in
administering the PT-AAI-R from the lead author of the interview. Interviews were audio
recorded and then transcribed and de-identified by research assistants in accordance with the
transcription guidelines established for the AAI. As is the case with the AAI, the PT-AAI-R
administrations varied in length considerably; some were less than an hour while others were
over two hours in duration. However, most of the interviews were longer than anticipated—i.e.,
over 90 minutes. To avoid a cumbersome procedure—and to increase this study’s chances of
being replicated—it was decided that only a portion of the responses from each PT-AAI-R
transcript would be scored and used in arriving at an overall Therapist RF score (see below for
information on RF scoring). There is precedent for using a shortened interview for the
assessment of RF; for example, Rudden, Milrod, and Target (2005) created the Brief Reflective
Function Interview (BRFI), an adaptation of AAI that can be in administered in approximately
one-third the time. The BRFI focuses less on the interviewee’s episodic memories of attachment-
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related experiences and devotes a proportionally greater amount of time to prompting
participants to demonstrate their capacity for RF. Rutimann and Meehan (2012) found that the
BRFI yielded RF scores that were reliable and comparable to those derived from the AAI (r =
.71) when the two interviews were administered to the same set of participants in the same year
(on average, 6 months apart). While the full PT-AAI-R was administered to the participants in
the present study, only the questions that might be asked in a shortened interview were coded.
These questions were the following (each one’s placement in the sequence of questions on the
PT-AAI-R is indicated):
4. How close do you feel to this patient? How does this compare to the way you feel
about other patients?
9. Have you felt rejected by your patient? How have you managed those feelings at such
times? Are there any particular instances that stand out in your mind? Why do you think
your patient did those things? Do you think he/she realized he/she was rejecting?
13. In general, how do you think your overall experiences with this patient have affected
your personality/who you are now? (Probe: Are there any aspects to this relationship that
you feel have been a setback for your development?)
15. Why do you think your patient behaves the way he/she does as a patient?
16. Have there been many changes in your relationship with your patient since you have
begun treatment? (Probe: Have your feelings for your patient changed over the course of
the treatment?)
17. Is there any particular thing which you feel you learned above all from this therapy
relationship? I'm thinking here of something you feel you may have gained from the
experience.
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De-identified PT-AAI-R transcripts including only the questions above were scored for
RF according to the Reflective-Functioning Manual (Fonagy et al., 1998). RF is a narrativebased measure of an individual’s level of mentalization. A higher RF score is derived from
statements that communicate either explicitly or implicitly any of the qualities of mentalization
mentioned in Chapter II. Fonagy et al.’s (1998) rating system yields an RF score from -1
(negative reflective function) to 9 (exceptional reflective function). A score of five is considered
to denote ordinary reflective function. The odd numbers of the RF score serve as anchor points
(see Table 2). Additionally, the convention is to accept scores half-way between two points
(scores such as 3.5 and 4.5); this study adhered to that convention. When scoring an interview
transcript for RF, individual responses are scored before the rater arrives at an overall score for
the narrative. Descriptions of the anchor points of the RF scale are in Table 2. Notably, RF
assessed from PT-AAI-Rs with therapists is referred to as Therapist RF as it is specific to the
therapeutic relationship.
To maintain the integrity of the Therapist RF ratings in this study, PT-AAI-Rs were
scored by two graduate students at a different institution. The two raters had completed a training
program in scoring RF from AAI transcripts and passed a subsequent reliability test. Initially, for
this study, the two raters scored the PT-AAI-Rs of three cases that had terminated prior to the 12month timepoint and were therefore ineligible to be included in the study’s data analyses. This
was done to allow the raters the opportunity to become familiar with the PT-AAI-R, to
troubleshoot any challenges in scoring Therapist RF from the PT-AAI-R (as opposed to scoring
RF from the AAI), and to obtain convergence in their scores.
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Table 2. RF Scale Anchor Points
-1: Negative RF
This type of narrative is very rare in a normal sample. Either the speaker actively rejects the
task of reflecting on mental states or their attempts to do so produce results that are
inexplicable or bizarre.
1: Lacking in RF
A narrative that is either devoid or nearly devoid of reflective functioning. When prompted to
consider mental states, the speaker might either bypass the opportunity or else describe mental
states that appear so biased that the speaker cannot be given credit for genuine reflective
functioning.
3: Low or Questionable RF
A narrative in which the speaker generally does not explicitly consider the mental states of self
or other, though mental states might be frequently referenced in passing. More explicit
reflective functioning efforts are typically unconvincing or off topic. Some clear indicators of
reflective functioning might be present, but only sporadically so.
5: Ordinary RF
The most common type of narrative in a normal, high functioning sample. Either reflective
functioning is consistently present in an ordinary manner (e.g., prompts to take a reflective
stance consistently include one or two types of indicators of reflective functioning) or it is
complex in certain areas (e.g., with multiple types of indicators of reflective functioning) but
questionable in others. Overall, reflective functioning is somewhat attenuated—either in the
limited variety of indicators present throughout the narrative, or in the speaker’s inability to
take a more elaborate reflective stance on particular relationships, or on particular aspects of a
single relationship.
7: Marked RF
A narrative that consistently features multiple types of indicators of reflective functioning.
There is detail on how mental states influence each other and influence observable behavior.
The result is a coherent and well-elaborated model of the speaker’s mind and of the minds of
important others in their life.
9: Exceptional RF
This type of narrative is rare. It features many responses that are highly sophisticated in their
reflective functioning. The speaker regularly goes “above and beyond” the prompt by
spontaneously considering how the mental states of all involved in a situation affect each
other, and by spontaneously considering the etiology of current mental states (e.g., how they
evolved over time in relationships with important others). Rather than being predictable, a
narrative with this score is often surprising in convincing ways.

To demonstrate the reliability of the RF scores for the 17 cases in the data analyses,
approximately one-third (6) of the PT-AAI-Rs were scored by both raters, which is in line with
the convention in the literature (see Bouchard et al., 2008; Cordes et al., 2017; Levy et al.,
2006b; Taubner et al., 2013). For those six PT-AAI-Rs, the two raters’ RF scores had an
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intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of .95, which is considered excellent interrater agreement.
For the six PT-AAIs that were scored by both raters, the second rater’s scores were used in the
data analyses as they were the more senior rater. However, none of the pairs of scores differed by
more than 0.5 points.
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Boulet & Boss, 1991). The BSI is a self-report measure
designed to assess levels of various forms of psychopathology. It has 53 items, each of which
asks the respondent to rate, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which he or she has experienced a
particular problem or complaint. The BSI measures symptoms on nine dimensions: somatization,
obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety,
paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. In validity studies for the BSI, test-retest reliability scores
for the nine dimensions have ranged from .68 for somatization to .91 for phobic anxiety;
Cronbach’s alpha estimates have ranged from .71 for psychoticism to .85 for depression (Boulet
& Boss, 1991; Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983).
Following the protocol of Benbassat and Shulman (2016), the 11 hostility and paranoid
ideation items on the BSI were averaged to create a measure of externalizing symptoms, the
BSI—Externalizing (BSI-EXT). In their study of Israeli adolescents and young adults, Benbassat
and Shulman (2016) obtained a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of .83 for these items. In the present
study, missing data were addressed via multiple imputation (MI; see van Buren, 2010), and this
produced multiple imputed datasets. (More information on the missing data methods used in this
study is provided later in this chapter.) Initially, across imputed data sets, Cronbach’s alpha
estimates for the BSI-EXT items at baseline were all .76 with no variation due to no missing
BSI-EXT data at baseline. At the 12-month timepoint, Cronbach’s alpha estimates across
imputed data sets ranged from .59 to .63. As the internal consistency of the measure was
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acceptable at baseline but below the threshold for acceptable reliability at 12 months, item-total
correlations were examined to determine which items were less strongly related with the others.
Based on this examination, three BSI items (4, 10, and 40) were removed from the BSI-EXT at
both baseline and 12 months, leaving a total of eight items—four each from the hostility and
paranoid ideation subscales. Following this, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the BSI-EXT items
at baseline were all .77—as before, there was no variation across imputed datasets due to no
missing data. For the 12-month timepoint, Cronbach’s alpha estimates across imputed data sets
ranged from .67 to .69. Therefore, the internal consistency of the measure remained acceptable at
baseline, and it improved but was just below a threshold of .70 at 12 months. For hypothesis
tests, results for the BSI-EXT were obtained both with and without the three items mentioned
above omitted; in each case, the results were comparable—reinstating the three items above did
not change the outcome of any test.
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS is a
36-item self-report measure designed to assesses multiple components of emotion dysregulation.
It has six factors: nonacceptance of emotional responses, difficulties in engaging in goal-directed
behavior in the context of negative emotions, impulse control difficulties, lack of emotional
awareness, limited access to emotion-regulation strategies, and lack of emotional clarity. The
respondent rates, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which they agree with each item from (1)
“almost never” to (5) “almost always.” Gratz and Roemer (2004), in their validation study for the
DERS, obtained a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of .93 for the full 36-item measure. In this study,
the DERS global score, the sum of all 36 items, was used as a measure of emotion dysregulation.
Of note, two cases did not receive the DERS at 12 months due to an administration error; one
case received the DERS at 12 months but had 25 percent of items missing at that timepoint.
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However, per The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study, patients had also
completed the DERS at 8 months into the treatment. For these three cases, the Last Observation
Carried Forward (LOCF; National Research Council, 2010) approach was employed and the 8month data, which did not have any missing items for any of the three cases, was used in place of
the 12-month data. As the LOCF approach resulted in a shorter time frame for the DERS change
scores for these the patients, it yielded a more conservative assessment of patient change in this
area. (Note: in subsequent reporting the final DERS score is referred to as the 12-month score for
all cases.) The remainder of missing DERS data were addressed through multiple imputation.
Across imputed data sets, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the DERS at baseline were all .95 after
rounding to two decimal places; Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the DERS at 12 months were all
.96 due to no missing data at this timepoint.
Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et al., 2001). The IPO is a selfreport measure based on an object-relations conceptualization of personality pathology (see
Kernberg, 1975). The version used in the present study is the 57-item version designed to assess
the respondent’s level of personality pathology along three dimensions: primitive defenses,
identity diffusion, and poor reality testing. For each item, the respondent rates, on a 5-point scale,
the extent to which the item applies to them. Across studies, Cronbach’s alpha estimates have
been .80–.87 for primitive defenses, .84–.90 for identity diffusion, and .85–.87 for reality testing.
Test-retest reliability has been .81 for primitive defenses, .83 for identity diffusion, and .80 for
reality testing (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). Lenzenweger et al. (2001) found the primitive
defenses and identity diffusion subscales to be highly correlated (r = .97). As these two subscales
were hypothesized to be more closely related to Therapist RF than reality testing was, the 37
primitive defenses and identity diffusion items were summed to create a measure of personality
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pathology, the IPO—Personality Pathology (IPO-PER). In the present study, across imputed data
sets, Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the IPO-PER at baseline were all .96 after rounding to two
decimal places, and Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the IPO-PER at 12 months were all .94 after
rounding to two decimal places.
Experiences in Close Relationships—Relationship Structures (ECR-RS; Fraley et al.,
2011). The ECR-RS is a self-report measure that assesses the interviewee’s attachment anxiety
and attachment avoidance in specific relationships. A researcher using the ECR-RS chooses the
relationships for which they would like to assess respondents’ attachment. In the present study,
participants completed the ECR-RS for the following relationships: mother, father, romantic
partner, best friend, and therapist. In each instance, the patient was instructed to think about the
target relationship while rating, on a 7-point scale, the degree to which they agreed or disagreed
with different statements for the relationship in question.7 Each form contains the same 9 items,
and in this study respondents saw 45 items total.
Typically, the ECR-RS is used to obtain two separate measures of attachment insecurity
for each relationship: avoidance, which is an average of the first six items, and anxiety, which is
an average of the last three items. Cronbach’s alpha estimates for the avoidance items for
different relationships, and for the anxiety items for different relationships, have ranged from .87
to .92 (Fraley et al., 2011). However, in the present study, therapist mentalization was not
hypothesized to have different effects for attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety. As such,
Fraley’s (2012) procedure for the creation of an overall score (i.e., an average of the avoidance
score and the anxiety score) was used to create a measure of general attachment insecurity, the

7

The ECR-RS instructions promote the completion of items in situations in which the respondent does not
have the target relationship by, for example, instructing the respondent to answer the questions about “a
mother or mother-like figure,” “a current or former romantic partner,” etc.
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ECR—Insecurity (ECR-INS). Additionally, Fraley’s (n.d.) protocol for averaging across
relationships was used to obtain a measure of attachment that was general rather than specific to
a particular relationship. This was done to test the hypothesis that Therapist RF would be
associated with changes in patients’ states of mind with respect to attachment across the
relationships assessed. Fraley et al. (2011), in their validity study for the ECR-RS, obtained
Cronbach’s alpha estimates of .88 for global (i.e., across-relationship) avoidance and .85 for
global (i.e., across-relationship) anxiety. However, in Fraley and colleagues’ research with the
ECR-RS (e.g., Fraley et al., 2015; Fraley et al., 2011), they required respondents to answer all
items for all relationships. As The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study did not
require patients to complete any item in any measure, patients in this study could skip any ECRRS items—or all of the items for any relationship (i.e., mother, father, partner, friend, or
therapist). To limit bias in standard errors, which increases as the amount of imputed data
increases (Eekhout et al., 2014), the ECR-INS score for a given relationship for a particular
participant was considered missing if less than 50 percent of the items for that relationship had
been completed at one or both timepoints. With this criterion, most patients had insufficient data
to produce an ECR-INS score for one or more of the five relationships assessed. Following
Leenders, Buunk, and Henkens’s (2018) protocol for missing ECR-RS data, each participant’s
final ECR-INS score at baseline and at 12 months was an average of the relationships that had
sufficient data to yield an ECR-INS score at both timepoints. Five patients had enough data to
yield scores for all five relationships, and their final ECR-INS score at each timepoint was an
average of their data for all five relationships. Five patients had enough data to yield scores for
four relationships; three patients had enough data for three relationships; one patient had enough
data for two relationships; and two patients had enough data for one relationship. One patient did
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not have enough data for any relationships—this case was excluded from the ECR-INS analyses.
As, for each relationship type, multiple patients had insufficient data, ECR-INS data for
individual relationships were not used in this study’s data analyses. Additionally, because the
final ECR-INS scores were combinations of different relationships for different patients, it was
not possible to obtain internal consistency information at each timepoint.

Missing data
Across measures, no more than 12 percent of participants were missing data for any item
with the exception of certain ECR-INS items, for which up to 47 percent of participants were
missing data. A possible explanation for the large amount of missing data for these ECR-INS
items is that patients skipped items in cases in which they did not have a particular relationship.
While the measure’s instructions did not require patients to currently have the exact relationship
indicated (as stated above, patients were instructed to complete the mother items with regard to
“a mother or mother-like figure,” the partner items with regard to “a current or former romantic
partner,” etc.), the large amount of data missing for the ECR-INS, when compared with the
amount missing for the other measures, suggests that patients considered many of these items to
be not applicable to them.
A Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) conducted on the entire dataset indicated that the data
could not be assumed to be missing completely at random, χ 2 (3,357) = 128,938.32, p < .001.
Without access to the data that are missing, it is not possible to determine conclusively whether
the data are missing at random (MAR) or missing not at random (MNAR) (van Buuren, 2012). In
light of this, multiple imputation (20 data sets) was selected to impute missing data as it is known
to “mitigate bias and improve the chances of satisfying the MAR assumption” (Enders, 2010, p.

76
17) by controlling for variables related to missing-data mechanisms (van Buuren, 2012).
Variables in the data for this study were inspected to determine which ones correlated with
missingness. A number of variables were identified and incorporated into the MI model, and
missing data were multiply imputed. Following the work of Eekhout et al. (2014), a measure was
excluded from the data analyses for a particular participant if that participant failed to complete
at least 50 percent of that measure’s items at one or both timepoints; this was done to limit bias
in standard errors, which increases as the amount of imputed data increases. Notably, this
procedure only affected the ECR-INS data—no other measure had over 50 percent of items
missing for any participant at either timepoint. Results of all subsequent tests were pooled across
the multiply imputed datasets.
To test whether results before and after MI differed, the hypothesis tests described below
were also run with cases with missing data excluded. A few relations were significant in the
complete-case analyses that were not significant in the analyses with MI data. However, all
relations that were significant with the MI data were also significant in the complete-case
analyses. As such, these results appear robust to the procedure used for missing data.

Analytical strategy
Hypothesis 1 stated that Therapist RF would be related to patient improvement, from
baseline to 12 months, in each of the four outcome variables described above: BSI-EXT, DERS,
IPO-PER, and ECR-INS. To test this hypothesis, generalized estimating equations (GEE; Liang
& Zeger, 1986) were used—one for each of the four outcome measures. GEE is an analytic
method that accounts for correlations among repeated measures. Unlike other approaches to
longitudinal data (e.g., RANOVA), GEE can be used with non-normally distributed outcomes
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and can accommodate missing data (Ballinger, 2004; Ma, Mazumdar, & Memtsoudis, 2012).
Additionally, GEE is robust to a misspecified correlation structure for repeated observations
(Ghisletta & Spini, 2004; Zorn, 2001); however, picking the correct structure increases the
efficiency of parameter estimates (Wang & Carey, 2003). For the analysis for each of the
outcome measures, the standard errors, the Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model
Criterion (QIC), and the parameter estimates were nearly identical across different working
correlation structures, indicating that none of the structures performed better than the others.
Thus an exchangeable correlation structure, which assumes that all pairs of observations in a
series of timepoints are equally correlated with each other, was specified. Beyond the
requirement of a working correlation structure, GEE assumes at least 10 clusters (or cases) and at
least two timepoints (Norton et al., 1996; Ghisletta & Spini, 2004); both assumptions were met
for these analyses.
Two therapists in this study each completed two PT-AAI-Rs and had two different
Therapist RF scores in the analyses. As Therapist RF is expected to vary across a given
therapist’s therapeutic relationships (Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al., 1998), the DurbinWatson statistic was used for each analysis to determine whether the data indicated that errors
could be treated as independent. Field (2017) suggests that Durbin-Watson values below 1 and
above 3 are definite cause for concern regarding the assumption of independent errors. Given the
exploratory nature of this study, Field’s benchmark was deemed acceptable. It was met for all
tests, so the data were not clustered by therapist.
In each GEE used to test Hypothesis 1, the symptom measure (i.e., BSI-EXT, DERS,
IPO-PER, or ECR-INS) was the dependent variable. The data were entered in repeated-measures
format with two rows for each case: one row for the baseline score and one row for the 12-month
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score. A two-level Time variable (baseline vs. 12 months) was entered into the model as a
predictor along with Therapist RF, which was mean centered, and the interaction between Time
and mean-centered Therapist RF. The significance of the interaction was regarded as an indicator
of whether change in the outcome measure varied by levels of Therapist RF.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that, for each of the four symptom measures described above (i.e.,
the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS), symptom level at baseline would moderate the
relation between Therapist RF and the outcome for that symptom. Several different models for
testing this hypothesis were considered, and each entailed certain benefits as well as certain
drawbacks. Repeated-measures ANOVAs would account for the within-subject correlation
between the baseline and 12-month scores. However, it was discovered that using a repeatedmeasures model to test Hypothesis 2, which regards the baseline score as a putative moderator,
would place the baseline score on both sides of the equation—i.e., as an outcome as well as a
predictor. In such a scenario, the baseline score would effectively cancel itself out. Additionally,
several authors (Dimitrov & Rumrill, 2003; Dugard & Todman, 1995; Huck & McLean, 1975;
Knapp & Schafer, 2009) have noted problems with repeated-measures approaches to measuring
change; for example, baseline scores are in most cases correlated with change scores, so
repeated-measures models do not adequately control for the baseline score in determining the
effect of the treatment variable on outcome. One option for circumventing the issues above
would be an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression predicting 12-month scores as a function
of baseline scores, thus predicting change. Using fabricated data, Dugard and Todman (1995)
illustrated the use of such a model to test whether a baseline score moderates the effect of a
treatment variable on a post-test score. In the present study, testing moderation in this way would
entail, for each outcome measure, a hierarchical regression with the baseline score, Therapist RF,
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and the interaction between the baseline score and Therapist RF as predictors of the 12-month
score. In this model, the baseline score and Therapist RF are both mean centered, and the
interaction is between these two mean-centered variables. However, OLS regression assumes
independence of observations; as such, the use of a baseline score as a predictor of a 12-month
score might lead to biased standard errors. To assess the severity of this bias, the decision was
made to test Hypothesis 2 with two different models. First, the hierarchical linear regression
model described above was used. In these tests, significant interactions between the baseline
score and Therapist RF that resulted in significant increments in the variance explained by the
model were probed further by calculating estimates of the relationship between Therapist RF and
the 12-month score at specific values of the baseline score (i.e., one SD above the mean and one
SD below the mean) and then performing simple slopes analyses. These follow-up probes
determined the significance and the nature of the interaction. Second, the data were entered in
long (i.e., repeated-measures) format, which resulted in the addition of a Time variable as well as
that variable’s interactions with Therapist RF and the baseline score. As in the first model, the
baseline score and Therapist RF were mean centered. The three-way interaction was between
Time and these two mean-centered variables. GEE was used to test the significance of the threeway interaction between Time, the baseline score, and Therapist RF to determine whether the
significance of the interaction term in the first model held after accounting for dependence
among repeated observations.
The underlying assumptions of the regression analysis described above are the
following: multivariate normality, a linear relation between each predictor and the outcome,
homoscedasticity of residuals, and independence of observations. The assumptions of normality,
linearity, and homoscedasticity were first assessed via visual inspection of plots of residuals, and
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independence between cases was assessed via Durbin-Watson tests as described above.
Additionally, a global test provided by the gvlma package in R was used as a more formal means
of testing the assumptions of regression. Individual tests performed for each assumption do not
consider the impact of violations of the other assumptions; also, performing multiple tests
increases the chance of incorrectly concluding that one of the assumptions has been violated (see
Peña & Slate, 2006). This global test provided a single p-value that indicated that all of the
assumptions of regression were met. Further, the Bonferroni outlier test was used to determine
that no cases had large absolute studentized residuals with Bonferroni-corrected p-values of <
.05. However, it was noted that the BSI-EXT data included two cases with large Cook’s
distances, with average values of 1.07 and 2.82 across imputed datasets; this indicated that each
of these cases had a large influence on the analyses. As such, the hierarchical regression
described above was re-run with these influential cases removed, and results both with and
without these cases included are reported in Chapter IV.

Significance level and power
A significance level of .10 was used for the hypothesis tests described above. Notably,
when compared to a significance level of .05, a significance level of .10 increases the probability
of a Type I error—i.e., concluding that the hypothesized relationship exists when it does not.
However, it reduces the risk of a Type II error—i.e., concluding that the hypothesized
relationship does not exist when it does. As this is a preliminary study for a construct that, to
date, has not been adequately studied in the field, and replication will be needed for any
significant findings, increasing the risk of Type I error was deemed acceptable in order to reduce
the risk of Type II error. Reducing the risk of Type II error was also a priority as there were

81
constrains on the sample size due to a limited number of student therapists at The Psychological
Center—and, by extension, a limited number of new cases starting. The statistical power of the
present study is discussed in further detail below.
To determine the number of cases that would be needed to test the GEE analyses in
Hypothesis 1 with adequate power, relevant effect sizes in developmental and clinical research
were examined. First, Fonagy et al. (1991) found that, among (N = 100) first-time mothers, a
mother’s RF, assessed via the AAI prior to her child’s birth, had a large association (r = .51) with
her child’s security classification assessed via the Strange Situation at one year. Additionally,
Slade et al. (2005) found that, in a sample of (N = 40) first-time mothers, a mother’s RF
specifically with regard to her relationship with her child, assessed via the PDI at 10 months,
had a large association (Cohen’s d = 0.81) with her child’s attachment security assessed via the
Strange Situation at 14 months. While these findings of Fonagy et al. (1991) and Slade et al.
(2005) concern the mother-child relationship, which generally differs from the patient-therapist
relationship in scope and importance, they suggest that a caregiver’s RF can have a large effect
on the attachment security of the individual receiving care. In the area of clinical research, De
Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, Luyten, and Lowyck (2018) found that, in a sample of (N = 175)
patients with BPD receiving hospital-based treatment, changes in patients’ RF were strongly
correlated (r = .89) with improvements in their symptomatic distress, as assessed via the Dutch
version of BSI. This finding concerns patient RF rather than therapist RF, but it speaks to the
importance of RF as a potential mediator of the amelioration of distress in the context of
personality pathology. As such, it has relevance for the present study, which views changes in
patient RF as a mediator of the effects of Therapist RF.

82
Based on the above research, which demonstrated large effect sizes but did not pertain
directly to Therapist RF, it was assumed that Therapist RF would have a medium-to-large effect
on the symptoms assessed, each of which has been linked to low RF in clinical samples. To
approximate the sample size needed to test Hypothesis 1 with adequate power, G-Power 3.1.9.2
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) was employed. In G-Power, the closest model to the
analyses used to test Hypothesis 1 is a repeated-measures design in which the interaction
between the time variable and a dichotomous variable is used to predict outcomes. G-Power
indicated that, for a design with two timepoints, a significance level of .10, and an effect size
half-way between a medium effect (Cohen’s f = .25) and a large effect (Cohen’s f = .40), a
sample of 18 cases would be required to obtain a power of at least .80 (the generally accepted
criterion for power in the field). The Hypothesis 1 analyses in this study, which included 17
cases for the BSI-EXT, the DERS, and the IPO-PER, and 16 cases for the ECR-INS, did not
meet this criterion and, as such, might be underpowered. However, the G-Power analysis above
does not reflect that the analyses in the present study had a continuous predictor variable (i.e.,
Therapist RF) or that they used a GEE model. So, following the above tests, research on the
power of GEE analyses was sought. Ma et al. (2012) investigated the power of GEE when
compared with other models and found that GEE performs better, in terms of power, than the
model assumed in the G-Power analysis (i.e., repeated-measures ANOVA). Therefore, while the
exact power of the GEE analyses for Hypothesis 1 are uncertain, the available information
suggests that they may be adequately powered or, if not, slightly underpowered.
With regard to the regression analyses for Hypothesis 2, relevant effect sizes were
sought. Research suggests that moderating effects, in general, are small (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, &
Pierce, 2005; McClelland & Judd, 1993; Shieh, 2009). And published research on the constructs
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examined in this study, by and large, did not offer guidance regarding the size of the moderating
effects that might be expected for the tests for Hypothesis 2. An exception was a study by
Schauenburg et al. (2010) who, in a sample of N = 31 therapists treating N = 1,381 patients,
assessed therapists’ state of mind with respect to attachment as a continuous variable, from
secure to insecure. They found that therapist security was associated with better outcomes in the
areas of symptom distress and interpersonal difficulties among patients with high baseline levels
of those problems. The size of the effect of the interaction between patients’ baseline symptom
distress and therapists’ attachment security on patients’ post-test symptom distress was mediumto-large, r = -.40. And the size of the effect of the interaction between patients’ baseline
interpersonal difficulties and therapists’ attachment security on patients’ post-test interpersonal
difficulties was medium, r = -.31. Notably, these findings were for the therapists’ attachment
security rather than their RF, though, as demonstrated in Chapter II, these constructs are
significantly related.
Further indirect evidence regarding the size of a potential moderating effect for baseline
symptom level can be found in the developmental literature. As noted above, Fonagy et al.
(1994) found that, among mother-child dyads in which the mother had experienced substantial
adversity, her RF was an almost perfect indicator of whether or not her child was rated as
securely attached at one year of age. In a sample of 27 such dyads, the child was rated as secure
in 100 percent (10 of 10) of the cases in which the mother had high RF but only 6 percent (1 of
17) of the cases in which the mother had low RF. For dyads in which the mothers did not have a
history of substantial adversity, RF was a less powerful predictor. In a group of 70 such dyads,
the child was rated as secure in 79 percent (31 of 39) of the cases in which the mother had high
RF and 32 percent (13 of 31) of the cases in which the mother had low RF. The effect size of the
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interaction between mothers’ history of adversity and mothers’ RF was medium (Cramer’s V =
0.33). While this effect size concerns the parent-child relationship—and adversity experienced
by a caregiver rather than a recipient of caregiving—it nevertheless illustrates the increased
importance a caregiver’s RF might assume in the context of increased distress.
Overall, in the literature, there is a limited amount of evidence with implications for the
size of the moderating effects under consideration in Hypothesis 2. The published data that do
have implications for this hypothesis suggest medium to medium-to-large effect sizes. However,
given the evidence that moderating effects are generally small, and the indirect nature of the
evidence cited above, it was considered prudent to estimate an effect size on the smaller end of
what the research above would suggest. As such, a medium effect size was hypothesized for
these tests. Subsequently, G-Power 3.1.9.2 was used to approximate the sample size needed to
test Hypothesis 2 with adequate power. It indicated that, for a linear regression with three
predictors (one tested predictor), a significance level of .10, and a medium effect size (f2 = .15), a
sample of 43 cases would be required to obtain a power of at least .80. As such, the analyses for
Hypothesis 2 are underpowered. The low power of these tests presents an inflated risk of
reaching an incorrect conclusion in each test. However, given the exploratory nature of this
study, it was decided to include these tests, as significant findings would have the potential to
stimulate attempts at replication that are more adequately powered. At the same time, these
results should be interpreted with additional caution.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Results
Sample characteristics
Of the 17 patients included in the data analyses, 13 (76.5%) were female and 4 (23.5%)
were male. They had a mean age of 32.2 years (SD = 9.80). Eight (47.1%) were White, three
(17.6%) were Black, one (5.9%) was mixed race, and five (29.4%) identified ethnically and not
racially; of the five who identified ethnically, four identified as Latino/Hispanic and one
identified as ethnically mixed. Twelve (70.6%) had at least a bachelor’s degree and nine (52.9%)
were employed full time.
The 17 patients included in the data analyses were compared with the 7 who terminated
prior to 12 months of treatment in terms of demographics. An independent-samples t-test
indicated that these groups did not differ in terms of age, t(22) = -1.14, p = .27, and chi-square
tests indicated that they did not differ in terms of gender (male vs. female, X 2(1) = 0.90, p = .37),
race (White vs. non-White, X 2(1) = 0.70, p = .65), education (bachelor’s degree vs. less, X 2(1) =
0.40, p = .65), or employment (full-time job vs. less, X 2(1) = 1.19, p = .39). These two groups
were also compared on their baseline scores for the symptom measures in this study. Betweensamples t-tests with cases with complete data indicated that these groups did not significantly
differ in their baseline scores for the BSI-EXT (t(22) = 0.93, p = .36), the DERS (t(18) = 1.07, p
= .30), the IPO-PER (t(21) = -.45, p = .65), or the ECR-INS (t(20) = .82, p = .42).
Of the 15 therapists, 10 (66.7%) were female and 5 (33.3%) were male. They had a mean
age of 33.80 years (SD = 7.10). Eleven (73.3%) were White, two (13.3%) were Black, one
(6.7%) was South/Southeast Asian, and one (6.7%) was mixed race.

Descriptive data and covariates for Therapist RF
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Therapist RF scores ranged from 3.5 to 7.0. (M = 5.35, SD = 1.13). A score of 3.5 is
closest to the “3” anchor point of the RF scale, which is low (or questionable) RF. A score of 7.0
aligns with the “7” anchor point of the RF scale, which is marked RF.
In this study, some (N = 10) cases had a once-a-week session frequency and others (N =
7) had a twice-a-week session frequency at the time of their PT-AAI-R administration. However,
a t-test indicated that Therapist RF was not significantly related to session frequency, t(15) =
-1.33, p = .20. In a similar vein, the correlation between Therapist RF and the cumulative number
of sessions the patient-therapist dyad had completed prior to the PT-AAI-R was not significant, r
= .04, p = .89, and neither was the correlation between Therapist RF and the length of time (in
days) that had elapsed since the first session, r = .01, p = .97. Additionally, correlations between
Therapist RF and the baseline score of the BSI-EXT (r = .33, p = .20), the DERS (r = -.05, p =
.86), the IPO-PER (r = .40, p = .12), and the ECR-INS (r = .20, p = .47) revealed no statistically
significant relationships. However, Therapist RF did have a medium positive correlation with the
IPO-PER at baseline as well as with the BSI-EXT at baseline, such that higher Therapist RF
scores were associated with higher IPO-PER scores at baseline as well as higher BSI-EXT scores
at baseline.

Descriptive data for outcome measures
Mean scores for the measures of patient symptoms (i.e., the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER,
and ECR-INS) at baseline and 12 months, as well as t-scores for the within-subjects changes, can
be found in Table 3. Dependent-samples t-tests indicated that, for the BSI-EXT and IPO-PER
scores, the reduction in patients’ scores from baseline to 12 months was significant, and the size
of the effect of time was medium. However, for the DERS and ECR-INS scores, the reduction in
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patients’ scores from baseline to 12 months was not significant, and the size of the effect of time
was small.

Table 3
Mean Outcome Scores‡
Outcome

Baseline
M
SD

12 months
M
SD

0.64

0.45

0.42

0.30

2.84

16

.005

0.63

DERS

86.65

25.22

84.71

25.40

0.42

16

.67

0.08

IPO-PER

78.36

27.60

68.04

18.20

2.87

16

.004

0.45

ECR-INS

2.84

1.06

2.69

0.93

1.03

15

.30

0.16

BSI-EXT

t

Dependent-samples t-test
df
p

d

‡

Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. N = 17 for BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER; N = 16 for
ECR-INS.

Relations among symptom measures
Relations among the symptom measures at baseline and 12 months can be found in Table
4. Notably, the BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER were more strongly correlated with each other
than they were with the ECR-INS. Also of note, the correlations between the IPO-PER and two
of the other symptom measures were significantly weaker at 12 months than they were at
baseline. Specifically, the correlation between the IPO-PER and the BSI-EXT at 12-months (r =
.41), was below the 90 percent CI [.47, .88] of the correlation at baseline (r = .74). Similarly, the
correlation between the IPO-PER and the DERS at 12-months (r = .40), was below the 90
percent CI [.49, .89] of the correlation at baseline (r = .75).
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Table 4
Relationships Among Outcome Measures‡
Outcome

BSI-EXT

DERS

IPO-PER

ECR-INS

BSI-EXT

.69**

.44†

.41

-.10

DERS

.70**

.72**

.40

.04

IPO-PER

.74***

.75***

.87***

.27

ECR-INS

-.01

.26

.31

.83***

‡

Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. All values Pearson's r. Correlations below the diagonal are
correlations between measures at baseline. Correlations on the diagonal are between the measure at
baseline and the measure at 12 months. Correlations above the diagonal are between measures at 12
months. N = 17 except N = 16 for correlations including ECR-INS. †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, and
***
p < .001.

Relations between Therapist RF and change in symptom measures over time
It was hypothesized that patients whose therapists had high levels of Therapist RF would
experience decreases in the BSI-EXT, DERS, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS that were on average
larger in magnitude than would patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF. To test
this hypothesis, generalized estimating equations (GEE; Liang & Zeger, 1986) were used—one
for each of the four outcome measures. The results of these analyses appear in Table 5.
As expected based on the results of the dependent-samples t-tests reported above, the
time effect was significant for BSI-EXT and IPO-PER scores. Specifically, holding Therapist RF
constant, Time was associated with significant decreases in the BSI-EXT as well as with
significant decreases in the IPO-PER. Additionally, holding Time constant, Therapist RF
positively predicted IPO-PER. This indicated that, regardless of timepoint, higher Therapist RF
scores were associated with higher IPO-PER scores. However, the interaction between Time and
Therapist RF was not significant for any of the outcome measures (all ps > .1). This indicated
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that the relation between Time and each of the symptom measures did not vary by levels of
Therapist RF. As such, these tests did not support the hypothesis that patients whose therapists
had high levels of Therapist RF would experience symptom decreases that were on average
larger in magnitude than would patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF.

Table 5
GEE Estimates for Outcome Variables‡
Outcome Variable
Predictor Variables

b

SE

Wald χ2

p

Time
Therapist RF
Time x Therapist RF

-0.23
0.13
-0.05

0.08
0.11
0.08

8.92
1.56
0.48

.003
.21
.51

Time
Therapist RF
Time x Therapist RF

-1.94
-1.04
-3.63

4.37
6.47
4.10

0.20
0.03
0.79

.66
.87
.38

Time
Therapist RF
Time x Therapist RF

-10.32
9.66
-1.86

3.45
5.67
3.32

8.94
2.90
0.32

.003
.09
.58

Time
Therapist RF
Time x Therapist RF

-0.15
0.19
0.09

0.15
0.26
0.16

1.01
0.54
0.37

.32
.47
.57

BSI-EXT

DERS

IPO-PER

ECR-INS

‡

Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. N = 17 for BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER; N = 16 for
ECR-INS.

Baseline symptom level as a moderator of Therapist RF
It was hypothesized that, among patients with high baseline levels of a symptom, those
whose therapists had high levels of Therapist RF would have lower 12-month scores for that
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symptom on average than patients whose therapists had low levels of Therapist RF. Additionally,
average 12-month scores of patients with low baseline levels of the symptom would not differ
between those whose therapists had high levels of Therapist RF and those whose therapists had
low levels of Therapist RF. This hypothesis was tested for each symptom measure with two
different models. First, a hierarchical regression with the baseline score, Therapist RF, and the
interaction between the baseline score and Therapist RF as predictors of the 12-month score.
This model holds baseline scores constant, thus predicting change. The results of this model are
reported in Table 6. Second, the data were entered in long format, with one row for the baseline
timepoint and a second row for the 12-month timepoint for each case; this resulted in the
addition of a Time variable as well as that variable’s interactions with Therapist RF and the
baseline score. In this second model, GEE was used to test the significance of the three-way
interaction between Time, the baseline score, and Therapist RF to determine whether the
significance of the interaction term in the first model held after accounting for dependence
among repeated observations.
As mentioned in Chapter III, when running the regression analyses for the first model, it
was noted that the BSI-EXT data included two cases with large Cook’s distances (average values
of 1.07 and 2.82 across imputed datasets), which indicated that these cases had a large influence
on the analyses. As such, the first model’s analyses were re-run with these cases removed, and
the results for both BSI-EXT analyses appear in Table 6.
The results in Table 6 show that, for the regression on 12-month BSI-EXT scores, the
only result that differed depending on whether all cases were included was the relation between
the baseline score and the 12-month score. The baseline score significantly predicted the 12month score when all cases were included (b = 0.44, p = .002) but it no longer did when the two
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cases with large Cook’s distances were excluded (p > .1). In neither analysis was the test of
interest, the interaction between Therapist RF and baseline BSI-EXT, significant (both ps > .1).

Table 6
Multiple Regressions on 12-Month Outcome Scores‡
Outcome Variable
Predictor Variables

b

SE

t

p

BSI-EXT—all cases included
Step 1
Baseline score
Therapist RF
Step 2
Baseline x Therapist RF

0.44
0.02

0.15
0.06

3.02
0.38

.002
.70

0.004

0.12

0.04

.97

BSI-EXT—cases removed
Step 1
Baseline score
Therapist RF
Step 2
Baseline x Therapist RF

0.30
-0.01

0.24
0.06

1.29
0.24

.20
.81

DERS
Step 1
Baseline score
Therapist RF
Step 2
Baseline x Therapist RF
IPO-PER
Step 1
Baseline score
Therapist RF
Step 2
Baseline x Therapist RF
ECR-INS
Step 1
Baseline score
Therapist RF
Step 2
Baseline x Therapist RF
‡

R2

ΔF

.47

.47

0.001

.37

.39
-0.09

0.18

0.49

0.24

.63
.55

0.69
-4.08

0.15
3.33

4.65
-1.23

<.001
.22
.72

-0.32

0.11

-2.81

7.91**

.005
.78

0.54
2.64

0.10
2.31

5.45
1.14

<.001
.25

-0.01

0.08

-0.16

.87

0.73
0.15

0.14
0.13

5.07
1.17

<.001
.24

.78

0.02

.70

.72
-0.09

0.12

-0.74

.46

Data in table pooled from multiple datasets. N = 17 for BSI-EXT, DERS, and IPO-PER; N = 16 for
ECR-INS. †p < .1, *p < .05, and **p < .01.

0.80
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With regard to the results with implications for the hypothesis stated above, the
interaction terms for the first model appear in Table 6. For the regression on 12-month DERS
scores, the interaction between Therapist RF and baseline DERS was a significant predictor (b =
-0.32, p = .005), and it significantly added to the amount of variance explained by the model, ΔF
= 7.91, p = .005. To determine the significance and nature of this interaction, estimates of the
relationship between Therapist RF and 12-month DERS at specific values of baseline DERS
(i.e., one SD above the mean and one SD below the mean) were calculated. These estimates are
depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Interaction between baseline DERS scores and Therapist RF.

Simple slopes analyses probing the interaction between baseline DERS and Therapist RF
showed that, when baseline DERS was high (1 SD above the mean), the difference in outcome
between dyads with low Therapist RF (1 SD below mean) and those with high Therapist RF (1
SD above mean) was significant—those with high Therapist RF had significantly lower 12-
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month DERS scores, b = -12.10, t = -2.74, p = .01. This result is represented by the slope of the
black line in Figure 1, which is significantly less than zero. However, when baseline DERS was
low (1 SD below the mean), the difference in outcome between dyads with low Therapist RF and
those with high Therapist RF was not significant, b = 3.95, t = 0.91, p = .36. This result is
represented by the slope of the gray line in Figure 1, which is not significantly different from
zero. Also, when Therapist RF was low, patients with high baseline DERS had significantly
higher 12-month DERS scores than did those with low baseline DERS, b = 1.05, t = 5.49, p <
.001. This result is represented by the difference between the gray and black lines on the left side
of the graph in Figure 1. However, when Therapist RF was high, the difference in outcome
between patients with high baseline DERS and those with low baseline DERS was only
marginally significant, b = 0.33, t = 1.66, p = .10. This result is represented by the difference
between the gray and black lines on the right side of the graph in Figure 1. In order to determine
whether this result held after correcting for autocorrelation, the results of the second model
described above were consulted. The second model indicated that the result held: the three-way
interaction between Time, baseline DERS, and Therapist RF remained significant and was of
comparable magnitude, b = -0.32, SE = 0.05, Wald χ2 = 34.77, p < .001. These results support
Hypothesis 2 with regard to the DERS.
As shown in Table 6, none of the interaction terms for the other outcome measures (i.e.,
the BSI-EXT, IPO-PER, and ECR-INS) were significant (all ps > .1). These results were
confirmed by the three-way interaction terms for the BSI-EXT (b = 0.004, SE = 0.12, Wald χ2 =
0.02, p = .97), the IPO-PER (b = -0.01, SE = 0.05, Wald χ2 = 0.06, p = .81), and the ECR-INS (b
= -0.09, SE = 0.07, Wald χ2 = 1.60, p = .21) in the second model. This indicates that the data did
not support this hypothesis for the other outcome measures of interest.
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Post-hoc qualitative comparison: Therapists who completed two PT-AAI-Rs
After the data were collected and the PT-AAI-Rs were scored, it was noted that, among
the two therapists who each completed two interviews, one had relatively consistent Therapist
RF scores for their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.0 for the first interview, 5.5 for the second), while the
second had rather different scores (6.5 for the first interview, 3.5 for the second). Each of these
observations conveys an important characteristic of Therapist RF. The first therapist’s two
interviews, which had relatively similar Therapist RF scores, demonstrate that a therapist might
achieve a relatively similar level of RF in somewhat different ways for different patients. (Note:
while Fonagy et al. (1998) did not propose categorically different types of “good” RF in their
scoring manual, there are nevertheless different ways in which ordinary-or-better-RF scores
might be obtained in a particular narrative.) The second therapist’s two interviews demonstrate
that a therapist might have a substantially higher level of RF for one patient than for another. The
discrepancy in this pair of interviews also reinforces the notion that Therapist RF is an attribute
of the therapy relationship—i.e., that it is not a product of just therapist attributes or just patient
attributes but rather is influenced by both parties in the therapeutic dyad. This assumption is
based on work by Diamond et al. (2003) who found evidence to suggest that therapists’ capacity
for RF may differ with respect to different patients. It is also based on the research and writing of
Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2017b; Fonagy et al., 1998) who suggest that RF, in
general, is influenced by the history and characteristics of a dyad in which it occurs. Notably,
this idea informs the present study’s hypotheses, which are based on the notion that the relation
between Therapist RF and patient outcomes is influenced by the type and magnitude of the
patient’s symptoms.
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The characteristics of Therapist RF mentioned above can be further illustrated by looking
at the responses given to the same PT-AAI-R prompt in each of these four interviews—i.e., in
both interviews completed by each therapist. Below are excerpts from each therapist’s responses
to the question, “Why do you think this patient behaves the way he/she does as a patient?” (Note:
the excerpts below were edited to preserve confidentiality.)

Therapist 1, PT-AAI-R for Patient 1
In response to the prompt above, the first therapist, in the first PT-AAI-R they completed,
produced a response that was scored a 5 (ordinary RF). It included the following:
My general experience of her is that she’s a very compliant patient. She comes in
relatively ready to do the thing—do what therapy is for. Which I think is you know
figuring, using it as a space to explore her emotions, trying to understand how she reacts
to people and to events. Um, and, I think part of that is like her motivation to figure out
what’s going with her. Um, because she does have sort of a dearth of close relationships.
And I think part of that um, obviously has to do with like her upbringing and her
relationships with her parents, but I, I don’t know, it’s a hard question to answer. It seems
really multifactorial. Um and also I think that I’m sure there’s a lot about me that
impacts, how she behaves in session. Yeah . . . I do, I do notice that there’s a give and
take between like how I am in the session and how she is in the session, yeah.
This response demonstrated an “ordinary” level of RF in a couple of different ways. First, the
therapist made explicit references to intentional mental states that they believed the patient had
held at various points in the treatment—e.g., “using it as a space to explore her emotions” and
“trying to understand how she reacts to people and to events.” Second, the therapist, through
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certain statements (e.g., “it’s a hard question to answer” and “it seems really multifactorial”),
indicated that their thoughts with regard to the patient’s mental states were not facts but
hypotheses and, thus, open to new information and possible revision. As fixed ideas about
another person are indicative of a lower level of RF, the therapist’s uncertainty about their
hypotheses indicates higher RF.
Another notable passage was the one in which the therapist reported a belief that their
own behavior had influenced the patient’s behavior. However, the therapist did not speak to
potential mental states intervening in the connections between their own and the patient’s
behavior, so this statement did not increase the RF score for this passage. Similarly, the therapist
took an intergenerational perspective (i.e., “she does have sort of a dearth of close relationships.
And I think part of that um, obviously has to do with like her upbringing and her relationships
with her parents”), which is often a marker of higher RF. However, in this case, the statement is
not developed with references to specific mental states, so it does not increase the level of RF in
the response. It is important to note that the instances in which the therapist did not explicitly
reference mental states do not necessarily indicate that the therapist was not capable of
considering mental states with regard to a particular topic. However, theory regarding RF (see
Fonagy et al., 1998) contends that spontaneous elaborations with regard to mental states are
indicative of higher levels of RF as they imply that the speaker is regularly taking a mentalizing
stance and implicitly understands the importance of doing so.

Therapist 1, PT-AAI-R for Patient 2
In the PT-AAI-R the first therapist completed with regard to their second patient, they
produced a response that was scored a 6 (ordinary-to-marked RF). It included the following:

97
I think . . . that [patient’s name] is really trying to figure out who she is. And I think that,
um, I think she’s enacting a lot of dynamics from her childhood that she hasn’t yet
understood. And like maybe doesn’t even realize that she’s doing. I think that . . . she has
a lot of expectations. I mean it’s very hard for her when her expectations are not met,
either by herself or by other people . . . And so she gets, she’s upset easily. But then she
has another part of her personality which is that she doesn’t really feel she should ever be
upset. {{subject laughs a beat}} ’Cause she feels like she should be happy all the time.
So um, so she’s a little bit between a rock and a hard place, I mean I think that she, I
think that her, I think she doesn’t allow herself a lot. I think she doesn’t allow herself
very much. [Interviewer: Very much?] Uh, anything. But particularly emotionally. I
think she just doesn’t allow herself to feel that much . . . and so when she does feel a lot
it’s very, very hard for her . . . I think [she is] feeling like she is so unhappy and she like
can’t really stand it anymore. Um, she’s really, she’s really like become aware of how
fake she feels, and how much she doesn’t want to feel that way, how much it’s getting in
the way, of her having any sense of like fulfillment or satisfaction, from her relationships
with other people in particular.
This response demonstrated an “ordinary-to-marked” level of RF in a few different ways. Similar
to the response above, it contained multiple references to specific mental states in the patient—
e.g., “it’s very hard for her when her expectations are not met, either by herself or by other
people,” and “she doesn’t really feel she should ever be upset . . . she feels like she should be
happy all the time.” However, this response included mental states that were in conflict with
each other (for example, the two just mentioned)—as well as an awareness of the distress that
this conflict seemed to create for the patient. This type of mentalizing—i.e., considering the
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interactions of mental states within a single mind—is indicative of higher RF. Additionally, this
response, similar to the one above, included a statement that communicated a recognition that
one frequently has limited insight into mental states; however, in this response, the limitation the
therapist mentioned was with regard to the patient’s insight into one of her own mental states
(i.e., “maybe doesn’t even realize that she’s doing that”). In a similar vein, and also indicating
RF, the response in this interview included statements that conveyed a sense that the patient
might work to disguise some of her mental states, from others or even herself—e.g., “she just
doesn’t allow herself to feel that much . . . and so when she does feel a lot it’s very, very hard for
her” as well as “she’s really like become aware of how fake she feels, and how much she doesn’t
want to feel that way.” The latter of these two statements also references a change in mental
states over time, which is another indicator of RF.
Similar to the response this therapist provided on their first PT-AAI-R, in this response
there is a statement that takes an intergenerational perspective (i.e., “I think she’s enacting a lot
of dynamics from her childhood”). But, as in the first response, this statement is not elaborated
(e.g., with regard to what the dynamics were, and how they influenced the patient’s thoughts and
feelings), so the therapist was not given credit for RF for this statement. Overall, this response
has several references to mental states that could have been more elaborated (e.g., “she has a lot
of expectations,” “she just doesn’t allow herself to feel that much”). However, once again, these
less-developed statements do not necessarily indicate that this therapist was not capable of
considering mental states in a more elaborate way. The therapist might or might not have had
more to say; however, in either case, they opted not to mentalize further.

Summary for Therapist 1’s responses
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Overall, these responses were comparable in terms of their level of RF, with the second
response demonstrating a level of RF one scale point above the first. (Note: despite the second
response having a higher score, the therapist’s first PT-AAI-R actually had a slightly higher
overall score—6.0 versus 5.5 for the second interview.) The ways in which RF was constrained
were similar across the two responses—most notably, the therapist often referenced mental states
without elaborating on them, or they alluded to interpersonal dynamics without speaking about
the mental states involved. Additionally, the two responses had some of the same types of
moderate-to-high-RF indicators—e.g., references to intentional mental states in the patient, and
statements recognizing the limitations on insight into mental states. However, there were also
some differences in the indicators of RF seen in the two responses. In the first response, the
therapist indicated that there were limitations on their insight into the patient’s mental states. In
the second response, the therapist indicated that the patient’s insight into her own mental states
might be limited. The second response also contained markers of RF not found in the first
response, which yielded a higher score for this response. These markers included references to:
interactions between mental states within a single mind, the intentional disguising of mental
states, and changes in mental states over time.

Therapist 2, PT-AAI-R for Patient 1
In response to the prompt above, the second therapist, in the first PT-AAI-R they
completed, produced a response that was scored a 7 (marked RF). It included the following:
I’m seeing this dropping, you know, dropping these important things to talk about and
then not coming back to them. And I think a good part of what’s going on is this desire to
please . . . she wants to be the good patient. She’s very afraid of not being the good
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patient. And then the not being able to ask for help is a theme that I’m seeing now more
than I did a few weeks ago. And I’m beginning to think it’s happening in the treatment
too. You know, she comes, she’s reluctant to specifically ask for what she wants to talk
about . . . But even this business of going, running to her mom and telling her about every
treatment session, there’s something about it that is, um, she’s working so hard to reveal
herself to be seen . . . to please but not to ask for help.
This response demonstrated a “marked” level of RF in a few different ways. There are references
to specific, intentional mental states in the patient (e.g., “desire to please,” “afraid of not being
the good patient,” “reluctant to specifically ask for what she wants to talk about”). Also, there are
references to an evolution in the therapist’s thinking (e.g., “I’m beginning to think” and “I’m
seeing now more than I did a few weeks ago”); this indicates an awareness of an important
attribute of mental states—specifically, that they can evolve over time. It also indicates that the
therapist’s thoughts have been open to revision. This last point is reinforced by some of the
language the therapist used when discussing the patient’s mental states: phrases such as “I think
a good part of what’s going on” and “I’m beginning to think,” which indicate that the therapist’s
thoughts about the patient are hypotheses rather than certainties—and thus open to new
information. Another indicator of RF can be found in the therapist’s idea that the patient’s
feelings about the treatment might have differed from observable aspects of her behavior within
the treatment. Imagining that individuals have depth beyond their observable behavior is an
important aspect of RF.
However, the “marked” level of RF in this response is not due solely to the presence of
multiple types of indications of RF. It is also due to the degree to which the patient’s
hypothesized mental states are elaborated and supported with evidence, and the degree to which
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a coherent and nuanced picture of the patient’s mind emerges. In this response, the therapist
reported a belief that the patient wanted to do what she felt the therapist was asking of her—i.e.,
she wanted to keep the therapist happy. The therapist also stated that the patient did not stick
with topics that she might have wanted to discuss further. They linked that observation to the
patient’s relationship with her mother, to whom the patient was reporting the events of each of
her therapy sessions. The therapist then extrapolated from the available information to formulate
a hypothesis that the patient wanted both her therapist and mother to see what she needed—and,
presumably, give it to her—but was not directly asking for help from either one. This multilayered conceptualization of the patient’s behavior in the early stages of this treatment is an
important part of how this response demonstrated “marked” RF.

Therapist 2, PT-AAI-R for Patient 2
In the PT-AAI-R the second therapist completed regarding their second patient, they
produced a response that was scored a 3 (low RF). It included the following:
Um, well I would say that, the way he behaves as patient, the things that are salient, is
that he is very respectful of the frame, and he is um, he is really eager for help. Um, I
think he is respectful of the frame because, a big part of his self-image is that he is um,
you know a decent, upstanding, good person. Um, and so, you know, and he had two
years of therapy in advance so he’s been trained on the frame. Um, and I think the reason
he is, uh so invested in therapy, is because, um, his life is more settled now than it has
been. Um, he’s, he has a really good job. His relationship is, um, a healthy relationship.
And I sense that he feels like if he’s gonna get his head in order, you know this is the, the
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time to do it. Um he’s not fighting any battles externally right now. You know, he has
someone to care for him. Um, and he’s really unhappy.
As mentioned above, this response received a score of 3.0 (“low” RF). It did contain references
to mental states in the patient; to account for the patient’s behavior in the treatment, the therapist
said that the patient was “very respectful of the frame” and “really eager for help.” Each
statement indicated some RF in that the therapist was considering the patient’s mind—if in
simple terms. The therapist’s subsequent elaborations of these mental states referenced static
qualities in the patient or external factors in his life. Specifically, with regard to “respectful of the
frame,” the therapist first stated that the patient had a “self-image” as “a decent, upstanding,
good person.” As this explanation referred to a static factor—akin to personality—rather than
specific mental states, it did not indicate a high level of RF. The therapist then supposed that the
patient “had two years of therapy in advance so he’s been trained on the frame.” As this
explanation attributed behavior to past experience without reference to intervening mental states,
it did not employ RF. Similarly, with regard to the “eager for help” mental state (which the
therapist later termed “invested in therapy”), the therapist explained this by stating that the
patient was “really unhappy” despite his life being “more settled now”—and then pointed to
external factors (e.g., the patient’s job and relationship) to support the “settled” aspect of the
patient’s life. As such, the therapist’s conclusion—“he feels like if he’s gonna get his head in
order, you know this is the, the time to do it”—appears to be derived from a consideration of the
patient’s life circumstances. While considering normative responses to life circumstances can be
an indicator of RF, on the whole this response is simple in terms of its consideration of mental
states; as such, it received a score of 3.0.
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Summary for Therapist 2’s responses
Overall, the second therapist’s responses were divergent in terms of their level of RF,
with the first response demonstrating a level of RF four scale points above the first. While both
of these responses included references to mental states in the patient being discussed, only in the
therapist’s first response did they acknowledge the possibility that the patient’s thoughts and
feelings might have been divergent from observable aspects of their behavior. Additionally, only
in the therapist’s first response did they reference the patient’s relationship with them as well as
reference their own mental states—i.e., the evolution of their thinking with regard to the patient.
In the therapist’s second response, the patient’s mental states were generally attributed to static
qualities in the patient or external factors in his life. There was also an instance in which the
therapist attributed the patient’s behavior to past experiences without referencing intervening
mental states. Overall, the differences in the level of RF seen in the two responses might be
viewed as differences in sophistication—only in the first response did a nuanced picture of the
patient’s mind emerge. The greater sophistication of the first response is notable as these two
responses were given by the same therapist in response to the same question—the only
difference was the particular therapeutic relationship under discussion.

Further illustration of Therapist 2’s PT-AAI-Rs
To illustrate further the ways in which Therapist RF might be expressed or constrained in
a PT-AAI-R, this section provides additional descriptive information on the two interviews
conducted by the second therapist mentioned above. As stated earlier, this therapist obtained
divergent Therapist RF scores on their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.5 on the first interview and 3.5 on the
second). As such, these interviews illustrate how Therapist RF might vary among a given
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therapist’s cases. Some implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter V. (Note: quoted
responses were edited to preserve confidentiality.)

First interview, overall Therapist RF score of 6.5
In this interview—which overall had a level of RF just below the “marked” anchor point
of the RF Scale—the therapist frequently considered the patient’s mental states and the impact of
those mental states on the patient’s behaviors. Additionally, their language often contained
acknowledgements that insight into mental states is imperfect. For example, when attributing
mental states to the patient, the therapist often used phrases such as “I think” and “I sense” in
ways that denoted some measure of uncertainty. However, despite this uncertainty, the therapist
still strove to make reasonable hypotheses about the patient’s mental states, implicitly
communicating that they saw value in the endeavor. They also considered that thoughts and
feelings regarding a given situation might diverge from observable aspects of that situation. (One
instance in which this quality was demonstrated is the response from this interview discussed in
the sections above, for the question of why this patient behaved the way she did as a patient.)
The therapist also communicated an understanding that mental states are potentially subject to
disguise. Additionally, they considered interactions between mental states. This marker of RF
can take different forms; in this interview it was manifest in the therapist’s consideration of the
intersubjective field between them and the patient—and how their own mental states might have
affected the patient’s. The therapist also communicated a high level of investment in the
treatment. While this last quality is not in itself an indicator of RF, it did, in this case, accompany
a high level of engagement with the patient’s mind. Overall, the therapist’s responses in this
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interview included a variety of indicators of RF, many of which were well elaborated, and this
resulted in nuanced and credible depictions of mental states within the therapeutic relationship.
In one response that included several of the above qualities, the therapist spoke about an
event in the therapy that caused them to feel, momentarily, some uncertainty regarding whether
the patient would continue in the treatment. They stated, “When [the patient] left me a voicemail
saying that her flights had been changed, and she wasn’t going to come in for therapy, I
remember feeling this little like jolt of, you know, ‘I wonder what that means, I wonder,’ you
know?” The therapist followed this by saying that there was not any obvious reason for them to
have had that feeling. The interviewer then asked them if they thought the patient had been
aware of the possibility that they (the therapist) might have had a reaction like that to the
cancellation. Their response was the following:
What an interesting question. I think she was because she, um, spent the first 15 or 20
minutes of our time meeting after that, telling me how dreadful her flights were and how,
you know, kind of how out of control the whole thing was and I sense that some of that
was, um, as a way of, um, making clear to me that this wasn’t something she did on
purpose. [Interviewer: And what was it like for you to hear her give all that information
about the dreadful quality of the flights?] I sat there debating whether or not to, say
something about, um, you know, by asking, “are there, are you concerned that somehow I
felt, you know, that you were not as engaged in therapy or something?” But it just, it just
didn’t feel right in the moment so I just kind of listened to her tale.
This response is particularly notable for its consideration of the ways in which each member of
the dyad’s mental states might have interacted with the other’s. Specifically, the therapist
reported that the patient’s cancellation prompted them (the therapist) to experience briefly some
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doubt about the future of the treatment even though, in their reasoning, there was not an obvious
reason for them to have felt that way. Then, in response to a prompt from the interviewer, the
therapist stated that the patient probably had wondered if the cancellation had upset them, and
they supported this supposition by reporting that, at the start of the next session, the patient had
seemed to be working to mitigate what she imagined was the therapist’s upset. This response,
while incorporating plausible readings of observable behavior, allowed for the possibility that
each member of the dyad’s thoughts and feelings might have diverged from the more observable
features of the situation (e.g., the therapist, in their reporting of the situation, had no clear reason
to doubt that the treatment would continue, yet they reported that they momentarily had such a
thought). It also reinforced the notion that mental states are susceptible to disguise (e.g., the
therapist was uncertain about the exact nature of patient’s mental state and whether the
interpretation they had in mind would have been productive; additionally, they did not reveal to
the patient that they had indeed felt some doubt about the treatment). Also of note, the
mentalizing here, particularly at the start of the excerpt above, seemed to be actively happening
during the interview; it did not seem to be a reiteration of an understanding previously obtained,
which is important as recapitulations of ideas about mental states do not necessarily denote RF,
especially if they were shared with the individual by someone else. While there are other factors
that the therapist potentially could have considered in this response, and this response in isolation
does not necessarily indicate an effective treatment, it is a multi-layered description of the mental
states underlying certain events transpiring in the therapy. This was also true of the response
from this PT-AAI-R discussed in the sections above, and it is characteristic of this interview as a
whole.
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Also of note, several of the therapist’s responses in this interview spoke to changes in
mental states between past and present. For example, the therapist stated that their feelings for
the patient had deepened, and that a frustration that they (the therapist) had felt toward the
patient earlier in the treatment perhaps “spoke to my level of care for her.” They also spoke
about the opportunity the therapy relationship had provided for experimenting with how much
they should intervene as a therapist, and the way their thoughts about this had changed: “I was
concerned early on that I would feel this need to interject and I don’t. It’s not that hard.” As
mentioned above, an awareness of the evolution of mental states over time is a marker of high
RF.
A final aspect of the interview that should be mentioned is the therapist appeared
relatively comfortable in their role as a therapist for this patient. This quality is discussed further
in a qualitative analysis in Chapter V.

Second interview, overall Therapist RF score of 3.5
In this interview, the patient’s mental states were usually described with broad strokes
rather than with specifics. Examples of this can be seen in the response from this PT-AAI-R
discussed in the sections above—i.e., the response to the question of why this patient behaved
the way he did as a patient. For example, in that response, the therapist said that the patient was
“respectful of the frame” because: a) he had been in therapy before, so he had been “trained on
the frame,” and b) “a big part of his self-image is that he is a decent, upstanding, good person.”
Responses such as these did not describe situation-specific mental states in the patient. In this
vein, the therapist, in this interview, seemed to keep some distance from the mind of the patient.
When asked what they have learned or gained from the therapeutic relationship—or the
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experience of working with the patient—the therapist responded that it was “professionally” a
“really interesting case” because “my other adult patient does not have a kind of personality
disorder . . . I’m not sure that he [i.e., this patient] officially meets all the narcissism criteria, but
he’s pretty close.” The therapist, in this response, employed technical terminology—e.g.,
“narcissism criteria”—instead of considering specific mental states in themselves or the patient.
While this does not mean that the therapist would have been unable to speak about specific
mental states here—i.e., those that made this “a really interesting case”—they did not
spontaneously do so. Another moment in which the therapist seemed to maintain some mental
distance from the patient occurred later in the interview: when asked how the therapy
relationship had affected their personality, the therapist initially dismissed the idea with some
humor. The follow-up prompt, a more general “how has it affected who you are now?” question,
which eschewed the implication that the interviewee’s personality had been affected by the
therapy relationship, led to the following response:
I think the most important way, but the same is true of my second adult patient, is that I
am affirmed in my choice of this as my profession . . . I love working with my
supervisors to try and make sense of what’s going on. I, um, it’s, I wish I knew a bit
more, like what I was doing. I’m grateful that my supervisors are there to help me. But I
really enjoy building these relationships. I really enjoy the time in the room. And so in
that way it has been actually very important, to who I am as a person because it affirms
my choice.
In this response, the therapist spoke of their own mental states but only tangentially referenced
the patient being discussed, and they spoke of their two adult patients as a pair. In a different
vein, this response is also notable for the way in which the therapist communicated some
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uncertainty with regard to their abilities and did not seem as comfortable in the therapist role as
they did in their first PT-AAI-R. This is discussed further the qualitative analysis in Chapter V.
An additional point with regard to the low-RF aspects of this interview, one that is
perhaps related to the somewhat impersonal nature of the responses described above, is that
descriptions of the relationship were often unintegrated with each other or not supported by
descriptions of events from the treatment. For example, in one response, the therapist initially
referred to the patient as “really very empty in many ways” before saying that they “admired”
him without elaborating on either assessment. This is notable from an RF standpoint as one
aspect of RF is the linking of higher-order representations for a given object into a coherent
whole, even if some of those representations are odds with each other.
A final note with regard to this interview is that a higher level of RF emerged in one of
the therapist’s responses. This underscores the notion that RF can fluctuate, and that it can do so
within a single relationship as well as across different relationships (Fonagy et al., 1998). It also
suggests that the therapist’s characteristic level of RF with respect to this relationship might be
higher in the future. This is discussed further in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Discussion
The tests described in Chapter IV yielded two significant findings. First, there was an
interaction between Therapist RF and patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline such that
Therapist RF was significantly related to reductions in emotion dysregulation for patients with
high levels of the symptom at baseline but not for those with low levels of it. Second, higher
Therapist RF was associated with higher personality pathology across timepoints. The hypothesis
that Therapist RF would be positively related with reductions in patients’ externalizing
symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality pathology, and attachment insecurity was not
supported. In addition, the hypothesis that a patient’s symptom level at baseline would moderate
the effect of Therapist RF was supported for only one outcome measure—emotion dysregulation.
However, all of the findings for this hypothesis—both the null and non-null findings—were
underpowered and should be regarded with caution.
Outside of the tests of this study’s hypotheses, the PT-AAI-Rs of the therapists who each
completed two interviews were examined. One of these therapists had relatively consistent
Therapist RF scores for their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.0 for the first interview, 5.5 for the second),
while the second therapist had rather different scores on their two PT-AAI-Rs (6.5 for the first
interview, 3.5 for the second). The variability of these Therapist RF scores, particularly the
second therapist’s scores, corroborates prior research suggesting that RF generally—and
Therapist RF, specifically—depends on the characteristics of the dyad in which it occurs
(Diamond et al., 2003; Fonagy et al., 1998).
Each of the topics above is discussed in greater detail this chapter, which is divided into
the following sections:
•

Insufficient statistical power in analyses.
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•

The interaction between patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline and Therapist RF.

•

The positive relation between patients’ personality pathology and Therapist RF.

•

Nonsignificant findings.

•

Intersubjective factors: Therapist RF as case dependent.

•

Qualitative analysis of two PT-AAI-Rs.

•

Clinical implications of the present study.

•

Limitations of the present study and directions for future research.

Insufficient statistical power in analyses
The tests for this study’s second hypothesis—i.e., that baseline symptom level would
moderate the effect of Therapist RF—yielded one significant finding and three nonsignificant
findings. However, as mentioned in Chapter III, these tests were underpowered—a sample of 43
cases would have been necessary to test this hypothesis with adequate power. Stated another
way, 43 cases would have been necessary to obtain an 80 percent chance of correctly concluding
that the hypothesized relationship exists. As such, there is an elevated possibility that each of
these tests yielded an incorrect conclusion with regard to the second hypothesis. Here it should
be reiterated that the present study was intended to be a preliminary study of Therapist RF and
generate hypotheses for future research. For this reason, it was decided to include the tests of the
second hypothesis. However, the results of these tests should be regarded with caution. While the
tests for the first hypothesis—i.e., that patient change would vary by levels of Therapist RF—
were more adequately powered than the tests for the second hypothesis, it should be noted that
these tests, too, were based on a small sample of 17 dyads. As such, the results of these tests also
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should be regarded with some caution. The sections below summarize these results and some of
their possible implications.

Interaction between patients’ emotion dysregulation at baseline and Therapist RF
It was hypothesized that high levels of Therapist RF would be more beneficial for
patients who were more symptomatic, at baseline, in the symptom areas assessed in this study.
The results suggest that this might be the case for patients’ emotion dysregulation symptoms. For
patients with high emotion dysregulation scores at baseline, Therapist RF was associated with
better outcomes in this area. For patients with low levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline,
outcomes in this area did not vary by levels of Therapist RF. This is in line with the literature
that identifies the amelioration of episodes of emotion dysregulation as one of the primary
functions of a caregiver’s RF (e.g., Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 1995). Indeed, it has been
hypothesized that emotion regulation precedes the development of mentalization in an individual
being cared for (e.g., a child or patient)—and makes possible the development of further
mentalizing capabilities in that individual (e.g., Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). Therapist RF would
be associated with a patient’s emotion regulation because emotion regulating interventions
require mentalization on the part of the therapist in order to be successful. As mentioned in
Chapter II, Fonagy et al. (1995) provided examples of interventions that a caregiver can use to
contain a child’s intense affect. These examples, which can be adapted for the patient-therapist
relationship, include interventions in which a therapist communicates:
•

that they understand the patient’s feeling, the cause of it, and how difficult it is;

•

that the feeling can be contained and coped with; and
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•

that they see intentionality in the patient’s gestures and communications to them, and that
the patient sees intentionality in the therapist’s gestures and communications.

Notably, in this formulation, Therapist RF has a direct effect on a patient’s emotion
dysregulation; the development of the patient’s capacity for mentalization is not a mediator of
this effect. However, a patient who is more regulated has an opportunity to develop a higher
capacity for mentalization (see Fonagy et al., 2017a), which subsequently transforms the
methods for emotion regulation at their disposal. And, notably, that capacity is modeled by a
therapist in exchanges such as the one described above.
Additionally, Therapist RF likely plays an important role in the emotional and behavioral
regulation of a therapist who works with a patient who has a high level of emotion dysregulation.
It can be dysregulating for a therapist to encounter dysregulation in a patient. A dysregulated
patient can bring into the therapy relationship hostile or otherwise upsetting behaviors. Therapist
RF, in these cases, might help a therapist to regulate themselves so that they refrain from
maladaptive behavior in response to hostile or upsetting behaviors from a dysregulated patient.
This would parallel the findings of Ensink et al. (2017), who found that mothers’ RF was
associated with fewer intrusive and aggressive behaviors in their interactions with their
children—and that most of those behaviors, when they did occur, did so in response to a child
doing something that produced distress in their mother. As a caregiver “returning” intense affect
in an unmodulated form—even subtly—would be counterproductive to the regulation of that
affect (Fonagy et al., 2002), a therapist’s self-regulation becomes an important aspect of the
therapy relationship for patients with high levels of emotion dysregulation.
Indeed, for the symptom of emotion dysregulation, Therapist RF might be crucial. As a
whole, the sample of patients in this study did not see improvements in their emotion
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dysregulation symptoms. But high Therapist RF predicted better outcomes in those with high
levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline. Here it is worth reiterating that the cases in this
sample predominantly were not manualized treatments, and mentalization was not an explicit
focus of therapists across the cases. This suggests that the relevance of Therapist RF is not
limited to treatments in which mentalization is viewed as a mechanism of change. It also
supports Allen, Bateman, and Fonagy’s (2008) assertion that mentalization is a common factor in
the efficacy of psychotherapy, regardless of the orientation of treatment.

Positive association between patients’ personality pathology and Therapist RF
It was hypothesized that Therapist RF would be related to patients’ symptom reductions
in the area of personality pathology. However, in the tests for this hypothesis, it was found that,
holding the Time variable constant, there was a positive relationship between Therapist RF and
personality pathology. In other words, high Therapist RF scores were associated with high
personality pathology scores. While this was unexpected, it can be connected with an important
finding from the developmental literature. As mentioned above, Fonagy et al. (1994) asked a
sample of new mothers about adverse events that they had experienced during their own
upbringing. These events included a life-threatening illness in either parent, mental illness in
either parent, and criminal behavior in either parent. As these experiences have been associated
with poor outcomes—for the person experiencing them as well as their offspring (see Fonagy et
al., 1995 for additional information)—mothers who had experienced more than two of these
events were considered “at risk.” Among the “at risk” mothers, 10 had high RF—in all 10 cases,
their child was securely attached to them. However, 17 highly stressed mothers had low RF, and
in only 1 of these cases was their child securely attached to them. These findings highlight the
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importance of a caregiver’s RF in the context of adversity. In this vein, it is possible that a
therapist might mentalize at higher levels when working with patients who have high levels of
certain types of symptoms; the therapist might experience these symptoms as a form of adversity
for the dyad. Sitting across from a patient with a high level of personality pathology, for
example, a therapist might feel a strong pull to mentalize with and about the patient with the goal
of ameliorating the patient’s suffering, which would be closely tied to the patient’s reduced
capacity for mentalization. The therapist might share with the patient a perspective in which the
patient’s dysfunctional response patterns are not immutable aspects of who they are. Or they
might share with the patient a perspective in which their life stressors are not personal insults or
manifestations of something personally wrong with them. In either case, the therapist would be
adopting a stance in which events might be viewed from multiple perspectives (notably including
the perspective that the patient brought into the session), which has the potential to reduce the
patient’s negative affectivity. And the therapist might feel a broader pull to introduce their
mentalizing capacity into the relationship so that the patient might identify with it and,
subsequently, think in similar ways without the therapist’s assistance. Of note, such interventions
might be employed by a therapist who is not explicitly considering mentalization as a construct.
Another possibility is that a therapist might increase their level of RF with a patient who
has a higher level of personality pathology in order to keep themselves emotionally regulated and
to maintain perspective on the relationship. In the context of the primitive defenses and identity
diffusion characteristic of personality pathology, these would be salient concerns. As mentioned
in Chapter II, individuals with impaired mentalization and personality pathology often
experience emotional contagion in social situations, which can prompt them to “be rigid and
highly controlling in order to maintain a subjective sense of coherence and integrity” (Fonagy et
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al., 2017a, p. 7). Therapist RF can be seen as a way for a therapist to counteract potential
dysregulation as well as maintain a sense of agency in the context of a patient’s controlling
behaviors.
Overall, for a sensitive therapist, a patient with personality pathology might present an
implicit “pull” for greater RF. In the present study, the correlation between Therapist RF, which
was assessed four months into the treatments, and patients’ personality pathology at baseline was
medium-sized (r = .40). While it was not quite statistically significant (p = .12), it was the largest
of the correlations between Therapist RF and each of the symptom measures at baseline. As
such, it is possible that higher personality pathology levels at baseline served a goad to higher
Therapist RF at four months of treatment.
That being said, in the present study, Therapist RF was not associated with changes in
personality pathology over time, even among patients with high levels of the symptom. This is
particularly notable, as, in the full sample, there was a significant, medium-sized reduction in
patients’ personality pathology scores on the IPO-PER (Cohen’s d = 0.45). The nonsignificant
relationship between Therapist RF and those reductions is discussed in greater detail in the
subsequent section. It also should be noted that Therapist RF was assessed at 4 months of
treatment and personality pathology was assessed at baseline and 12 months. As such, there is
temporal uncertainty in the relations between Therapist RF and the assessments of personality
pathology. The interpretation offered above is that high personality pathology was a pull for
greater Therapist RF (i.e., Therapist RF increased as a response to patients’ personality
pathology scores); however, this is not the only possible interpretation of the data. While it
would be unexpected, an alternate explanation is that patients’ personality pathology scores
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increased as a response to high Therapist RF. The lack of clarity associated with the timing and
limited number of the assessments in this study is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Nonsignificant findings
As mentioned above, Therapist RF was positively associated with patients’ personality
pathology scores, but its relationship with changes in those scores was nonsignificant. However,
personality pathology was not the only symptom measure in this study for which change was not
dependent on Therapist RF. None of the symptom measures changed from baseline to 12 months
in ways that would have been predicted by Therapist RF. And for only one symptom measure,
emotion dysregulation, was there a relation between Therapist RF and outcome that was
moderated by the baseline level of the symptom. There are several potential reasons for the little
support obtained for this study’s hypotheses. These include the following: patient symptom
levels that were lower than those that have been reported for other clinical samples, a limited
range of Therapist RF scores, a lack of support for this study’s hypotheses in the general
population, a lack of temporal clarity in the relations between Therapist RF and the symptom
measures, and psychometric problems with the measure of attachment insecurity used. Each of
these will be discussed below.

Relatively low patient symptom levels in the present sample
In order to obtain information on the severity of the present sample’s symptom levels,
one-sample t-tests were used to compare each symptom measure’s mean score at baseline with
samples in the literature. The results of these tests appear in the following sections.
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BSI-EXT. Derogatis and Melisaratos’s (1983) validity study for the BSI included a
stratified random sample of non-patients (N = 685) as well as a sample of psychiatric outpatients
(N = 1,002). The BSI-EXT scores for Derogatis and Melisaratos’s non-patient sample (M = 0.34)
were significantly lower than the baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present study,
t(16) = 2.52, p = .02. However, the BSI-EXT scores for the psychiatric outpatient sample (M =
1.15) were significantly higher than the baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present
study, t(16) = -4.29, p < .001. More recently, Benbassat and Shulman (2016) reported the BSIEXT data for a non-treatment-seeking sample of Israeli young adults (N = 65). The BSI-EXT
scores for Benbassat and Shulman’s sample (M = 1.02) were significantly higher than the
baseline BSI-EXT scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -3.20, p = .005. Overall,
while BSI-EXT scores appear to vary substantially across samples and be sensitive to age and
cultural differences, evidence suggests that the present sample is less symptomatic than other
outpatient samples in the area of externalizing symptoms.
DERS. Gratz and Roemer’s (2004) validity study for the DERS used a non-clinical
sample of college undergraduates (N = 357). The DERS scores for Gratz and Roemer’s sample
(M = 78.65) were not significantly different from the baseline DERS scores of the sample in the
present study, t(16) = 1.31, p = .21. DERS scores for a treatment-seeking sample can be found in
Mennin, Fresco, Ritter, and Heimberg (2015), who reported DERS data for individuals in
outpatient treatment with a principal diagnosis of GAD (N = 21). The baseline DERS scores for
Mennin et al.’s sample (M = 91.79) were not significantly different from the baseline DERS
scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -0.84, p = .41. A sample with higher levels of
emotion dysregulation can be found in Haynos, Roberto, Martinez, Attia, and Fruzetti (2014),
who reported DERS data for individuals with anorexia nervosa both before (N = 65) and after (N
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= 51) inpatient admission for weight restoration. The DERS scores of Haynos et al.’s preadmission sample (M = 111.24) were significantly higher than the DERS scores of the sample in
the present study, t(16) = -4.02, p < .001. The same was true of the DERS scores of Haynos et
al.’s post-admission sample (M = 101.57), t(16) = -2.44, p = .03. Overall, the sample in the
present study appears to be comparable to non-inpatient samples in the area of emotion
dysregulation.
IPO-PER. Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Kernberg, and Foelsch’s (2001) validity study for the
IPO used a non-clinical sample of college undergraduates (N = 249). The IPO-PER scores for
Lenzenweger et al.’s sample (M = 87.93) were not significantly different from the baseline IPOPER scores of the sample in the present study, t(16) = -1.43, p = .17. A more clinical sample can
be found in Spitzer et al. (2006), who drew a sample of high dissociators (N = 51) from nonclinical, outpatient, and inpatient populations at a German university. The IPO-PER scores for
this sample (M = 102.9) were significantly higher than the baseline IPO-PER scores of the
sample in the present study, t(16) = -3.67, p = .002. Relatively few published studies have
reported descriptive statistics for the individual subscales of the version of the IPO developed by
Lenzenweger et al. (2001). However, the data that are available for the IPO subscales upon
which the IPO-PER is based (i.e., the Primitive Defenses and Identity Diffusion subscales)
suggest that the present sample has a level of personality pathology that is comparable to a nonclinical sample.
ECR-INS. Fraley, Hudson, Heffernan, and Segal (2015) provided descriptive data on the
ECR-RS from two large web-based samples (N = 2,399 for the first sample and N = 2,300 for the
second). Averaging across the four ECR-RS forms that were administered by Fraley et al. (2015)
to each sample—i.e., Mother Father, Partner, and Friend—the average attachment insecurity
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scores of those samples were 3.12 and 3.02, respectively. The first sample did not significantly
differ from the sample in the present study in terms of attachment insecurity, t(15) = -1.08, p =
.30. The same was true of the second sample, t(15) = -0.69, p = .50. However, caution should be
used in comparing the ECR-INS scores in the present study to the averages in the Fraley et al.
(2015) sample given that, in the present study, patients were able to choose the ECR-RS forms
they completed, and different patients chose to complete the ECR-RS for different sets of
individuals. Additionally, patients in the present study had the option of completing an ECR-RS
for their therapist. That being said, the ECR-INS scores in the present study suggest a level of
attachment insecurity that is comparable to that found in a general, non-clinical population.
The present sample’s relatively low levels of the symptoms assessed are notable as there
is evidence that patients’ RF scores are negatively related to the number and severity of their
symptoms. For example, in the area of depression, RF has been negatively related to Beck
Depression Inventory scores for patients with major depressive disorder (MDD; Ekeblad et al.,
2016); additionally, psychiatric inpatients with MDD (Fischer-Kern et al., 2013) have had
significantly lower RF scores than outpatients with chronic depression (Taubner, Kessler,
Buchheim, Kachele, & Staun, 2011). Also, RF has been negatively associated with frequency of
drug use (Stover & Kiselica, 2014), and, for borderline personality disorder, negatively
associated with patients’ likelihood of receiving the diagnosis (Fonagy et al., 1996) as well as the
symptom-related distress of those who have it (De Meulemeester et al., 2018). Taken together,
the above findings suggest that low symptom levels—such as those found in present sample—
should correlate with higher RF. If the patients in the present sample were relatively unimpaired
in terms of RF, this would be notable as a major pathway through which Therapist RF is
expected to lead to patients’ symptom reductions—i.e., through increases in patients’ RF—
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would be less relevant for individuals with unimpaired RF. It also should be noted that, among
the four symptom measures examined in this study, the one that Therapist RF would be theorized
to ameliorate most directly would be emotion dysregulation.8 Therapist RF would be expected to
affect the three other symptoms largely by increasing patient RF, which, as stated above, might
not be impaired in the present sample. Further exploration of this study’s hypotheses among
patients with higher levels of psychopathology is warranted.

Limited range of Therapist RF scores
It should be noted that a relatively limited range of Therapist RF scores (3.5 to 7.0) was
obtained from the PT-AAI-Rs in this study. These scores (M = 5.35, SD = 1.13) were
predominantly rated as “ordinary” (i.e., scale point 5.0) or better, with only 5 of the 17 PT-AAIRs receiving a lower score. In this vein, Diamond et al. (2003) reported Therapist RF scores for a
sample of 10 cases with experienced therapists (M = 5.75, SD = 1.53), and, notably, they
obtained only a slightly wider range of scores (3.0 to 8.0) than were found in the present study. It
is possible that the developmental studies that have produced some of the most compelling
findings for the importance of a caregiver’s RF have obtained wider ranges of RF scores, but
those studies have not reported ranges so this unknown. If that is the case, however, a sample
with a wider range of Therapist RF scores might be needed to observe significant relations
between Therapist RF and expected outcomes. That being said, it might not be feasible to obtain
a sample of patient-therapist dyads with a full range of Therapist RF scores; it is unlikely for a
therapist to score at the lower end of the RF scale—i.e., to have “absent” or “negative” RF for a

Higher levels of patient RF would be expected to increase the efficacy of a patient’s emotion regulation
strategies; however, Therapist RF is also expected to improve a patient’s emotion regulation directly,
without increases in patient RF as an intervening factor. This is described briefly above as well as in
Chapter II.
8
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patient. It is possible that the relations hypothesized in this study might remain stronger in theory
than they are in empirical research.

A lack of support for this study’s hypotheses in the general population
As mentioned above, there was a positive association between patients’ personality
pathology (IPO-PER) scores at baseline and Therapist RF at four months, though the significant
reductions in personality pathology scores between baseline and 12 months were not
significantly related to Therapist RF. An explanation for these findings, one that differs from this
study’s hypothesis that Therapist RF would be beneficial for patients with personality pathology,
is that Therapist RF was a response to high personality pathology because it helped therapists, or
certain therapists, in the context of patients’ personality pathology. (The potential benefits of
Therapist RF, for a therapist, when working with patients who have personality pathology are
described above.) However, in this alternative explanation, Therapist RF would primarily help
therapists and would not directly benefit patients with personality pathology. A similar
explanation could be given for patients’ externalizing symptoms (BSI-EXT) scores in this study.
Like patients’ personality pathology scores, patients’ externalizing symptoms scores decreased
from baseline to 12 months, but this change was not related to Therapist RF. And while there
was not a significant relation between Therapist RF and externalizing symptoms (while holding
the Time variable constant) in the tests for Hypothesis 1, there was a medium-sized correlation
between externalizing symptoms at baseline and Therapist RF at four months, though this
correlation was nonsignificant, r = .33, p = .20. Similar to the way Therapist RF at four months
seems to have been elevated in the context of elevated personality pathology at baseline, it might
have been elevated in the context of elevated externalizing symptoms at baseline, perhaps

123
because it was beneficial for therapists in that context. However, factors other than Therapist RF
would better explain patient changes in that symptom. It also should be noted, as it was above,
that the timing and limited number of the assessments in this study yields some uncertainty with
regard to the relations between Therapist RF and the various outcome measures. As such, the
explanation just given for the relation between Therapist RF and externalizing symptoms is not
the only possible interpretation of the data. This is discussed in greater detail below.
Emotion dysregulation (DERS) and attachment insecurity (ECR-INS) were more
treatment-resistant symptoms in this sample. Neither symptom significantly changed in the full
sample, and Therapist RF was not associated with the baseline score of either one. However, as
mentioned above, emotion dysregulation scores at baseline had a moderating effect: for patients
with high baseline scores, these scores improved more in the context of high Therapist RF than
they did in the context of low Therapist RF, but, for patients with low baseline scores, outcomes
did not depend on Therapist RF. In this way, the data appear to support this study’s second
hypothesis with regard to the relationship between Therapist RF and emotion dysregulation.
With regard to the nonsignificant results for attachment insecurity, one potential explanation
concerns the measure that was used to assess it in this study. This is described in greater detail
later in this chapter.
The paragraphs above offer some explanations for the null findings presented in Chapter
IV. A more global explanation for why, across symptoms, Therapist RF was not related to
patient improvements can be found in Fonagy et al. (2017a), who argue that the larger social
systems in which an individual operates are crucial in determining the ways of thinking and
acting that are adaptive for that individual. An implication of this is that, if an individual’s larger
environment remains hostile and threatening to their sense of subjectivity—and such a scenario
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is possible in cases in which an individual possesses a generally low capacity for mentalization—
the individual’s ways of navigating that environment might remain static even if a therapeutic
relationship attempts to facilitate different ways of thinking and acting. In this vein, a single
relationship (e.g., the therapy relationship), even if it is an attachment relationship, might be
insufficient to influence an individual’s capacity for mentalization across various contexts if that
capacity is being suppressed by the social systems in which the individual is embedded. In such a
scenario, the purported mechanism of change for Therapist RF—i.e., improvements in patient
mentalization—would break down. It is possible that the patients in the present study, in their
day to day lives, faced substantial resistance to changing their particular ways of thinking and
behaving. In terms of why two symptoms (i.e., externalizing symptoms and personality
pathology) did improve in the overall sample—just not in ways related to Therapist RF—it is
possible that nascent improvements in these areas were received positively by patients’ social
environments and reinforced, and that this was less the case for any nascent changes in the other
symptoms assessed (i.e., emotion dysregulation and attachment insecurity), which did not
significantly improve in the overall sample. However, this is a tentative hypothesis. Future
studies of Therapist RF ideally would obtain evidence with regard to the conditions in patients’
lives that could suppress the quality of their mentalization (e.g., chronic interpersonal conflict,
exposure to violence, scarcity of needed resources). Such studies also should include multiple
assessments of patient mentalization (RF) in order to assess how it changes in relation to both the
social conditions mentioned above as well as Therapist RF.

Lack of temporal clarity in relations between Therapist RF symptom measures
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To verify that Therapist RF is indeed not related to changes in the symptom measures in
this study, it would be important to assess changes in Therapist RF over time, and, more
specifically, to assess Therapist RF at the same time post-test measures are given to patients.
However, in this study’s design, the only measurement of Therapist RF was at the four-month
timepoint. Therapist RF might have changed between 4 and 12 months. As such, the nature of
the relationship between Therapist RF at 12 months and the symptom measures at that timepoint
is unknown. It is possible that Therapist RF at 12 months—or the difference between Therapist
RF at 4 months and 12 months—would be more closely related to patient outcomes than
Therapist RF assessed at 4 months was.
It also should be noted that, while the four-month timepoint was chosen for PT-AAI-R
administration in order to study Therapist RF’s relation to subsequent changes in patients’
symptom levels, Therapist RF at four months is not a predictor in a strict sense of the term. It
was measured after treatment had begun and four months after the baseline measures had been
administered. At that timepoint, Therapist RF already would have been affected by certain
aspects of the relationship. However, Therapist RF assessed at the very start of a treatment (e.g.,
at pre-treatment or the first treatment session) would not have been valid as the PT-AAI-R
requires the interviewee to have an accretion of experiences within the therapeutic relationship in
order to answer its questions.
Overall, the timing of the assessments in this study introduces some temporal uncertainty
into the findings, and this makes their interpretation difficult. Additionally, the reliance on just a
single measure of Therapist RF means it is unknown how changes in Therapist RF might have
related to changes in each of the symptoms. Specifically, based on the current data, it is unknown
whether changes in a particular symptom might have followed increases or decreases in the level
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of Therapist RF. Similarly, it is unknown whether changes in Therapist RF might have followed
increases or decreases in the level of a symptom. While Therapist RF cannot be manipulated
directly—and thus a true experimental design with Therapist RF is not possible—future studies
ideally would include multiple assessments of Therapist RF, as well as assessments of Therapist
RF that are contemporaneous with symptom assessments; such a design has the potential to
increase understanding of the relations between these constructs.

Psychometric problems with measurement of attachment insecurity used
As mentioned above, attachment security did not significantly change from baseline to 12
months for the patients in this study as a whole. Additionally, Therapist RF was not related to the
changes that did occur in this symptom. However, there were methodological issues with the
measurement of attachment insecurity in this study that might have contributed to the
nonsignificant findings with regard to this measure. The instrument available for the assessment
of attachment insecurity within The Psychological Center’s programmatic evaluation study was
the ECR-RS, which is designed to measure attachment insecurity on two separate scales (i.e.,
avoidance and anxiety) and measure it for specific relationships rather than generally. While the
lead author of the ECR-RS has outlined protocols both for averaging the ECR-RS’s scales and
for averaging items across relationships (Fraley, 2012, n.d.), neither protocol has been subject to
thorough validation procedures; additionally, the literature does not contain an example of
researchers using both protocols on the same data. It is possible that these protocols, each of
which was used in the creation of the present study’s measure of attachment insecurity (the ECRINS), introduced additional measurement error, and that this error obscured the relations between
attachment insecurity and other constructs of interest in the data. It is also notable that there was
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a large amount of missing ECR-RS data, which might have been a result of respondents
considering items for certain relationships to be “not applicable” to them if they did not have a
particular type of relationship at the time they completed the measure. Ultimately, the large
amount of missing data led to different relationships being dropped from the study’s analyses for
different patients—and ECR-INS scores that were combinations of different relationships for
different patients. This was another potential source of measurement error. Additionally, the
missing data prevented the calculation of internal consistency scores for the ECR-INS as not all
patients’ scores were derived from the same relationships. Overall, the ECR-INS has some
notable methodological problems that might have contributed to the nonsignificant results
obtained with this measure.
With regard to measures of attachment that might be used in future studies of Therapist
RF, a study by Klohnen, Weller, Luo, and Choe (2005) suggests that internal working models for
specific attachment relationships predict outcomes for those relationships, but more general
internal working models do not. However, evidence also suggests that an individual’s
relationship-specific internal working models are nested within their more global model of
attachment relationships, which explains the commonalities typically found across an
individual’s relationship-specific models (Collins, Guichard, Ford, & Feeney, 2004; Overall,
Fletcher, & Friesen, 2003). In light of this, improvements in an individual’s global model of
attachment—rather than changes in particular relationship-specific models—could be a more
impactful target of psychotherapeutic interventions.
In terms of the best way to assess an individual’s global model of attachment, different
self-report measures take somewhat different approaches. Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg (2003)
have argued that the evidence most strongly supports a two-factor model in which attachment
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avoidance and attachment anxiety describe separate dimensions of attachment insecurity, and the
absence of both describes attachment security. In this vein, a measure that assesses attachment
along these dimensions—the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR; Brennan, Clark, &
Shaver, 1998; Fraley et al., 2000)—has been a particularly popular self-report measure for
attachment researchers (Cameron, Finnegan, & Morry, 2012).9
However, other authors have presented evidence that suggests a somewhat different
model. Cameron et al. (2012), in a meta-analysis of (N = 32) studies with the revised ECR, found
a medium-to-large (r = .41) correlation between the attachment avoidance and attachment
anxiety dimensions. In this vein, Mannarini and Boffo (2014) found that much of the variance in
global models of attachment mapped onto a single latent dimension, and items pertaining to
attachment security were most prominent in describing this dimension. This finding dovetails
with an understanding that attachment security has unique benefits, and the construct of
attachment is not simply concerned with the absence of various type of insecurity—e.g.,
avoidance or anxiety (Lopez, 2019). As such, the ideal measure of an individual’s global model
of attachment should directly assess attachment security. One validated self-report measure that
does so is the Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Additionally, the
AAI might be utilized in future studies of Therapist RF to obtain a measure of patient RF; if so,
measures of attachment could be derived from AAI transcripts. (Of note, even if measures of
attachment security are obtained from AAI transcripts, it still would be prudent to assess
attachment via a second instrument to see if any significant relations between patient RF and
attachment security still hold when these constructs are assessed via different measures.) AAI

9

Note that the ECR and ECR-R obtain assessments of global attachment avoidance and global attachment
anxiety, and in this way differ from the ECR-RS which obtains relationship-specific assessment of those
dimensions.
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scoring procedures yield categorical assessments of attachment security as well as multiple
scales that have been associated with attachment security (see Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2008
for a review).

Intersubjective factors: Therapist RF as case dependent
The preceding sections in this chapter offer explanations, based on this study’s findings,
for how Therapist RF might operate across therapeutic dyads. However, those explanations are
based on aggregate data and concern groups of dyads rather than individual dyads. In addition to
group-level explanations, it is likely that the interplay of factors within a specific dyad
contributes to the therapist’s level of RF for that relationship. As such, this section concerns
intersubjective reasons why Therapist RF might be higher or lower for a particular dyad. The
idea that the expression and effect of RF—and Therapist RF, specifically—might be dependent
on the dyad in which it occurs has been raised by Fonagy and colleagues (e.g., Fonagy et al.,
1998) and by Diamond et al. (2003). This idea informs the present study’s hypotheses, which are
based on the notion that the effect of Therapist RF should depend on the patient in the room with
the therapist.
In their pilot study of the original PT-AAI (Diamond et al., 1999; George, Kaplan, &
Main, 1984, 1988, 1996), Diamond et al. (2003) found evidence suggesting that Therapist RF
might be influenced by specific attributes of the dyad in which it occurs. And, as was the case in
the present study, Diamond et al. found that some of the therapists who completed multiple PTAAIs in their study had divergent Therapist RF scores for their different cases. They also found
that, in successful treatments, the patient and therapist had levels of RF that were
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complementary; specifically, the therapist had a level of RF on the PT-AAI that was a couple of
scale points above the patient’s level on the interview.
The outcome of present study also has an implication with regard to the ideal level of
Therapist RF for a dyad—albeit a different implication. Specifically, the present study suggests
that patients who have high levels of emotion dysregulation have greater need for Therapist RF.
While this study and the one by Diamond et al. (2003) have different designs (Diamond et al.
assessed Therapist RF at 12 months rather than at 4 months; they also included a measure of
Patient RF whereas this study did not), both studies suggest that a patient’s presentation might
have bearing on the ideal level of Therapist RF for a dyad.
However, while therapists might have reason to adjust their level of Therapist RF for a
particular patient, factors related to the dyad might limit the level of RF a therapist is able to
obtain. For example, patients who are highly symptomatic in areas that reflect poor RF (e.g.,
emotion dysregulation) might pose special problems for some therapists in maintaining their
level of RF with regard to the therapeutic relationship. Additionally, Therapist RF might be
adversely influenced by countertransferential processes happening outside a therapist’s
awareness—or by other challenges brought by the pairing of a specific patient with a specific
therapist. For example, if the events unfolding in the patient’s life are unresolved aspects of the
therapist’s own life, therapy sessions might be prone to dysregulate the therapist or otherwise
constrict the therapist’s ability to have mental perspective on the therapy relationship.
The interplay between the attachment styles—or the defensive patterns—of the patient
and therapist might also have bearing on Therapist RF. Tyrrell, Dozier, Teague, and Fallot
(1999) administered AAIs to patients and therapists and rated those transcripts, via the Q-sort
method, along a general attachment-style dimension with dismissing/deactivating at one end and
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preoccupied/hyperactivating at the other. They found that complementarity (i.e., difference)
between a patient and their therapist along this dimension was associated with better working
alliance and better patient functioning than was concordance (i.e., sameness) along this
dimension. It is possible that, in the context of greater concordance between a therapist and
patient in attachment style or defensive structure, the therapist would have had less perspective
on the patient’s difficulties, and that a path for therapeutic change would be less visible to them.
This might contribute to a therapist feeling less efficacious and experiencing greater doubt
regarding the prospects of the treatment, which would influence their state of mind with respect
to their role as caregiver. One way to describe the relation between concordance,
complementarity, and RF would be that, when dyads are complementary rather than concordant
with respect to attachment, the therapist is less inclined to take the patient’s behavior “at face
value,” and more inclined to wonder about specific, intentional mental states behind the patient’s
behavior. In other words, the therapist is more likely to employ RF. However, it also should be
noted that excessive difference between the members of a therapeutic dyad poses its own
problems for a treatment (see Kantrowitz et al., 2016). Kantrowitz (2002) argues that poor
therapy matches are those in which the patient and therapist are either too similar or too
discrepant in areas such as personality and defensive patterns. The following section seeks to
further illustrate intersubjective factors such as these via a discussion of two PT-AAI-Rs
completed by the same therapist.

Qualitative analysis of two PT-AAI-Rs
The two PT-AAI-Rs that were completed by the same therapist but yielded discrepant
Therapist RF scores, initially described in Chapter IV, can be used to illustrate how a therapist’s
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capacity for RF might be restricted or facilitated within a particular therapeutic relationship. In
the first interview, this therapist had a relatively high Therapist RF score (6.5). They explicitly
considered the mental states underlying the patient’s behavior, and their responses included
many different indicators of RF (e.g., an awareness that mental states are susceptible to disguise).
Aside from this therapist having an underlying capacity for high RF, one explanation as to why
Therapist RF was relatively high for this case follows on the notion, described above, that
different patients pose different “needs” for Therapist RF. In this case, the patient had
particularly high levels of emotion dysregulation at baseline; her DERS score was 110, which is
nearly a full standard deviation above the mean of the present sample. (Note: the patient’s 12month score was 105; this is not a large improvement, but it is notable given that the average
DERS improvement in the sample was only 1.94 points.) Additionally, the therapist seemed to
have positive answers to all three of the caregiving postulates described by George and Solomon
(1996): “(1) willingness to respond, (2) effectiveness of caregiving strategies, and (3) ability to
read and understand [the patient’s] signals” (pp. 200–201). Specifically, they communicated a
strong desire to help the patient, a confidence that they could help the patient, and, overall, a
confidence in their ability to “read” the patient—as evidenced by their willingness to make
hypotheses about specific mental states in the patient. As such, it is likely that, for this patient,
the therapist had a Secure Base state of mind with respect to caregiving (George & Solomon,
1996). Chapter II includes evidence suggesting that the therapy relationship can have many of
the qualities of an attachment relationship, and, as such, the attachment and caregiving systems
are important ways of understanding what happens in a therapeutic dyad. A Secure Base state of
mind with respect to caregiving would be notable as, among the states of mind outlined by
George and Solomon (1996), it enables the most mental flexibility and the least defensive
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exclusion of information. As such, it would suggest high RF, and it is one way of understanding
the relatively high Therapist RF score in this interview. In a similar vein, neither the nature of
this patient’s symptoms nor the content of the sessions with her appeared to pose special
difficulty for the therapist by being too concordant with—or too divergent from—their own
psychic difficulties or life circumstances (see Kantrowitz, 2016); this, too, is a boon to the
therapist’s mental flexibility and facilitative of high RF.
In the second interview, the therapist had a relatively low level of Therapist RF (3.5),
though their response to one question demonstrated higher RF. In this interview, the therapist
was relatively avoidant of the mind of the patient. One possible explanation for this is that
specific factors related to the case might have prompted the therapist to wonder whether major
improvements in the patient’s mental functioning were beyond the scope of the treatment. This is
potentially indicated in statements such as “I wish I knew a bit more” and multiple statements
that the case was a “challenging” one. This, perhaps in conjunction with the therapist’s
inexperience, could have produced a caregiving strategy that was based on a negative answer to
the second caregiving postulate mentioned by George and Solomon (1996), “effectiveness of
caregiving strategies.” That, in turn, could have led to a negative answer to the first postulate,
“willingness to respond,” and resulted in a Rejecting state of mind for the therapist with respect
to this caregiving relationship. Notably, a Rejecting state of mind, according to George and
Solomon (1996), requires a caregiver to defensively exclude from awareness information
regarding the negative effects of their caregiving strategy. It therefore is a state of mind that
reduces RF.
Another explanation for the relatively low level of Therapist RF in the second interview
can be found in prior studies in which patients with Dismissing states of mind with respect to

134
attachment have evoked less empathic responses from therapists—with such patients, therapists
were more likely to respond with more cognitive interpretations and less likely to respond with
reflections of patients’ emotions; in effect, therapists were likely to intervene in ways that were
congruent with their patient’s attachment style (Hardy et al., 1999; Rubino, Barker, Roth, &
Fearon, 2000). A therapist who closely mirrors a patient’s Dismissing state of mind would likely
minimize or exclude from awareness attachment-related thoughts and feelings; as such, their
level of RF regarding the relationship would be reduced. Of note in this regard, it was mentioned
in Chapter II that it is beneficial for therapists to respond increasingly “out of style” (i.e., not in
line with the patient’s defensive structure or insecure attachment style) over the course of a
treatment in order to promote change in the patient. However, research suggests that the ability
to do so is a function of the therapist’s clinical experience and the security of their state of mind
with respect to the caregiving they provide as a therapist (Daly and Mallinckrodt, 2008; Holmes
& Slade, 2018; Slade, 2008). Homes and Slade (2018) argue that the latter is related to a
therapist’s comfort in their role, which stems from “deep, domain-specific knowledge” (Miller,
Hubble, Chow, & Seidel, 2013, p. 90). An implication of this is that a training therapist working
on their very first cases should be inconsistent in their ability to think and respond “out of style”;
as such, they would be expected to experience constraints in RF related to the patient’s defensive
structure or attachment style, which they would be attempting to mirror in order to provide
empathic responses. That being said, it should be noted that constraints in Therapist RF are not
limited to training therapists. In Diamond et al.’s (2003) study of RF within the therapeutic
relationship, a senior clinician had RF scores that ranged from 3.0 to 7.0 for the three PT-AAIs
they completed.
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Interestingly, from the standpoint of different cases posing a greater or lesser “need” for
RF, the second case posed a high need—the patient’s emotion dysregulation (DERS) score at
baseline was 125, which was more than 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. (Note: the
patient’s 12-month score was 149, so their symptoms in this area actually worsened.) As such,
this case should have posed a high demand for Therapist RF, though it appears to be the case that
RF was constrained due to other factors, perhaps those mentioned above. Notably, however, one
response in the interview featured a high level of Therapist RF. Indeed, the therapist seemed to
have a high capacity for Therapist RF, as demonstrated in the first PT-AAI-R they completed.
The high-RF response in this interview might speak to the therapist’s developing confidence in
their ability to be helpful to this patient. A possible avenue for the future development of this
case would be one in which the therapist shifts internally to more affirmative answers to the
“effectiveness of caregiving strategies” and “willingness to respond” postulates outlined by
George and Solomon (1996). This would result in a Secure Base state of mind with respect to
their caregiving that would be less likely to result in the defensive exclusion of information
regarding mental states within the dyad. Furthermore, it would have the potential to result in a
cyclical pattern of improvements in which the therapist’s increased comfort leads to fewer
constraints on RF and further effectiveness for this case.

Clinical implications of the present study
Several of this study’s quantitative and qualitative findings have implications for clinical
practice. One interesting finding, discussed in a different context above, is that the therapists in
the present study had a limited range of Therapist RF scores (3.5 to 7.0). This range is similar to
the range of Therapist RF scores obtained by Diamond et al. (2003) in their pilot study of the
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original PT-AAI (3.0 to 8.0). Notably, the therapists in Diamond et al.’s study conducted a
manualized treatment, Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP; Yeomans et al., 2015). The
therapists in the present study, on the other hand, generally used a mix of supportive and
expressive techniques that had been tailored to each patient. However, despite the heterogeneous
approaches to treatment used in the present study, all of the therapists mentalized to some extent.
In light of this, it might be considered how a variety of treatment techniques—even techniques
for which mentalization is not an explicit goal—can spur therapist mentalization. Some core
techniques of major treatments for borderline personality disorder (BPD) can be used to illustrate
this point. In Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), for example, the technique of
mindfulness entails a close, nonjudgmental attention to reality. When applied to internal stimuli,
mindfulness involves observing one’s thoughts and feelings in a manner akin to mentalization.
The therapist regularly demonstrates this skill for the patient, which entails the observation and
acceptance of one’s thoughts and feelings—and possibly exploring specific reasons for them—
but also suspending action on any impulses related to them. The precipitating event is then
jointly observed by the therapist and patient, who attempt to view it as objectively as possible
(i.e., how a judge in a court of law might view it), which frequently provides an alternate
perspective on the situation to take into consideration when planning action. This relates to
another core DBT technique—dialectics—which entails holding two conflicting viewpoints in
mind and simultaneously acknowledging that both contain some truth. While the mindfulness
and dialectical interventions in DBT were not designed with mentalization in mind, they require
a therapist’s mentalization in order to be implemented successfully.
Another approach to treating BPD—one mentioned above—is Transference Focused
Psychotherapy (TFP; Yeomans et al., 2015). While TFP and DBT are based on different
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theoretical orientations, TFP is similar to DBT in that it was not designed with mentalization in
mind. However, a core therapeutic technique of TFP—the interpretation of the object relations
dyads underlying patients’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (see Levy et al., 2006a)—requires a
high level of therapist mentalization. Specifically, these interpretations require the therapist to a)
think about what is happening in the “here and now” of the therapy relationship, b) consider the
“here and now” in light of the patient’s history, c) elucidate the mental representations of “self”
and “other” that inform what the patient is currently experiencing, and d) think about what is not
being expressed by the patient—about what, perhaps, they are protecting or defending against—
and explicitly integrate that into the interpretation. As the above illustrates, the process of
making an interpretation can require a high level of mentalization. In this respect, it is possible
that interpretations that require greater mentalization on the part of the therapist are more
effective in increasing patient mentalization—at least for patients with mentalization
impairments. Along these lines, Levy et al. (2006) found that TFP was more effective than both
DBT and Supportive Psychotherapy (SPT; Appelbaum, 2005) in increasing mentalization for
patients with borderline personality disorder. This is a topic worthy of further study.
As mentalization’s popularity as a clinical construct has increased, therapeutic techniques
designed with mentalization in mind have become more prevalent (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).
Mentioned in Chapter II, Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006) is a
manualized treatment that was developed for borderline personality disorder. MBT incorporates
a variety of techniques that explicitly call for the therapist to mentalize and model this capacity
for the patient. However, as the brief discussions of DBT and TFP above illustrate, treatments
with different focal points might still require therapist mentalization. Stated another way,
different treatments and techniques might stimulate therapist mentalization in different ways
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based on their underlying theories of patient change. As such, different types of therapist training
programs could be successful in developing therapists’ ability to mentalize. A potentially related
finding from the present study is that Therapist RF was not related to whether the patienttherapist dyads had been meeting once or twice a week at the time of the PT-AAI-R, nor was it
related to the cumulative number of sessions the dyads had completed in the four months prior to
the interview. One possible interpretation of this is that Therapist RF stabilizes quickly—at least
early in treatments. If so, this would underscore the notion that there are many different roads to
therapist mentalization, and these processes are not substantially derailed if one avenue or
another is not available in a limited number of therapy sessions.
However, while different types of therapist training programs could be successful in
developing therapists’ ability to mentalize, it is also possible that specific forms of therapist
mentalizing are particularly beneficial for patients—at least for certain outcomes. Fonagy et al.
(1998), in their manual for the RF Scale, identified many possible indicators of moderate-to-high
RF. These indicators, several of which are illustrated in the qualitative comparison in Chapter
IV, speak to somewhat different qualities of RF. Based on the results of this study’s hypothesis
tests, it is worth looking more closely at the aspects of Therapist RF that might have been
responsible for the improvements in emotion regulation experienced by patients who had high
levels of that symptom. These aspects of Therapist RF can be grouped into two broad categories
according to their general function.
1. Increased context for, integration of, and specificity of mental states. This category
includes mentalizing statements that a) link mental states with precipitating events or
other mental states, b) identify interactions or conflicts between mental states within a
single mind, c) identify interactions or conflicts between mental states in two or more
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persons, d) consider the historical context of a mental state—e.g., an individual’s
personal history or shared history with another person or group of persons, and e)
elaborate a mental state with new detail or support a mental state with new evidence.
Collectively, these types of mentalizing statements would serve a few overlapping
functions. (Note: a therapist might make one of these types of statements him- or herself,
or they might guide the patient to do so.) First, they would reinforce the patient’s
(perhaps only nascent) higher-order representation of the mental state through language
that meaningfully describes it and through linkages with higher-order representations of
other events and mental states. As outlined in Chapter II, this should contain the affects
under consideration and make them more amenable to cognitive reappraisal. Second, and
in a similar vein, mentalizing statements that increase the specificity of a particular
mental state should make additional aspects of the patient’s episodic memory conscious
and reduce the anxiety associated with mental content that is outside of awareness. As
mentioned above, research has suggested that specific memories are associated with less
arousal than more general ones are (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006). Finally, the
mentalizing statements described above should increase the integration of the patient’s
self-concept and the organization of their internal world. Through linking the mental state
under consideration with related affects and memories, the patient’s broader
representations of their life and self-concept should become more understandable and
meaningful. This would be expected to reduce baseline levels of anxiety and arousal.
2. Increased perspective on mental states. This category includes statements that a) reflect
an understanding that insight into mental states—others’ as well as one’s own—is
limited, b) consider that mental states are subject to disguise, and others’ thoughts and
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feelings about a situation might be divergent from observable aspects of it, c) consider
the defensive aspect of certain mental states and the possibility of unconscious
motivations, d) reflect an awareness that mental states are transient—i.e., that a thought
or feeling can, or already has, changed over time—even if the object of the thought has
not apparently changed, and e) reflect an awareness that mental states differ from
concrete reality. Collectively, these types of mentalizing statements from a therapist
would offer some perspective on mental states by introducing the idea that they are
fallible as well as the idea that they are not synonymous with reality or with the self. It
should be noted, however, that this type of perspective on mental states is not the same as
mental “distance.” (Distance implies avoidance, and it is associated with generality rather
than specificity.) Viewing particular mental states as not synonymous with the self
bridges connections between disparate mental states and fosters the integration of the
patient’s self-concept. Viewing mental states as not synonymous with reality allows the
patient to tolerate, observe, and think about mental states without fearing that they might
destroy the self or the other.
The mentalizing statements in the two categories above can also foster emotion regulation in
conjunction with each other. For example, mentalizing statements that consider the interactions
of mental states within a single mind, and mentalizing statements that recognize unconscious
motivations and limitations on insight into mental states, are both related to the intentional
stance. If the patient can accept motivations that are complicated, ambiguous, or not apparent at
the moment, then their understanding of themselves and others is more likely to remain
cohesive—and they are more likely to maintain ideas of autonomy and responsibility—in the
face of confusing or incomplete information. A therapist modeling this type of thinking for a
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patient would be expected to reduce the patient’s baseline levels of anxiety and arousal. This can
be linked with the developmental literature as Fonagy et al. (1995) have argued that a parent’s
modeling of the intentional stance is particularly critical in the facilitation of a child’s
mentalization.
The sections above delineate some mechanisms through which Therapist RF might
ameliorate emotion dysregulation for patients with high levels of that symptom. In this context, it
is worth considering some implications of high emotion dysregulation. Specifically, emotion
dysregulation is regarded as a hallmark of personality pathology, and it is at the center of several
different treatments for personality pathology (e.g., Clarkin & Levy, 2006; Lecours et al., 2013).
While, in the present study, patients’ scores on the measure of personality pathology, the IPOPER, were comparable to scores that had been obtained for a non-clinical sample (Lenzenweger
et al., 2001) and significantly lower than scores that had been obtained for a clinical sample
(Spitzer et al., 2006), patients’ scores on the measure of emotion dysregulation, the DERS, were
comparable to scores that had been obtained for an outpatient, treatment-seeking sample
(Mennin et al., 2015). (Note the DERS was the only symptom measure in the present study for
which this was the case—the other measures had scores that were significantly lower than those
that had been obtained for treatment-seeking samples.) As such, the DERS was possibly a more
sensitive measure to features of personality pathology than the IPO-PER was in the present
sample. In this vein, it also should be noted that the six subscales of the DERS do not strictly
concern emotion dysregulation. These subscales are the following: nonacceptance of emotional
responses, difficulties in engaging in goal-directed behavior in the context of negative emotions,
impulse control difficulties, lack of emotional awareness, limited access to emotion-regulation
strategies, and lack of emotional clarity. Notably, impulse control difficulties—alongside
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emotion dysregulation—is viewed as one of the defining features of borderline personality
disorder; according to Clarkin and Levy (2006), “impulsivity and negative affectivity/emotional
dysregulation are the two core personality traits that characterize much of the phenotypic
variation seen in BPD” (p. 407). Additionally, several of the DERS subscales—e.g., limited
access to emotion-regulation strategies, lack of emotional clarity—overlap with the criteria
specified in the Alternative Model for Personality Disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).10 This
lends further support to the notion that, in the present study, patients’ DERS scores were a proxy
for modest levels of personality pathology, and DERS decreases were potentially meaningful
indicators of reductions in personality pathology as well as emotion dysregulation.
A final point with regard to the relationship between therapist mentalization and emotion
dysregulation is that there are different forms of emotion dysregulation, and the form being
experienced by a patient might have bearing on the effectiveness of therapist mentalization at
that juncture. For example, it has been noted that patients with features of borderline personality
most often utilize hyperactivation—i.e., attachment-seeking—strategies to manage internal and
interpersonal stress (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). Such strategies can result in dysregulated states
with elevated affects. In such a context, emotion regulation that occurs via therapist
mentalization should lead to the downregulation of affect for the patient. However, in other
situations, a patient might use deactivation—i.e., attachment-avoidant—strategies to manage
internal and interpersonal stress. Such strategies for dysregulation would be associated with the
suppression of affects, at least initially. The patient might appear untroubled to the therapist;

10

The Alternative Model was designed to address the degree to which, in the current taxonomy, some
individuals receive several personality disorder diagnoses—i.e., the criteria overlap—as well as the
degree to which many individuals with disordered personality do not meet the criteria for any diagnosis—
i.e., the criteria are difficult to satisfy.
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alternately, they might seem “off” (e.g., deliver a troubling story in a deadpan way) but be
subjectively unaware of anything amiss (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013). While it is possible that
emotion regulation via therapist mentalization might lead to the upregulation of conscious affects
for this patient, it is often the case that a high level of therapist mentalization would be a less
appropriate technique in such a scenario. A patient whose affect is absent from the content of
their speech may be operating in a “pretend mode” in which mental content has been decoupled
from underlying affects (see Bateman & Fonagy, 2013; Black, 2019). A therapist’s mentalizing
with a patient who is functioning in pretend mode might promote pseudo-mentalization in the
patient—e.g., hypermentalization (Fonagy et al., 1998). This would not help the patient to
mentalize the original source of the dysregulation. In such cases, behavioral activation or a more
emotion-focused technique might be a more efficacious intervention.
While it is possible that one aspect of therapist mentalization is knowing when to
mentalize explicitly with a patient and when to adopt other strategies, there might be times when
mentalization is simply not the best course action for a therapist—or a patient. The level of
Therapist RF that would be most efficacious might fluctuate throughout a treatment. This is one
explanation for why, in the full sample of cases in this study, Therapist RF did not have a linear
relationship with improvements in any symptom—even emotion dysregulation. However,
Therapist RF was related to improvements in emotion dysregulation for patients with high levels
of that symptom at baseline. It is possible that such patients frequently experienced dysregulated
states with elevated affects, and high levels of Therapist RF were beneficial for those affect
states. Notably, these patients might have been more likely to endorse DERS items than patients
who more often used deactivating strategies; the latter group might have been less aware of their
dysregulation (Bateman & Fonagy, 2013).
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Limitations of the present study and directions for future research
The present study was a preliminary study of Therapist RF, a construct that, to date, has
received relatively little attention. However, there were several limitations to the study, and these
have bearing on the results and inform directions for future research. These limitations can be
divided into sample-related limitations and design-related limitations.

Sample-related limitations
This study was conducted at a training clinic in which each training therapist carried a
relatively limited number of patients and patient turnover was limited. Therefore, a higher N was
sought but ultimately not obtained. This resulted in perhaps the most important limitation of the
present study—the small sample size. While this study used a significance level of .1 in order to
reduce the probability of Type II errors, the tests for this study’s second hypothesis (i.e., the tests
of the moderating effect of baseline symptom level) were clearly underpowered. While all results
in the present study should be viewed as tentative pending future research, the results of the tests
for the second hypothesis should be viewed as particularly subject to change.
The limited pool of potential participants also had another unfortunate consequence.
Specifically, it prevented the use of inclusion criteria based on baseline symptom levels. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, low RF has been associated with patients with higher levels of
pathology. However, the patients in the present study had relatively low symptom levels. They
were admitted to The Psychological Center as appropriate training cases for student therapists—
many of whom were at the start of their doctoral training—and suitable for a clinic without 24hour backup. So, even though the symptoms examined in this study were ones that have been
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linked with RF either empirically or theoretically, not all of the patients in this study were
symptomatic in these areas. Therapist RF is likely less salient for these patients. Another samplesize-related consideration is that, while it is possible that studies of Therapist RF will reliably
yield limited ranges of scores, a larger sample of therapists might have yielded scores closer to
the endpoints of the RF scale. A wider range of scores might offer a more complete picture of the
influence of Therapist RF.
It also should be noted that the therapist sample—i.e., beginner therapists, many of whom
were treating their first or second adult patient—limits the generalizability of the findings. And
while one year of treatment has been a reasonable timeframe for the assessment of change in this
study’s outcome measures (see Clarkin et al., 2007; Steele, Steele, & Murphy, 2009), it might
not have been a reasonable timeframe for the present sample due to the beginner status of the
therapists. A further consideration is that the treatments in this study were tailored to each
patient, and different patients received somewhat different interventions. As a result of this
heterogeneity, the findings in this study cannot be associated with specific therapeutic
techniques. While Fonagy and colleagues have argued that mentalizing is a common factor in
psychotherapy whether or not it is an explicit focus of the therapist (Allen et al., 2008), it is
possible that a different sample taken from the same population would have yielded cases with
somewhat different techniques on average—and yielded different results.

Design-related limitations
This study had a limited timeframe, and it is unknown whether additional significant
relations between Therapist RF and the outcome measures would have been found after the first
year of therapy; it also is unknown how the significant relations that were found in the first year
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subsequently changed. Outcome assessments after the first year would have been illuminating.
Additionally, it would have been beneficial to have included additional measures of both
Therapist RF and the outcome measures within the first year of treatment to see how the
relationships between them changed over time. At present, it is unknown how Therapist RF
might develop over time in response to a patient’s presentation—if it is relatively static or more
dynamic. While Therapist RF was assessed at four months to assess subsequent changes in
patients’ symptoms—and, as mentioned above, it was not desirable to assess it sooner—the
symptom measures were assessed at different timepoints (i.e., baseline and 12 months). As such,
there is a lack of temporal clarity in the relations between Therapist RF and the symptom
measures. For example, we do not know how an assessment of Therapist RF at 12 months would
have related to symptoms assessed at that time.
A challenge to additional PT-AAI-R administrations would be the length of the
interview—most administrations were over 90 minutes. In this study, a requirement of additional
PT-AAI-R administrations would have placed a large burden on the therapists who were
interviewed as well as the transcribers and RF raters. However, the potential of a shorter
interview, which this study illustrated, makes multiple administrations more feasible for all
involved. A caveat to this is it seems it would be beneficial to include some of the questions from
the second half of the PT-AAI-R—questions that are explicitly designed to assess a therapist’s
caregiving system. The caregiving system should have been elicited for therapists when they
answered the PT-AAI-R questions scored for this study; however, it is possible that questions
specifically designed to activate the caregiving system would have yielded more robust
information regarding Therapist RF. That being said, the re-instatement of any questions must be
weighed against the cost of doing so in terms of the feasibility of a study.

147
Another design limitation that should be mentioned is the omission of measures of patient
RF. It is unclear if patient RF changed during the treatments in this study, and if any such
changes were related to Therapist RF. In the present study, it would have been beneficial to
know where the proposed model of change “broke down”—i.e., whether Therapist RF was
unrelated to change in patient RF, or if it was related to change in patient RF but patient RF was
unrelated to change in the other symptom measures. Additionally, the general level of RF with
which the patients began treatment is unknown. If the patients in this study had, on average,
higher RF scores than the patients in other published studies, they might have presented less of a
need for high Therapist RF.
It also should be noted that the present study exclusively used self-report measures to
assess patient outcomes. Self-report measures offer several advantages, such as ease of
administration and access to information that only the respondent might have (Stone, Bachrach,
Jobe, Kurtzman, & Cain, 1999). However, self-report measures are prone to biased responses,
such as those related to social desirability (van de Mortel, 2008). In this vein, less-desirable
characteristics may be under reported (Bauhoff, 2011). Additionally, a participant’s frame of
reference for a particular outcome might change after an intervention (Rosenman, Tennekoon, &
Hill, 2011). In the present study, the degree to which patients accurately reported symptoms—or
reported them in the same way across timepoints—is unknown. Ideally, outcomes would have
been assessed through a combination of clinician-report, patient-report, and structured-interviewor lab-based measures. This would have increased the validity of the results.
Also of note, it was considered important to include a measure of attachment insecurity
among the outcome measures in this study as RF has been linked to attachment security.
However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the attachment instrument available for use in this
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study, the ECR-RS, was not designed to measure respondents’ general (i.e., across-relationship)
attachment insecurity; rather, it was designed to measure attachment avoidance and attachment
anxiety in specific relationships. The measure of attachment insecurity created for this study, the
ECR-INS, followed two separate protocols outlined by the authors of the ECR-RS: one for
combining its avoidance and anxiety subscales, and another for combining scores across the
relationships assessed (Fraley, 2012, n.d.). However, as mentioned above, neither of these
protocols was thoroughly validated and it is possible that each introduced additional
measurement error. Additionally, the large amount of missing ECR-RS data resulted in ECR-INS
scores that were averages of different relationships for different participants; this too might have
introduced additional measurement error. As such, there is some uncertainty in this study’s
findings with regard to the relation between Therapist RF and patients’ attachment insecurity,
and the use of the ECR-RS to obtain a measure of general attachment insecurity should be
considered a design-related limitation of this study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the
Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)—and the AAI’s assessments of
attachment security (see Main, Hesse, & Goldwyn, 2008 for a review)—would be more
appropriate measures for the assessment of attachment insecurity in future studies.
In a similar vein, it should be noted that the measure of externalizing symptoms used in
the present study, the BSI-EXT, was created by combining the hostility and paranoid ideation
subscales of the BSI. While there is precedent for this procedure (i.e., Benbassat & Shulman,
2016), the BSI-EXT has not been validated as a measure of externalizing symptoms.
Additionally, even after the three BSI-EXT items that had the weakest correlation with the total
score were removed from the measure, Cronbach’s alpha estimates of the BSI-EXT items at the
12-month timepoint were only .67–.69 across imputed data sets. In psychological research, the
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most widely used threshold for acceptable internal consistency is a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of
.70 (Cho & Kim, 2015; Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006). While published studies have sometimes
utilized measures with Cronbach’s alpha estimates below .70 (Peterson, 1994), and acceptable
internal consistency should reflect factors such as the stage of the research and the number of
items in the measure (Cho & Kim, 2015; Cortina, 1993), the range of alpha estimates obtained
for the BSI-EXT at the 12-month timepoint represent less-than-desirable reliability for a measure
meant to assess a single factor (Cortina, 1993). This calls into question whether the items
included in the BSI-EXT all assessed the same construct—i.e., externalizing symptoms. It also
indicates a greater-than-desirable amount of error variance for the measure, and a somewhat
reduced likelihood that hypothesis tests using this measure would detect relationships between
externalizing symptoms and other constructs of interest in the data. As such, this study’s use of
the BSI is another design-related limitation.

Future research
Future studies of Therapist RF should be adequately powered for the effect sizes found in
the present study, some of which were in the small to medium range. Additionally, the patient
sample in future studies should include a proportion of individuals with higher baseline levels of
the outcomes in this study: externalizing symptoms, emotion dysregulation, personality
pathology, and attachment insecurity. It also would be beneficial to employ a more
representative sample of therapists.
In terms of design, future studies of Therapist RF should include at least one but ideally
two administrations of the PT-AAI-R or the AAI to patients, for a measure of patient RF, which
might be a mediator of the effects of Therapist RF. Additionally, future studies should assess
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Therapist RF and the outcome measures more frequently to make possible a time series analysis
of these constructs. The administration of an abridged PT-AAI-R would be more efficient than
the administration of the full interview. However, when interviewing therapists, it might be
beneficial to add a small number of the PT-AAI-R questions specifically designed to assess the
caregiving system. Additionally, multiple methods of assessing patient outcomes should be
employed to account for the possibility of bias in self-reported outcomes, and to increase the
validity of results. Further, given the drawbacks of the BSI-EXT and ECR-INS elucidated above,
these measures are not recommended for use in future studies as assessments of externalizing
symptoms and general attachment insecurity, respectively. Rather, future studies should use
measures that have undergone thorough validity tests as assessments of these specific constructs.
Finally, follow-up assessments after one year of treatment should be administered to obtain data
on the relations between Therapist RF and patient symptoms over a longer timeframe.
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APPENDIX
PATIENT-THERAPIST ADULT ATTACHMENT INTERVIEW—REVISED (PT-AAI-R)
(George, Kaplan & Main, 1998; Diamond, Clarkin, Levy, Levine, Kotov, & Palumbo, 2016)
Introduction: In this interview, I'll be asking you about your relationship with your
patient/current individual therapist. I ask that you speak freely during the course of this
interview. The interview should take about 60–90 minutes.
1a. Patient: Have you been in therapy before, either at The Psychological Center or elsewhere?
How long did that (those) treatment(s) last? How often did you see that (those) therapist(s)?
When did you first start seeing your current therapist? How frequently have you seen him/her?
Has the therapy been continuous? Have there been any other treaters involved?
1b. Therapist: How long have you been seeing adult patients at The Psychological Center? How
long have you been seeing child patients? How many adult patients have you seen at The
Psychological Center? Did you conduct therapy prior to your time at The Psychological Center?
If so, how long have you been seeing patients overall? Approximately how many patients have
you seen overall? When did you first start seeing the patient whose treatment we will be
discussing today? How frequently have you seen him/her? Has the therapy been continuous?
Have there been any other treaters involved?
2. I'd like you to try to describe your relationship with your therapist/patient, going back to the
beginning.
3. Now I'd like to ask you to choose five adjectives or words that reflect your relationship with
your therapist/patient. Then afterwards I'll ask you why you chose them. I'll write each one down
as you give them to me.
OK, let me go through some questions about your description. You say your relationship with
him/her is ___________. Are there any memories or incidents that come to mind with respect to
___________? (If you do not get a vivid incident, reiterate the question and press more firmly
for a specific example. After two tries, go on to the next word. Continue this for all 5 adjectives.
Examples of probes are: Well, can you think of a specific memory that would illustrate how your
relationship is (...)? Well, that's a good general description, but I'm wondering if there was a
particular time that happened, that made you think about it as (...)? If the subject cannot succeed,
you might continue by saying, well, that's fine, let's take the next one then.)
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4a. Patient: How close do you feel to this therapist? How does this compare to the way you feel
about other therapists you’ve had?
4b. Therapist: How close do you feel to this patient? How does this compare to the way you feel
about other patients?
5a. Patient: When you have been upset emotionally in sessions with your therapist, what have
you done? Can you think of a specific time that you were upset emotionally in a session? How
did you manage it? (If subject doesn't spontaneously bring up therapist's reactions, probe: How
did your therapist respond?)
5b. Therapist: When your patient been upset emotionally in sessions with you, how has he/she
expressed it? Can you think of a specific time that he/she was upset emotionally? How did you
react?
Have you been upset emotionally while treating this patient? Can you think of a specific time
that that happened? How did you manage it? How did the patient react?
6a. Patient: Have you been hurt physically since you’ve been in treatment? Again, do any
specific incidents come to mind? (If subject doesn't spontaneously bring up therapist's reactions,
probe: How did your therapist respond?)
6b. Therapist: Has your patient been hurt physically since he/she has been in treatment? Do any
specific incidents come to mind? How did you react?
Have you been hurt physically since beginning treatment with this patient? Can you think of a
specific time that you were hurt? How did you manage it? How did the patient react?
7a. Patient: Have you been ill since you’ve been in treatment? Do any specific incidents come to
mind? Do you remember how your therapist responded?
7b. Therapist: Has the patient been ill since he/she has been in treatment? Do any specific
incidents come to mind? How did you respond?
Have you been ill since beginning treatment with this patient? Can you think of a specific time
that you were ill? How did you manage it? How did the patient react?
8. What is the first time you remember being separated from your therapist/patient? (Or, if early
in the treatment: Have you had any separations from your therapist/patient?) Here I am thinking
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about separations other than normal breaks between sessions—for example, vacations, holidays,
and cancellations by you or the therapist/patient. What was the reason for this separation? How
did you respond? How did the therapist/patient respond?
Are there other separations that stand out in your mind?
What are separations from your therapist/patient like for you?
9. Have you felt rejected by your therapist/patient? How have you managed those feelings at
such times? Are there any particular instances that stand out in your mind? Why do you think
your therapist/patient did those things? Do you think he/she realized he/she was rejecting?
10a. Patient: Have you been unusually frightened or worried since you’ve been in treatment?
What have you done at such times? How has your therapist responded to your feelings of fear or
worry during the course of your treatment? Do any specific incidents come to mind?
10b. Therapist: Has the patient been unusually frightened or worried since he/she has been in
treatment? Can you think of a specific time that that happened? How did you react?
Have you been unusually frightened or worried since beginning treatment with this patient? Can
you think of a specific time that you were unusually frightened or worried? How did you manage
it? How did the patient react?
11. Has your therapist/patient ever been threatening with you in any way, even jokingly? (Probe
for threats, silent treatment, and abuse.) When did this occur? Did it happen frequently? How did
you respond? How did the therapist/patient respond?
12. In the course of the treatment, have you ever worried that your therapist/patient would end
the treatment?
13. (If early in the treatment, interviewer can preface the following question by saying, “I realize
you just started with your therapist patient, but . . .”) In general, how do you think your overall
experiences with this therapist/patient have affected your personality/who you are now?
(Possible probe: Are there any aspects to this relationship that you feel have been a setback for
your development?)
14a. Patient: Have you experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since you’ve
been in treatment? How did your therapist respond?
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Have you experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially traumatic
since you’ve been in treatment? (Possible clarification: I mean any experience that was
overwhelmingly and immediately terrifying.) How did your therapist respond?
14b. Therapist: Has the patient experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since
he/she has been in treatment? How did you react?
Has the patient experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially
traumatic since he/she has been in treatment? How did you react?
Have you experienced the loss of a parent or other close loved one since beginning treatment
with this patient? How did you manage it? How did the patient react?
Have you experienced other difficult experiences that you would regard as potentially traumatic
since beginning treatment with this patient? How did you manage it? How did the patient react?
15. Why do you think your therapist/patient behaves the way he/she does as a therapist/patient?
16. Have there been many changes (or, if early in the treatment, “any changes”) in your
relationship with your therapist/patient since you have begun treatment? (Probe: Have your
feelings for your therapist/patient changed over the course of the treatment?)
17. (If early in the treatment, interviewer can preface the following question by saying, “Again, I
realize you just started with your therapist/patient, but . . .”) Is there any particular thing, which
you feel you learned above all from this therapy relationship? I'm thinking here of something you
feel you may have gained from the experience.
Optional questions for therapist:
18. If you had three wishes for your patient several years from now, what would they be? I'm
thinking partly of the kind of future you would like to see for him/her.
19. What would you hope your patient might have learned from his/her experiences of being
treated by you?
Questions 1-19 are adapted from the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main,
1996).
Additional Questions for Both Patient and Therapist:
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20. Has the therapist/patient been able to tolerate views of him/herself that are very different
from his/her own views? Could you tell me more about that? (Probe: Could you give a specific
example of a time when that happened?)
21. Has the therapist/patient made observations about you that you felt were accurate and that
you could incorporate into your understanding of the therapist/patient?
22a. Patient: How effective would you say your therapist is? Could you tell me more about that?
[Try to ascertain why the patient is assessing the therapist’s effectiveness in the way that he/she
is.]
22b. Therapist: How effective would you say you are as a therapist? Could you tell me more
about that? [Try to ascertain why the therapist is assessing his/her effectiveness in the way that
he/she is.]
23a. Patient: How motivated are you to be in this treatment?
How motivated do you think the therapist is to treat you?
23b. Therapist: How motivated do you think the patient is to be in this treatment?
What is your level of motivation to treat this patient?
24a. Patient: How effective, do you think, are the therapeutic techniques that your therapist is
using to help you? What techniques have been effective? (Probe, if not addressed in response:
What makes these techniques effective?)
24b. Therapist: How effective, do you think, are the therapeutic techniques that you are using to
help your patient? What techniques have been effective for this patient? (Probe, if not addressed
in response: What makes these techniques effective?)
25a. Patient: In what ways do you depend on your therapist to help you? Why these ways and not
others? To what extent do you see yourself as a person deserving of help?
25b. Therapist: In what ways does your patient depend on you for help? Why these ways and not
others? To what extent do you see yourself as someone who can help this patient?
26a. Patient: Have you ever felt helpless or overwhelmed by this treatment or your therapist?
Have you ever imagined terminating?
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26b. Therapist: Have you ever felt helpless or overwhelmed by this treatment or the patient?
Have you ever imagined terminating?
27a. Patient: How well does your therapist read or understand you? How attuned is he/she to
you?
27b. Therapist: How well do you read or understand your patient? How attuned are you to
him/her?
How well do you think your patient reads or understands you?
28. To what extent has there been an honest meeting of the minds in your relationship with this
therapist/patient?
29. Therapists/patients often notice similarities between themselves and their patients/therapists.
How do you think the patient/therapist is like you? How have these similarities influenced your
relationship with him/her?
30. How do you think the therapist/patient is unlike you? How have these differences influenced
your relationship with him/her?
31. How do you think your therapist/patient feels about you? How do you feel about your
therapist/patient?
32. If you met this therapist/patient in ordinary life would you want to be his/her friend?
33. Do you think of your therapist/patient outside of the therapy? How often and in what ways?
34. Do you imagine having a different kind of relationship with this therapist/patient outside of
the therapy situation? What kind of relationship? (Probe: Could you tell me a bit more about
that?)
35. Does the therapist/patient remind you of any particular person in your life (Probe: in your
family, friendship network, etc.)? Can you say more about your relationship with that person?
36. When negative feelings (such as anger, envy, and hostility) come up when you are with the
therapist/patient, in what ways do you manage them? Why do you think you have you managed
them in those ways? In what ways has your therapist/patient responded? Why do you think
he/she has responded in those ways? Are there any particular instances that stand out in your
mind?
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37. Is there anything I haven’t asked you about that would help me to understand your
relationship with the therapist/patient?
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